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Summary 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to present the Bolsa Familia, the most recent 
and well-known Brazilian experience in the field of Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) 
programmes, and to study some of its impacts on school attendance and occupational 
choices for children. Given its design, it is expected that children from families 
participating in the programme are enrolled in school and have frequent attendance to 
classes, but how strong are the conditions imposed on those families? Are the rules 
sufficient to change the beneficiary families’ behaviour towards their children’s time 
allocation? The low level of schooling is pointed out as a decisive factor in the 
persistence of poverty among the lower income classes of Brazilian society and in the 
past decade a large amount of resources has been invested as an attempt to improve 
educational outcomes, and, consequently, people’s living conditions. 
CCTs have been very popular in Latin America and other developing areas of the world 
in the past few decades. Even though these programmes’ design and implementation can 
vary substantially from country to country, in all of them a benefit is given in cash to the 
targeted population, who, in their turn, have to comply with several conditions which 
aim to improve their life standards permanently. The Bolsa Familia was created in 2003 
and since then the programme has been extended considerably, both in terms of families 
and areas covered and in terms of the amount of benefits transferred. Currently, families 
are considered eligible if their monthly per capita income is lower than R$140 (US$84 / 
NOK 469). The total benefits received by selected households can vary from R$32 
(US$19 / NOK 107) up to R$306 (US$183 / NOK 1,025), and the amount is transferred 
directly to the households, which are not required to disclose how they spent it. The 
families are required, however, to ensure that all children between 6 and 15 years old 
are enrolled in school and that they fulfil a minimum attendance requirement (85% for 
children between 6 and 15 years old and 75% for adolescents between 15 and 17 years 
old). In addition, pregnant women have to follow the pre-natal care schedule with the 
health centres, and children under 7 years old should have their vaccination schedule up 
to date and their physical development monitored. While the cash transfers aim to 
reduce poverty in the short run by immediately increasing family disposable income, the 
conditions imposed are an attempt to improve the prospects for future generations and 
thereby break the poverty cycle.  
The increase in the number of beneficiary families and amounts transferred has been 
shown to have positive effects on both poverty and inequality. Soares (2012) estimates 
that from 1999 to 2009, poverty in Brazil fell from 26% to 14% of the population, while 
extreme poverty decreased from 10% to 5%. He also points to a reduction of 16–21% in 
inequality, depending on the methodology used. Thus, it appears clear that the short-run 
objectives of the programme are being achieved. However, great emphasis is also given 
to the conditions imposed by the Bolsa Familia, as they are used to alleviate welfare 
dependence and to justify a long-run approach to development. If the improvement of 
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nutritional, health, and educational outcomes for children from poor households is 
reflected in their wages as adults through increased productivity, then one might hope 
that these individuals and their families would not need cash transfers in the future to 
keep themselves above the poverty line. 
The impact of the programme on some of these outcomes is still controversial, however. 
If we consider the effect on educational outcomes, for example, some earlier studies 
failed to find a significant effect of Bolsa Familia on school enrolment and attendance. 
More recently, various approaches have been used to estimate the different impacts, and 
researchers typically find small but significant programme effects. In order to have a 
better understanding of the choices made by the families (or individuals) regarding 
schooling, it is also important to consider children’s and adolescents’ participation in 
labour market activities. Premature engagement in market activities is usually 
associated with low educational attainment and regarded as an important factor 
contributing to the transmission of poverty across generations. In Brazil, the labour 
force participation rate for children and adolescents is very high, exceeding the 
participation registered in other parts of Latin America and elsewhere. 
During the 1990s, many macroeconomic and institutional reforms took place in Brazil, 
such as monetary stabilisation, trade liberalisation, privatisations, expansion of credit 
(for both consumers and corporations), and increase of expenditure on social policies. 
These reforms, combined with favourable conditions in the international market, led to 
the high economic growth registered recently (Souza (2012)). The prosperous economic 
environment could also be noticed in terms of an increase in the general level of 
consumption and changes in the labour market. The household survey PNAD, conducted 
on a yearly basis by the national statistics bureau IBGE, provides data on education, 
labour market, and income variables, which can be used to better understand the 
evolution over the past few years of the variables studied in this dissertation. My own 
calculations based on IBGE’s data reveal that from 1993 to 2009, the labour force 
participation rate decreased from 22.8% to 9.7% for children between 10 and 14 years 
old and from 57.3% to 40.7% for adolescents between 15 and 17 years old. In addition, 
the fraction of 10- to 14-year-old children reported as full-time students increased from 
70% in 1993 to 88.7% in 2009. The percentage of children in that age range who were 
studying and active in the labour market fell from 18.2% to 8% over the same period. As 
for the 15- to 17-year-olds, the percentage of individuals only studying went from 31.8% 
to 62.9% between 1993 and 2009, while those who were economically active and out of 
school decreased from 26.6% to 8.4%. For the older age group, the percentage of 
individuals combining school and labour market activities did not present expressive 
fluctuations (remaining around 30%), so it appears clear that over the years more 
people in this age bracket became economically inactive and started to dedicate their 
time fully to school. 
Even though the aggregate data provide a good indication of the general changes in 
schooling and market participation recorded over the years, it is not possible to isolate 
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the effects of the Bolsa Familia in this setting. Therefore, using microdata from the 
PNAD, the effects on school attendance and children’s time allocation for individuals 
between 10 and 15 years old are estimated using STATA. As a starting point, I estimate 
the impact of Bolsa Familia on school attendance only using a linear probability model, a 
logit model, and propensity score matching. Overall, the coefficients estimated are 
statistically significant and consistent across the different approaches, indicating that 
participation in the programme increases the probability of school attendance by 2 to 
2.9 percentage points, depending on the method used for estimations. These effects are 
in accordance with the results published previously by other authors and support the 
conclusion that the Bolsa Familia has a significant but very limited impact on school 
attendance for this age group. 
Schools in Brazil only function in shifts and it is possible for children to work after or 
before their classes. The Bolsa Familia does not impose any condition restricting the 
children’s participation in the labour market, but it was expected that increased 
household income together with the schooling requirements imposed by the 
programme would reduce the incidence of child labour. Contrary to prior expectations, 
some authors find that the programme in fact increases the participation of children in 
labour market activities. It is argued that poor households depend heavenly on all 
available sources of income, including the earnings obtained from children’s work, and 
that the amount transferred to participants of Bolsa Familia would not be enough to 
remove the children from the labour market, or at least not completely. 
It seems reasonable to assume that even if children do not stop to work completely, the 
Bolsa Familia should limit the amount of time dedicated to labour market activities and 
also incentivise children to stay longer at school, or not to drop out so easily. Thus, the 
children in the sample used are divided into four groups: ‘only studying’, ‘only working’, 
‘studying and working’, and ‘not studying or working’. Multinomial logit estimations 
show that the Bolsa Familia reduces idleness among the 10- to 15-year-olds, but its 
effect on the probability that children will ‘study and work’ is higher than on the 
probability that they will ‘only study’. The marginal effects calculated indicate that 
participation in the programme decreases the probability of ‘not studying or working’ 
and of ‘only working’ by 1.7 and 0.6 percentage points, respectively. Also, it leads to an 
increase of 1.9 percentage points in the probability that children ‘study and work’. All 
the marginal effects calculated were statistically significant at the 5% level, except the 
one estimated for the ‘only study’ option. Therefore, the Bolsa Familia does change the 
time allocation for children of school age, mainly by leading those not studying (either 
completely inactive or only working) to school. However, it seems that the programme is 
not offering enough incentives for children to stop working; once they are active in the 
labour market, it rather induces them to combine work and schooling activities. 
Finally, the estimated impacts of Bolsa Familia on children’s schooling and occupational 
choices are consistent with the existing literature on the subject, confirming a limited 
effect of the cash transfers and the conditions imposed on these particular outcomes. It 
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is evident that if educational attainment is considered crucial to the long-run 
development of individuals, the conditions regarding this issue should be revised and 
amended according to the country’s context. Furthermore, it is also important to 
improve the quality of the public services provided and to better integrate them with the 
social assistance programmes. 
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I. Introduction 
The social assistance system in Brazil has been subject to major changes over the past 
two decades. In addition to the supply of public services, such as health and education, 
the central government also started to implement policies aiming to reduce poverty and 
inequality. The objective of this dissertation is to present one of the most well-known 
transfer programmes, the Bolsa Familia (PBF), and to assess its impacts on school 
attendance and time allocation for children between 10 and 15 years old. 
The Bolsa Familia is a Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programme created in 2003 by 
aggregating and expanding other initiatives which aimed to improve the life standards 
of the poorest segments of society. The programme has its primary focus on the short 
run, seeking to reduce poverty and eradicate starvation, although the conditions which 
the participants should follow mostly target their long-run development. The conditions 
imposed on the families involve both health and educational aspects, but in this study I 
restrict the attention to educational and labour market outcomes, as all children 
between 6 and 15 years old from families receiving the PBF benefits should be enrolled 
in school, and a minimum attendance, which depends on the children’s age, should also 
be verified. 
Education is still considered a central point for development policies, since poor 
educational performance is pointed out as a cause for the persistence of poverty and 
inequality in Brazil. Souza (2012) explains that historically Brazil has registered low 
levels of schooling and the educational opportunities have favoured the upper-middle 
and rich classes. Until the first half of the 20th century there was very limited access to 
primary education, especially in the North and Northeast regions, but a vast amount of 
resources was invested in post-secondary education. However, with the reformulation 
of the Brazilian educational system, the emphasis shifted to primary and secondary 
education, which started to receive higher investments. Currently, primary school is 
compulsory for children between 6 and 14 years old and the percentage of children 
enrolled has increased over the years.  
According to the Brazilian statistics bureau (IBGE), the percentage of children between 
6 and 14 years old attending school increased from 88.7% in 1992 to 97.6% in 2009 
(Souza (2012)), while the average years of study for individuals 10 years old or more 
rose from 5.2 years in 1995 to 7.2 in 20091. Despite these improvements, the average 
years of study for the whole population over 10 years old is still very low, less than the 
complete primary school series, which indicates how difficult it is to boost educational 
outcomes in Brazil. Hence, it seems not only necessary to provide public services, such 
as education, but also to attempt to change the population’s behaviour towards more 
schooling. The opportunity cost of sending children to school is likely to be very high for 
many poor families, so that even if the parents are aware of the negative impact which 
low schooling levels can have on their children’s future wages, they cannot survive 
                                               
1 IBGE’s statistics database (http://seriesestatisticas.ibge.gov.br), based on household surveys from 1992 until 2009. 
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without the income from the children’s work. Therefore, with programmes like the PBF, 
policy makers try to guarantee a certain level of income to the families and, at the same 
time, to incentivise school attendance for the children. 
The Bolsa Familia is currently one of the largest CCTs in place, covering all Brazilian 
regions and assisting over 13 million families. The amount of money invested in the 
project is also vast: in 2011, more than R$17 billion2 were transferred to selected 
families, which corresponds to 0.42% of the Brazilian GDP. Due to its size and costs, the 
Bolsa Famila is the topic of several studies covering both the short- and long-run 
objectives of the programme. However, the results reported are debated among 
researchers, especially when it comes to the impacts on educational outcomes. While 
early studies failed to find a statistically significant effect of the PBF on school 
attendance, even if the children from beneficiary families are required to keep a 
minimum attendance of 85%, more recent articles have shown that the PBF has a 
positive impact on both enrolment and attendance. The estimated effects are not very 
large, though, leading some researchers to question the cost-effectiveness of the 
programme. In addition, there are not many studies covering the possible changes to 
children’s occupational choices that may be driven by the PBF. 
In this dissertation I show how school attendance and participation in labour market 
activities for children in different age groups have changed over the past decades and 
how family income appears to be a key determinant of children’s early entry into the 
labour market. The high participation rate in the labour force for children and 
adolescents below the legal age of 16 years old is a persistent issue in Brazil, and it is 
related both to socio-economic and to cultural factors. Provided that the Bolsa Familia 
can alter the households’ decisions by increasing their income and restricting children’s 
time available for work activities, it seems pertinent to analyse not only the effects of 
this cash transfer on school attendance, but also on the decisions about the children’s 
time allocation. Although the aggregate data can provide a good indication of relevant 
changes which may have occurred during the analysed period, it is not possible to 
isolate the effects of the Bolsa Familia on the outcomes presented. Therefore, I will use 
different econometric approaches to estimate on STATA the average effect of 
participating in the PBF on children’s school attendance and how they divide their time 
between schooling and labour market activities. 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows: Section II presents the main 
features of a selection of CCT programmes currently in place and summarises the 
development of social assistance programmes in Brazil until the creation of Bolsa 
Familia. Section III describes briefly the dataset used in this study. Section IV is divided 
in two parts: Part A provides a brief overview of Brazilian socio-economic indicators 
and how they compare to other Latin American and Caribbean countries; Part B covers 
the evolution of labour market participation for children and adolescents aged 10 to 17 
                                               
2 About US$10 billion or NOK 56 billion. 
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years old in Brazil. In Section V, Part A reviews the literature concerning the impacts of 
Bolsa Familia on children’s educational outcomes and labour market participation. 
Finally, Part B of Section V evaluates the impacts of PBF on school attendance and 
children’s occupational choices based on data from the 2006 household survey. Section 
VI concludes and discusses some policy implications of the findings. 
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II. The expansion of Conditional Cash Transfer programmes 
During the 1990s, many Latin American and Caribbean countries adopted Conditional 
Cash Transfer (CCT) programmes aiming to improve the life standards of the poorest 
segments of the population. Today, the World Bank3 reports that almost every country 
in Latin America has a CCT in place. Likewise, similar initiatives have been implemented 
in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Turkey, Cambodia, Malawi, Morocco, Pakistan, and South 
Africa, among others. Although these programmes can differ a lot in terms of 
implementation and design, not to mention administrative aspects, they all follow the 
same recipe: transfers are made to low-income families in order to improve life 
standards in the short run, but at the same time the conditions imposed are an attempt 
to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty. 
Mexico had a pioneer experience in the field of CCTs, starting with the PROGRESA 
(Programa de Educacion Salud y Alimentacion) in 1997. This programme targeted poor 
households with children aged 8 to 18 years old and aimed to improve their health and 
their educational and nutritional situation by focusing primarily on children and their 
mothers (Rawlings (2005)). The allowance varied according to number of children and 
grade attended in school, but all families receiving the transfers were to comply with 
the same rules: enrol all children of school age and keep a minimum attendance of 85%; 
maintain the required number of visits to health centres for all family members; and 
attend health and nutrition lectures planned for mothers. In 2002 PROGRESSA was 
renamed Oportunidades and had its main objectives expanded. Since then, the 
programme also encourages the targeted households to generate their own income by 
facilitating access to microcredit and investing in housing improvements. In addition, 
educational grants were extended to individuals up to 20 years old. 
Another important aspect of this programme is that its evaluation was included in the 
project plan. Fiszbein and Schady (2009) argue that part of PROGRESA/Oportunidade’s 
success might be related to the way it evolved based on the outcomes of several studies 
developed to estimate its impacts. Significant effects of this programme have been 
documented by many authors (see, e.g., Fiszbein and Schady (2009); Skoufias (2001); 
Morley and Coady (2003); Rawlings (2005); and Adato and Hoddinott (2007)), and its 
success has encouraged other countries to adopt or adjust similar programmes. 
As other examples of CCTs one can mention Bono de Desarrollo Humano (Ecuador), 
Familias en Accion (Colombia), and Program of Advancement Through Health and 
Education (Jamaica). All these programmes cover the whole national territory and have 
conditions aiming to improve the educational and health standards of poor families. 
Likewise, programmes such as Chile Solidario (Chile), Social Risk Mitigation Project 
(Turkey), Programa de Asignacion Familiar (Honduras), Cash Transfer for Orphans and 
Vulnerable Children (Kenya), and Red de Proteccion Social (Nicaragua) also condition 
                                               
3 Fiszbein and Schady (2009). 
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the cash transfers on educational and health guidelines, but they have a relatively 
limited scope and only target very narrow parts of the respective populations. 
Furthermore, some of them are still working as pilots. 
In general, all the programmes above target poor and/or very poor households; hence 
the immediate alleviation of poverty achieved with the cash transfers appears to be 
their common short-run goal. However, there is no general agreement concerning long-
run development. Even though education and health are promoted through the 
conditions imposed on beneficiaries, the weight put on each area can vary considerably 
according to each country’s social context. A brief description of the CCTs mentioned 
above is given in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
Fiszbein and Schady (2009) refer to Chile’s programme Chile Solidario as a clear 
exception to the main features presented by other programmes. The authors stress that 
Chile Solidario only targets extremely poor households, which represent about 5% of 
the country’s population, and that the country’s social services define a set of 
household-specific targets to be achieved by the families registered in the programme. 
The amount received is not considered large, but the aim is mostly to motivate recipient 
households to use other social assistance programmes, to which they are given 
preferential access, so they can understand what actions would lead them to move out 
from extreme poverty. 
Finally, another special case is the Brazilian Programa Bolsa Familia (PBF). Although the 
conditions imposed concern the health and education of children, families living in 
extreme poverty (with monthly income per capita below R$604) are eligible even if they 
have no children, as the programme has a great emphasis on hunger and poverty 
alleviation (both immediate goals). A detailed description of the PBF and its evolution 
over time is given in the following section. 
A. The Brazilian experience: Programa Bolsa Familia  (PBF) 
In Brazil, social assistance programmes started to be formulated around the 1930s, but 
they acquired legal status only after a new constitution was adopted in 1988. The new 
constitution brought major changes to the social security net such as the social security 
system (including the pension system, disability and unemployment insurance, among 
others) and social assistance policies. Only then were the assistance policies explicitly 
established as a citizen’s right, not based on merit or favour (Silva (2008)). New laws 
were adopted starting from 1991, granting unconditional transfers to families below the 
poverty line (named minimum income programmes). 
Silva (2008) points out that as new projects were developed, the link between 
education and income transfers appeared to be fundamental. Although public schools 
were available in the great majority of municipalities, the opportunity cost of sending 
                                               
4 RS$60 is US$36 or NOK 201, using 2011 exchange rates. See exchange rates on Table A.2 in the Appendix. 
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children to school was considered too high for the families targeted by social assistance 
programmes. At the same time, the lack of education was pointed out as a contributing 
factor to the persistence of poverty, making evident for policy makers the necessity to 
improve educational outcomes as a way to assure a higher income level in the long-run. 
The first experiments of conditional transfers were implemented in Campinas (Sao 
Paulo), Ribeirao Preto (Sao Paulo), Santos (Sao Paulo), and Brasilia (Distrito Federal) in 
1995. Over a short period of time, other municipalities across the country adopted 
similar initiatives and all of them targeted families with children of school age. 
However, the cash transfers were managed at a local level and the criteria regarding 
eligibility and for how long families would receive the benefits could vary from city to 
city.  
In 1996, the Programa de Erradicacao do Trabalho Infantil (PETI), a programme 
developed to eradicate child labour, was launched. Although it covered the whole 
country, only families with children performing or at imminent risk of performing 
activities defined as harmful or the worst form of child labour5 received support from 
the government. In this particular case, children up to 14 years old were to have a 
minimum school attendance of 85% and also take part in extra socio-pedagogical 
activities outside regular school hours. 
But it was only in 2001 that the federal government created a national programme 
targeting all children in the lower income classes, not only those performing harmful 
work: the Programa Bolsa Escola (PBE). Households were considered eligible if their 
per capita income was less than R$906 per month and they had children aged 6 to 15 
years old. The families accepted in the programme were entitled to a benefit of R$15 per 
child, up to a maximum of R$45 per household,7 provided that regular school 
attendance for the children was reported to the local government.  
Even though the PBE was financed by the federal government, each municipality was 
responsible for managing the funds received, including not only the registration of 
families and confirmation of their eligibility and compliance with the rules, but also 
transferring the money. As highlighted by Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite (2003), the 
federal government only checked the number of beneficiaries and compared this 
number to local indicators of affluence. In case of discrepancies, the local governments 
had to adjust the number of families receiving the benefits. 
                                               
5 According to the criteria of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), activities are considered harmful for children of 
developmental age depending on the duration and type of worked performed. The worst form of child labour includes 
slavery, prostitution and pornography, and armed conflicts or illicit activities (especially drug traffic), and applies for all 
children until 18 years old. 
6 With 2001 exchange rates, RS$90 was US$38 or NOK344. In that year, households with monthly income per capita equal 
to or lower than R$45 (US$19 / NOK 172) were considered below the poverty line. See Table A.4 in the Appendix. 
7 The benefits varied from US$66 to US$19, or NOK 57 to NOK 172, at 2001 exchange rates. 
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In addition, other locally managed programmes were launched around the same time, 
such as Bolsa Alimentação, Cartão Alimentação, and Auxílio-Gás. The first one, for 
instance, was developed to improve nutrition and reduce infant mortality, so low-
income families received the cash transfers if they assured regular attendance of 
pregnant women to pre-natal care and followed the vaccination schedules for children 
up to 6 years old. 
All these CCTs targeted the same subpopulation, but the conditions the families were to 
follow were different depending on the programme in which they were registered. Also, 
as resources were managed at the local level, it became difficult to evaluate their impact. 
Silva (2008) points out some problems regarding the co-existence of several income 
transfer programmes: some overlapped, having not only the same target group but also 
the same objectives; the lack of a central administration caused a loss of resources; the 
management of policies for different areas covered by the programmes was spread 
across ministries; the budget designated to social projects was insufficient; and many 
families were not receiving the benefits, even if they were eligible according to the 
programmes’ criteria. 
As a solution to the problems listed above, the government elected in 2002 proposed 
the unification of all federally subsidised social programmes. The Programa Bolsa 
Familia (PBF) was created in 2003, merging the existent programmes, altering 
administrative aspects, and also expanding their scope. The plan was to include income 
transfers in a broader social policy to achieve the long-run development goals for the 
country, supervised by the Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Alleviation 
(Ministerio do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate a Fome; MDS). Thus, the revised 
programme has three main objectives: to immediately alleviate hunger and poverty; to 
assure basic social rights in health, education, and nutrition; and to promote individuals’ 
development, assuring appropriate environment and means to permanently pull them 
out of a vulnerable situation.8 Currently, families are considered eligible if their monthly 
per capita income is lower than R$140.9 Eligible families should be registered in their 
municipality in a central record (Cadastro Unico dos Programas Sociais do Governo 
Federal; CadUnico) managed by the federal government. Finally, depending on income 
and number of children reported, MDS selects the families to receive the benefits, 
prioritising those with lower earnings.   
The total benefit received varies according to household characteristics. Today, the 
amount transferred is composed of (a) a Basic Benefit10 of R$70, paid to households 
classified as extremely poor (with monthly per capita income below R$70); (b) a 
                                               
8
 MDS, http://www.mds.gov.br/bolsafamilia . 
9 US$84 or NOK469, at 2011 exchange rates. Households earning up to R$136 (US$81 / NOK 456) were considered below 
the poverty line in 2011. 
10
 The Basic Benefit is paid to households with per capita income lower than the extreme poverty threshold even if they 
have no children, since the PBF is part of Programa Fome Zero designed to eliminate hunger and extreme poverty. R$70 is 
US$42 or NOK235. 
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Variable Benefit of R$32 per children under 15 years old (limited to 5 per family); (c) a 
Variable Benefit for Youth of R$38 per adolescent between 16 and 17 years old (limited 
to 2 per family); and (d) a Compensatory Variable Benefit paid to households which 
suffered income loss when all other assistance programmes11 were condensed to PBF. 
Hence, the total amount received by eligible households can vary from R$32 to R$306.12 
It is important to note that the money is transferred directly to the family (preferably to 
the mother) and there is no need to report how it was spent. Nevertheless, as the PBF 
also merged the conditionality from older programmes, it is compulsory for the person 
registered as responsible to follow rules regarding heath and school attendance for the 
children. Essentially, the families should ensure 
(1) the enrolment of all children between 6 and 15 years old in public schools; 
(2) a minimum school attendance of 85% for children between 6 and 15 years old, 
and 75% for adolescents between 16 and 17 years old; 
(3) that pregnant women follow the pre-natal care schedule, including regular visits 
to health centres and joining educational activities regarding infant nutrition; 
(4) that children below 7 years old have received vaccinations appropriate to their 
age and have their development monitored in the health centres. 
According to data made available by the MDS, in 2011 there were over 20 million 
families registered in the CadUnico, and, among those, around 13 million were selected 
to receive the benefits. Even though not all the families eligible and registered are 
receiving cash transfers, the number of families included in the programme has 
increased expressively over the years, as shown on Diagrams 1 and 2. In the first year of 
its implementation, 2004, a total amount of R$3.8 billion13 was transferred to over 6 
million families and in 2011 the sum transferred to beneficiaries exceeded R$17 billion. 
                                               
11
 Including Bolsa Escola (PBE), Auxilio-Gas, Auxilio Alimentacao, and Cartao Alimentacao. 
12
 From US$19 to US$183, or from NOK 107 to NOK 1,025, using 2011 exchange rates. 
13 US$1.3 billion or NOK 8.8 billion, at 2004 exchange rates. 
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Both the amount spent on the programme and the number of its beneficiaries make the 
PBF one of the largest CTTs currently in place. The immediate impacts of the money 
transferred are visible: Poverty and inequality have decreased in the last decade thanks 
to the programme (e.g., Souza (2012) and Soares (2012)). The government has 
increased its efforts to elevate the standard of living for people below the poverty line 
and reducing poverty has become one of its top priorities. Therefore, in the past few 
years, great emphasis was given to PBF’s short-run objectives, as the changes to the 
conditions imposed on the families or the population targeted were minimal. Regarding 
educational outcomes, for example, the only adjustment was the inclusion of 16- to 17-
year-olds as direct beneficiaries and subject to the minimum school attendance rule. 
However, the specialised literature stresses that the conditions imposed are crucial to 
the long-run development of the individuals participating in the programme today, so 
its impacts on nutrition, health, and education should not be overlooked.  
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III. Dataset 
The data used in this study were obtained from the national household survey Pesquisa 
Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios (PNAD), produced by the Brazilian statistics 
bureau, Instituto Brasiliero de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE). The PNAD is a sample 
survey carried out on a yearly basis since 1971. From 1990 until 2003, it covered all 
national territory except the rural areas of the northern states of Rondonia, Acre, 
Amazonas, Roraima, Para, and Amapa, but since 2004 the survey has had nationwide 
coverage. Even though the regions included in the sample have changed over the years, 
the survey is designed to produce representative statistics. The data collected during 
the interviews are weighted and the results published reflect the projections based on 
population characteristics recorded during the decennial census.14 The main topics 
covered by the PNAD include demographics, health and nutrition, housing, education, 
and cultural and economic aspects of the households analysed. Due to the difficulty of 
including all relevant topics, the survey is divided in two areas: basic research, covering 
the same core topics every year (housing, education, labour market, and income), and 
supplementary research, to extend the study of permanent basic topics or investigate 
new themes considered relevant.  
Besides covering several areas, the household survey also has the advantage of offering 
a sufficiently large sample with only minor comparability issues (especially after the 
1980s). In addition, the data reported are usually very consistent and of high quality, 
allowing a year-by-year analysis (Souza (2012)). 
The household survey is still the most common database used by researchers,15 even if 
it has some drawbacks. For instance, in the years of the national census the household 
survey is not carried out. Hence, there are no data available for the PNAD sample for 
1980, 1991, 2000, and 2010. Also, due to a delay in processing information collected in 
the early 90s, the survey was cancelled in 1994. Souza (2012) emphasises that incomes 
tend to be underreported, which can affect the estimation results. In addition, the 
PNAD’s sampling design creates a bias towards larger municipalities, underestimating 
the scope of some social programmes. However, the author considers the lack of panel 
                                               
14 The population projections are re-calibrated to correct for wide discrepancies between two censuses, which can make 
the studies’ results not directly comparable, even if the authors worked with the same database. 
The Brazilian Census has a larger household sample collected based on municipality characteristics. The fraction of 
municipalities to be covered in the research depends on their size, based on number of inhabitants and families. The 
Census survey is carried out every 10 years and provides demographic information about individuals and households in 
both rural and urban areas. 
15 Other datasets are not normally used to assess the impact of CCTs in Brazil and surveys carried out with beneficiaries and 
eligible families usually have a limited scope, restricting the inference to a regional level. Oliveira et al. (2007) used the 
data obtained from a survey carried out by governmental agencies to produce a preliminary report about the impacts of 
Bolsa Familia on health, education, and labour market variables as well as on families’ spending. And Kassouf and Glewwe 
(2012) used the School Census, conducted by Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anisio Teixeira (INEP), 
an institute linked to the Brazilian Ministry of Education, to assess the impact of Bolsa Escola / Bolsa Familia on several 
educational outcomes. 
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data one of the biggest issues, since pure cross-sectional data limits the analysis of 
trajectories for the outcome variables.  
Since the social programmes gained a more consistent structure from the 90s, it seems 
pertinent to consider the evolution of the main variables studied after that period. 
Educational aspects are covered in the permanent section of the PNAD, so the aggregate 
data offer a broader view of changes in schooling and labour market participation 
(detailed in Section IV Part B). 
However data regarding participation in social programmes is somewhat limited.16 Only 
in a few years (2003, 2004, and 2006) did the survey investigate whether families were 
receiving any transfers from social programmes. Therefore, the estimations of the PBF 
effects (disclosed in Section V Part B) were carried out with microdata from the 2006 
PNAD, which is the most recent and complete data for the purpose of evaluating this 
programme. 
 
  
                                               
16 The amount received for participation in social programmes is not explicitly disclosed, so it needs to be derived from 
other income variables reported. The calculations of the amount received in benefits are based on Soares et al. (2006). 
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IV. Youth and labour market participation in Brazil and Latin America 
and the Caribbean: A brief overview 
According to the Brazilian Statistics Bureau, IBGE, the most recent data for the 
household survey revealed that 1.67 million children between 10 and 14 years old and 
4.34 million adolescents between 15 and 17 years old were economically active in the 
country during 2009. The bureau classifies all individuals aged 10 or more who during 
the reference period17 were employed or searching for jobs as economically active. Full-
time students, pensioners, disabled or institutionalised individuals, and those 
performing non-remunerated housework or living of rents are considered economically 
inactive. 
The labour force participation rate (LFPR) is given by the number of economically 
active individuals in a certain age group divided by the total number of individuals 
belonging to the same age group. Over the past two decades, the youth LFPR in Brazil 
has been relatively high, usually above the average for Latin American countries. Many 
factors can lead to an early entry into the labour market, and, in fact, the populations of 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean region vary considerably in terms of 
socio-economic characteristics. Regardless of those differences, the CCT programmes 
and the conditions they impose indicate a very similar goal regarding long-run 
development through human capital accumulation. 
In order gain an understanding of the context in which families make their decisions 
regarding children’s time allocation, Part A presents a brief overview of the Brazilian 
position in Latin America in terms of socio-economic statistics, highlighting some key 
labour market indicators. Then, Part B focuses on aggregate data from PNAD surveys to 
identify general trends for youth participation in the Brazilian labour market. 
A. Key socio-economic indicators for Brazil and Latin America and the Caribbean 
The socio-economic background for countries in the Latin American and Caribbean 
region varies widely. Considering the Brazilian case, at a macro level the country has 
reported good economic performance, sometimes better than the average of the region; 
however, social indicators still point out significant internal disparities, as the 
persistence of extreme poverty and great inequality register. Table 1 presents a few 
socio-economic indicators produced by the World Bank for the years 1999 and 2008.  
                                               
17 In this study I consider the reference period as 365 days prior to the survey, unless otherwise stated. 
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The socio-economic indicators show an overall improvement for the region as a whole, 
including Brazil. The Brazilian public expenditure on health and education increased 
considerably, exceeding the average registered for the Latin America and Caribbean 
region in 2008. For instance, the investment in public education in Brazil went from 
3.9% of the GDP in 1999 to 5.4% in 2008, while it only rose from 4.2% to 4.4% for Latin 
America and the Caribbean. At the same time, Brazil registered a drop in death, 
fertility,18 and unemployment rates and in the poverty gap, as well as an increase in life 
expectancy and school enrolment. Finally, the total enrolment in primary school in 
Brazil increased around 3 percentage points in the period considered, so that in 2008 it 
was also above the average in Latin America. 
Likewise, the data from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) confirm that the 
social development in Brazil has been more accentuated than the average of the Latin 
American area according to certain measures. Diagram 3 shows the percentage of 
employed individuals below the international poverty line of US$1.25 per day. The 
poverty threshold is considered at the household level; therefore, an individual is 
classified as ‘working poor’ if employed and living in a household with income per 
capita below the defined poverty line. Between 1993 and 2009, the percentage of 
employed individuals living below the poverty line of US$1.25 a day in Latin America 
fell from 8.5% to 3.7% on average. Even though the Brazilian data are missing for a few 
                                               
18 Brazil is still undergoing a demographic change. The drop of fertility rates combined with lower infant death rates 
indicates the positive effect of the investments made on health and sanitation. With more resources destined to pre- and 
post-natal care, health assistance to mothers and their children has improved, reflecting a lower number of deaths per 
birth. Also, better access to health care contributed to the education of adult females regarding contraceptive methods. 
GDP growth (annual %) 5.17 4.09 0.25 0.44
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 4.21 2.91 -1.22 -1.06
GDP per person employed (constant 1990 PPP $) 12891.00 17081.20 12947.00 17572.64
Current account balance (% of GDP) -4.01 -4.35 -4.33 -3.10
General government balance (% of GDP) -7.39 -5.27 -5.28 -4.70
Government consumption (real 2005 US$) 149236.36 327051.55 151756.36 334881.05
Household consumption (real 2005 US$) 463007.95 1369234.23 464750.75 1383068.91
Imports, GNFS (real 2005 US$) 99807.98 444986.58 84746.21 429621.92
Private consumption (implicit price deflator constant 2005 US$) 1.17 1.00 0.82 0.88
Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%) 64.00 60.78 64.70 61.39
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 17.84 20.29 20.69 23.30
Trade (% of GDP) 27.14 50.78 20.23 42.59
Death rate, crude (per 1,000 people) 6.42 6.08 6.39 5.92
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) 2.40 2.67 1.90 2.29
Health expenditure per capita (current US$) 242.37 253.39 714.99 552.42
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 69.81 71.31 72.43 73.64
Public spending on education, total (% of GDP) 3.88 4.15 5.40 4.44
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) 9.60 9.38 7.10 6.93
GINI index 59.78 53.80 55.07 51.31
Poverty gap at $2 a day (PPP) (%) 9.76 9.82 5.30 5.51
Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population) 21.32 21.99 11.32 12.38
Total enrollment, primary (% net) 92.37 93.56 95.12 94.92
TABLE 1 - Selected socio-economic indicators, Brazil and Latin America & Caribbean, 1999 and 2008
1
Latin 
America &
Caribbean Brazil
Latin 
America &
Caribbean
1- Source: World Bank database (http://databank.worldbank.org), own elaboration
1999 2008
Indicator Brazil
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years, it is also possible to notice a sharp decrease in the percentage of the work force 
below the poverty line: from 7.1% in 1993 to 2% in 2009.19 
 
The ILO also presents key indicators regarding youth participation in the labour market 
during the analysed period. However, most of the countries do not consider individuals 
below 15 years old as part of the population of active age, as does Brazil; in order to 
facilitate comparisons among countries and regions, in this section, the age bracket 
considered is 15 to 24 years old. Even though this is not the exact age group studied in 
Section IV Part B, it can be used as a general overview of the Brazilian position in the 
region in terms of youth participation in the labour force.  
Using the definition of Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR), ILO’s data reveal that 
the Brazilian youth participation in the labour market is clearly high, especially when 
compared to the average in the Latin America and Caribbean region, as shown in 
Diagram 4. 
                                               
19 The same trend was observed for the other international poverty threshold of US$2 a day. In that case, the share of 
working population living on less than US$2 a day in Brazil decreased over 9 percentage points, going from 15% in 1993 to 
5.9% in 2009. The average for the Latin America and Caribbean region also declined during that period, from 17.6% to 
9.5%. 
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Diagram 3 - Share of workers below the poverty line
1 
of US$1.25 a day (percentage), 1993 to 2009
2
Source: ILO
3
1- The share is measured as the proportion of employed people living below the international poverty line of US$ 1.25 a day and generated using microdata from national household income/expenditure surveys. Poverty status is 
determined at the household level, with poor households defined as those with per-capita expenditure below the given poverty line. In order to maximise comparability across countries, international poverty lines are used, whereby 
prices in local currencies are converted using purchasing power parity exchange rates and adjusting for inflation. Employment status is determined at the individual level. In order to be classified as working poor, a person must be 
both employed and living in a household with per-capita expenditure below the poverty line.
2- Brazilian data not available for the years 1994, 2000, and 2005
3- Source: Key Indicators of the Labour Market, published by the International Labour Organisation; Own elaboration
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Even though the youth’s LFPR declined slightly from 1993 to 2009 in the whole region, 
the participation in Brazil remained above the Latin American average. However, when 
comparing statistics for individual countries, it is not possible to identify any clear 
single trend in the participation rate for the 15- to 24-year-old age group; and while 
some countries present a relatively stable participation rate over the years, others show 
some large fluctuations (Diagram 5). 
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Diagram 4 - Labour force participation rate (percentage), 15 to 24 years old, 1993 to 2009
Source: ILO
1
1- Source: Key Indicators of the Labour Market, published by the International Labour Organisation. The participation rates are harmonised to account for differences in national data collection and 
tabulation methodologies. The series includes both nationally reported and imputed data and only estimates that are national, meaning there are no geographic limitations in coverage.
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Source: ILO1
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The situation changes completely for the older age group, from 25 years old and above, 
though. In that case, the Brazilian LFPR remained below the average in the Latin 
America and Caribbean region from 1993 to 2009 (Diagram 6). 
 
Hence, aggregated data from different sources appear to confirm that despite the public 
investments in education and the improvements in socio-economic indicators over the 
past decades, individuals are still becoming economically active at a young age in Brazil. 
The statistics showed so far only cover individuals above 15 years old, which is the 
minimum recommended age to start working according to ILO regulations (ILO 1973). 
The household surveys published by IBGE, on the other hand, include data regarding 
market activities for children aged 10 years old and above, which are used to expand 
the analysis of children’s time allocation in Brazil.   
B. The evolution of youth’s labour market participation in Brazil 
Even though the youth participation in the labour market in Brazil remained above the 
average in the Latin America and Caribbean region for the 15- to 24-years-old age 
bracket, it is possible to observe a general reduction in the percentage of children 
economically active since 1993. 
Diagrams 7.A and 7.B show the evolution of LFPR for two age groups: 10 to 14 years old 
and 15 to 17 years old, both from 1993 to 2009. There has been a notable reduction in 
participation for both genders over the considered period. For instance, the female 
LFPR for the youngest age group dropped from over 17% in 1993 to 6.8% in 2009, and 
similarly, the participation rate for girls in the 15- to 17-years-old age group fell from 
around 48% in 1993 to 34.7% in 2009. Although the participation rate for males is 
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Diagram 6 - Labour force participation rate (percentage), 25 years and older, 1993 to 2009
Source: ILO
1
1- Source: Key  Indicators of the Labour Market, published by the International Labour Organisation. The participation rates are harmonised to account for differences in national data collection and 
tabulation methodologies. The series includes both nationally reported and imputed data and only estimates that are national, meaning there are no geographic limitations in coverage.
Own elaboration
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higher than for females, it also changed considerably. For boys aged 10 to 14 years old, 
the LFPR in 2009 was around 12%, which is less than half of the figure observed in 
1993. Likewise, 71% of the males between 15 and 17 years old were considered active 
in the labour market in 1993, whereas 48% were reported as part of the labour force in 
2009. 
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Diagram 7.A - Percentage of individuals active in the labor force - 10 to 14 years old, by gender, 1993 to 2009
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So, it does not come as a surprise that during the period in question, the proportion of 
children and adolescents classified as economically inactive increased considerably, as 
shown in Diagram 8.20 Given that the IBGE considers full-time students who are not 
working as economically inactive, the changes regarding participation in the labour 
market could indicate that more children are frequenting school. 
 
We note that the decrease in LFPRs does not appear to be related either to an increase 
of the population in younger age groups, or to an overall reduction in the size of the 
labour force, as is presented in Diagram 9.A.   
                                               
20 From 1993 until 2005, people were divided into three groups: economically active, economically inactive, and not 
declared. Since 2006 individuals are classified only as economically active or economically inactive.   
82.4 %
86.4 %
89.0 %
51.9 %
58.1 %
61.4 %
65.3 %
87.8 %
93.2 %
68.6 %
75.7 %
80.3 %
29.0 %
39.4 %
44.9 %
51.3 %
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Female, 10 to 14 years old Female, 15 to 17 years old Male, 10 to 14 years old Male, 15 to 17 years old
Following IBGE's criteria, people from 10 years old are considered active in the labour market if in the referred period they were employed or seeking employment. Likewise, the burreau classifies the following segments as inactive: 
pensionists, students, disabled individuals, those performing non remunerated housework or living of rents, and institutionalised individuals
1- The household survey is not carried out in years when the national census takes place, as in the year 2000; in 1994, it did not take place for exceptional reasons
2- Until 2003, the survey did not cover the rural areas of 6 States: Rondonia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Para, and Amapa
Own elaboration
Diagram 8 - Percentage of individuals economically inactive, by age group and gender, 1993 to 2009
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Diagram 9.B shows a rough evolution of market conditions from 1993 to 2009. During 
the period, we notice a vast increase in the overall employed population and, at the 
same time, a not so sharp rise in the number of individuals unemployed or out of the 
labour force. Also, during the period, the labour market conditions did not deteriorate, 
so the lower participation cannot only be due to a greater difficulty in finding jobs. 
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Therefore, the proportion of the labour force constituted of young individuals also 
decreased over time, as illustrated in Diagram 10.A. From 1993 to 2009, the percentage 
of the total labour force consisting of children between 10 and 14 years old decreased 
by over 4 percentage points. A similar reduction, of around 3 percentage points, was 
also registered for the 15- to 17-years-old age group.  
 
Diagram 10.B indicates a change in the labour force structure. As the fraction of 10- to 
14- and 15-to 17-year-olds composing the labour force was reduced, the percentage of 
older individuals, mainly 25 to 64 years old, increased about 9 percentage points 
between 1993 and 2009.  
Diagram 10.A - Percentage of labour force composed by selected age groups, 1993 to 2009
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Although the decline in market participation for children in the younger age groups 
appears clear, it is also important to assess the changes in school attendance. Recently, 
the elementary education system was modified in Brazil: until 2005, children started 
primary school at the age of 7 and the course lasted for 8 years; starting from 2005, the 
basic cycle was expanded to 9 years, so children should start studying at the age of 6. 
This change in the primary school system should not affect the results of this study in 
any significant way, though, since only the first cohort of 6-year-olds affected by the 
reform are covered by the PNAD data (those turning 6 in 2005 and 10 in 2009). Also, 
the age groups covered in the PNAD remained the same and the initial age for admission 
to secondary school was not altered. Moreover, there were no changes concerning the 
school schedule, which is still part time21 in public schools. 
As a result, it is still possible to attend school and work after or before classes take 
place. Diagrams 11.A and 12.A illustrate how individuals allocate their time between 
school and market activities in different years. The children were arranged in three 
groups: ‘only studying’, ‘studying and economically active’, and ‘only economically 
active’. Diagram 11.A presents the time allocation options for the 10-to 14-years-old 
group. The fact that children in this age group should be attending compulsory primary 
school is reflected in the high percentage of individuals only studying. At the same time, 
the number of individuals in this age group who are economically active but do not 
frequent school almost vanished over the years. Finally, the proportion of individuals 
who are studying and active in the labour market also decreased from 1993 to 2009. 
                                               
21
 Usually, the classes are either in the mornings, afternoons, or, in certain schools, evenings. Only children registered in 
programmes such as PETI have to comply with extended school schedules, including activities after the regular classes’ 
hours. 
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In Diagrams 11.B and 11.C, the same figures exposed in Diagram 11.A are sorted by 
gender. By comparing those diagrams, we see clear differences in the time allocation of 
males and females. A lower proportion of boys dedicate their time only to studies and 
more of them combine work and school activities, when compared to girls. Still, the 
figures do not disclose the type of occupation performed by the individuals and it is not 
accurate to assume that males are more predisposed to work. Following the survey 
criteria, unpaid housework is not considered a market activity and Brazilian females are 
traditionally more engaged in that sort of work. Consequently, the differences related to 
market participation can reflect only the difference in activities performed and not a 
gender preference itself. 
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Once the children enter secondary school the time allocation appears to change rather 
dramatically. Diagram 12.A shows the percentage of adolescents from 15 to 17 years old 
studying and/or active in the labour market. The proportion of individuals only 
studying increased from 31.8% in 1993 to almost 53% in 2009 and the number of those 
out of school dropped by 20 percentage points over the same period. On the other hand, 
the fraction of people dividing their time between studies and work activities remained 
more or less constant, around 30%. 
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Diagram 12.B shows the time allocation for males between 15 and 17 years old. During 
the analysed period, the fraction of individuals only studying almost doubled, mainly 
due to a reduction in the number of boys active in the labour market but out of school. 
In 1993, over 36% of males aged 15 to 17 years old were not attending school and only 
working (or seeking employment), whereas in 2009 the same population was only 
12.8%. The data also show some small fluctuations in the percentage of individuals 
performing both activities. Accordingly, the percentage of males participating in the 
labour market and studying was about 34% in 1993, the lowest record in this time 
series, and then it increased to 42% in 1999, but remained around 40% from 2001 to 
2008.   
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Similarly to the youngest group, there were more females between 15 to 17 years old 
only studying when compared to males of the same age. Diagram 12.C shows an 
increase in the proportion of young women attending school over the years, as well as a 
reduction in the percentage of those only working (or intending to work). Finally, the 
percentage of females dividing their time between school and the labour market was 
around 26% in 1993, reached its peak of 31% in 2005, and then decreased to 27.7% in 
2009. 
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For 15- to 17-year-olds, the path concerning time allocation appears to be more 
dynamic and influenced by market conditions. Even though public secondary schools 
are available to those willing to continue their studies, enrolment in those grades is not 
compulsory. There are strong incentives to enter the market and gain work experience 
during the hours free from school activities, and employers are legally allowed to hire 
anyone over 16 years old.22 Besides, given the size of the Brazilian informal market, it is 
not unlikely that children and adolescents are able to perform some sort of work even if 
it is not entirely in accordance with the law. 
It is, nevertheless, interesting to analyse the options available and the existence of social 
programmes which aim to enhance educational prospects for the most vulnerable share 
of the population, which is also the case of Programa Bolsa Escola / Bolsa Familia. These 
programmes are directed to poor households, based on the premise that insufficient 
income is the main cause of the unfortunate choices that end up reproducing the 
poverty cycle. In Diagram 13, the percentage of children in the 10- to 14-years-old age 
group reported as economically active is arranged according to the income per capita in 
their household. The income variable is presented in terms of the minimum wage in 
vigour during the reference year,23 such that in 1993 ‘Cruzeiro Reais’ was the reference 
currency, turning into ‘Reais’ for the rest of the years in the diagram. Overall, it is 
possible to confirm the reduction in labour force participation over the years for all 
income groups. However, the essential information presented in Diagram 13 is the 
concentration of children working (or willing to work) in the lower income groups.  
 
                                               
22
 Or 14 years old, in special cases such as apprentices. 
23 The values established for the minimum wage are presented in Table A.3 in the Appendix. 
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The distinction of participation among income groups is not as sharp for the older age 
group, 15 to 17 years old, according to Diagram 14. In this case, the participation is 
considerably high for the majority of the income classes, although it also decreased over 
time and with household earnings.  
Neither Diagram 13 nor 14 allows precise examination of the changes in LFPR for 
different income groups. However, they show a higher participation in working 
activities for children living in relatively poor households along the 15 years analysed. 
Interestingly, richer families still report children active in the labour market. Therefore, 
even though income seems to be a determinant, it may not be the main or sole factor in 
the decision process regarding children´s time allocation.  
 
Thus, from the aggregate data available, it is clear that school enrolment for children in 
primary school increased and, at the same time, their market participation was reduced 
accordingly. Between 1993 and 2009, the percentage 10- to 14-year-olds in the total 
labour force decreased from 5.7% to 1.6%, while it went down from 7.4% to 4.1% for 
15- to 17-year-olds. And given the combinations of schooling and working activities 
possible to the individuals in these two age brackets, a general change in their time 
allocation can also be noticed. The fraction of 10- to 14-year-old children reported as 
full-time students rose from 70% in 1993 to 88.7% in 2009, and the percentage of 
children of that age who were studying and active in the labour market fell from 18.2% 
to 8% in the same period. As for the 15- to 17-year-olds, the percentage of individuals 
only studying went from 31.8% in 1993 to 62.9% in 2009, while those who were 
economically active and out of school decreased from 26.6% to 8.4%. For the older age 
group, the percentage of individuals combining school and labour market activities did 
not change expressively (remaining around 30%), so it appears clear that over the years 
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more people in this age bracket became economically inactive and started to dedicate 
their time fully to schooling activities. 
How much of this improvement can be attributed to social policies is still not clear from 
the discussion so far. In particular, given the differences in market participation for 
children in different income classes, it could be the case that the socio-economic 
changes in Brazil did not favour all individuals across those different classes. Even 
though some children from families with higher income were reported as economically 
active, the percentage of children from lower-income families who remained 
economically active over the years was much higher, indicating that income level is a 
relevant factor revealing different decisions about children’s time allocation. So, with 
social policies like the Bolsa Familia focusing on the poor segments of the society, it is 
also important to assess how strongly the benefits offered to pursue education impact 
the decisions on schooling and time allocation of children between school and work 
activities.  
42 
 
V. The impact of CCTs on educational outcomes and child labour in 
Brazil 
A. Literature review 
The different aspects involved in how families decide on their children’s time allocation, 
the consequences of their decisions, and what influences their decisions are the subject 
of several studies. In developing countries, poverty is commonly associated with an 
early entry into the labour market and lower schooling levels. The literature often 
suggests there is a trade-off between human capital accumulation (through formal 
education) and child labour24 (for the Brazilian experience see, e.g., Cacciamali, Tatei, 
and Batista (2010); Cardoso and Souza (2004); Soares, Kruger, and Berthelon (2012); 
Emerson and Souza (2002)). And, given that poor families cannot survive without the 
income generated by their children, they send the children to work rather than to 
school.  
Regardless of how the studies are structured, one of the key assumptions is that human 
capital is an increasing function of schooling. Hence, children from poor households 
would obtain less schooling and, consequently, a lower stock of human capital, which 
would be reflected in their future wages as adults. Poverty could thereby persist to 
future generations, creating new child labour cycles. 
To some extent, working and studying are considered conflicting activities on the 
children’s daily schedule. It is clear that working reduces the time available to 
complementary studying activities, even if the work routine does not conflict 
completely with school. According to the World Bank (2001), it is evident in Brazilian 
data that children’s working activities tend to be substituted for both leisure and 
schooling. Furthermore, the educational attainment statistics show that working 
children usually enter school 4 months later than non-working children and they are 
half a school grade behind for every year they remain at work (World Bank (2001)). 
The impacts of CCTs on targeted areas have been covered by many authors,25 and the 
results show some differences regarding the size and also significance of their effects. In 
general, the analyses made with Brazilian data find small but positive impacts of CCTs 
on schooling outcomes directly related to the conditions imposed: enrolment and 
attendance. 
Schaffland (2011), using the 2006 PNAD, estimates the effect of Bolsa Familia benefits 
on both school enrolment and school attendance with a regression discontinuity26 and a 
                                               
24 Child labour here is defined as any form of work, remunerated or not, performed by individuals below the legal working 
age. ILO’s convention 138 sets 15 years old as the basic minimum age at which children can start working, given that is 
usually when children should have finished compulsory schooling. In Brazil, the legal minimum age is 16 years old (or 14 
years old in case of apprentices). 
25
 For a detailed overview of CCTs studies, please refer to Fiszbein and Schady (2009). 
26 The regression discontinuity design was not considered a suitable method, given that there was no clear cut-off point for 
any of the different per capita incomes calculated. 
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propensity score matching approach. The propensity score matching approach indicates 
that the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for the whole sample (children 
aged 6 to 17 years old) is robust, fluctuating around 4% for the different matching 
methods. When the sample is divided, the ATTs for the younger subsample (from 6 to 9 
years old) are slightly higher than for the older one (10 to 15 years old), but not greater 
than 3% for any of the subsamples. The effects for school attendance are also significant 
and robust. Schaffland (2011) estimates that children in beneficiary families miss fewer 
days of school; an average of 0.3 days for the whole sample, and 0.32 to 0.38 days for 
the younger and 0.18 to 0.22 days for the older children, depending on the method 
applied. However, the author does not consider the participation of the children in 
labour market activities as part of the study. 
As highlighted by Ferro, Kassouf, and Levison (2010), Brazilian schools often operate in 
shifts and children can attend classes and still work before or after they go to school. 
Using data from the 2003 PNAD, the authors find that combinations of schooling and 
work appear to be relatively common; 9.26% of the 10- to 14-year-olds combined work 
with school activities, while 0.55% only worked and 88.16% only attended school.  
Incorporating the working possibilities in their study, Cardoso and Souza (2004) use a 
logit model to estimate the probability that a child aged 10 to 15 years would attend 
school or work. With data from the census for the year 2000, they show that children 
from families receiving cash transfers (the Bolsa Escola, in that year) have a higher 
probability of attending school, and the effect is about the same among the different 
samples defined. Yet, the results reveal no net effect on child labour, which is attributed 
to the low amount of transfers made. 
Cardoso and Souza (2004) also select the children into four categories: ‘only working’, 
‘working and attending school’, ‘only attending school’, and ‘not working and not 
attending school’. Their estimations indicate that the Bolsa Escola transfers reduce the 
incidence of ‘only working’ children at the same time as they increase the number of 
children ‘working and attending school’. The results, thus, suggest cash transfers 
increase school attendance by driving to school children who previously only worked or 
who neither worked nor studied (Cardoso and Souza (2004)). 
Also assessing the impact of the federal Bolsa Escola, Ferro, Kassouf, and Levison (2010) 
compare two samples from the 2003 PNAD: families receiving the benefits, and families 
who signed up but were waiting for the approval to receive the transfers. They use 
propensity score matching to estimate the PBE’s impacts on children’s school enrolment 
and both parents’ and children’s working decisions. For children between 6 and 15 
years old, the different models indicate an increase in school enrolment of 2% in urban 
areas and up to 4% in rural areas, both statistically significant. Additionally, unlike 
Cardoso and Souza (2004), Ferro, Kassouf, and Levison (2010) report a negative effect 
of transfers on children’s participation in the work force. The reduction is about 2% in 
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urban areas and even higher for rural areas, varying from 6% to 9% depending on the 
model considered. 
Cacciamali, Tatei, and Batista (2010) assess the impact of the Bolsa Familia on child 
labour and school attendance using the household survey for 2004, the first year in 
which the programme was in place. The probit model shows an increase of the 
probability of a child attending school, and such increase is even more accentuated 
among families living in rural areas. Somewhat counter-intuitively, however, the models 
reveal a positive and significant coefficient for child labour, so the probability of the 
child working increases if the family receives PBF benefits.  
Continuing the analysis, Cacciamali, Tatei, and Batista (2010) calculate the marginal 
effect of the Bolsa Familia on the probability of a child to ‘only study’, ‘study and work’, 
‘only work’, and ‘not study or work’. They conclude that the programme has a negative 
effect (2.5% in urban and 4% in rural areas) on the probability of a child to ‘not study or 
work’, so it reduces idleness significantly. In addition, the benefits seem to increase the 
probability to ‘only study’ by 1.36% in the urban area, but the marginal effect for rural 
areas is not statistically different from zero. 
Oliveira et al. (2007), in a policy evaluation report produced by the MDS, present some 
preliminary results of the PBF’s impacts on several key outcomes, such as health, 
education, labour market participation, and household expenditure. The data were 
gathered in a survey conducted by government agencies in November 2005 with three 
groups: families receiving the benefits (treatment group), families registered in the 
programme but not yet receiving the benefits (control 1), and, finally, families who did 
not apply for the programme even if eligible (control 2). Focusing on educational 
outcomes, the ATTs estimated by propensity score matching indicate that the Bolsa 
Familia increases school enrolment for children aged 7 to 14 years by 2.7 to 4.9% 
(compared to control group 1). The drop-out rate decreases by about 0.2% for children 
in families receiving the benefits (compared to control group 2). Finally, the coefficients 
estimated for progression rates are significant but do not have the expected sign (the 
ATT ranged from -2.3 to -3.9). The authors claim, however, that a negative impact on 
school progression could be due to a lower drop-out rate, so that children were 
remaining in school despite bad performance. They argue that without the programme, 
children performing badly would tend to drop out more easily and the negative impact 
on progression observed in the published results should not be permanent.27 
In a recent article, Kassouf and Glewwe (2012) use panel data obtained from Brazil’s 
school census,28 which contains information on schools (facilities and participation in 
                                               
27
 In the authors’ view, the new generations of children assisted by the Bolsa Familia would have better conditions to 
develop themselves in school, given that from a very young age the programme would allow them to have better nutrition 
and access to health services, and their families could spend more money on didactic materials. They expect that a higher 
attendance rate would also impact progression rates positively.  
28 The Brazilian school census is a survey conducted by Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anisio 
Teixeira (INEP), an institute linked to the Brazilian Ministry of Education (Miniterio da Educacao – MEC). The survey covers 
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governmental programmes, for example) and students’ educational outcomes. They 
estimate the impact of CCTs (Bolsa Escola and then Bolsa Familia) on enrolment, drop-
out rates, grade promotion, and grade repetition for children of school age (6 to 15 
years old). Even though the dataset used is very different, the results are in line with the 
ones estimated using the household surveys. Kassouf and Glewwe (2012) report 
significant impacts for all three outcomes and with the expected signs. From the 
different models estimated, the CCTs increase enrolment by about 5.5% in first to fourth 
grade (6 to 10 years old) and 6.5% in fifth to eighth grade (11 to 15 years old). It also 
decreases the drop-out rates by 0.5% and 0.4% for the younger and older subsamples, 
respectively. Finally, the promotion rate increases about 0.9% for children in first to 
fourth grades and 0.3% for children in fifth to eighth grades.  
Therefore, most of the researchers reveal small effects of Bolsa Escola / Bolsa Familia 
on educational outcomes. Kassouf and Glewwe (2012), Schaffland (2011), Ferro, 
Kassouf, and Levison (2010), and also Cacciamali, Tatei, and Batista (2010) all point out 
that the programmes in Brazil target children in an age group which already has high 
enrolment in school, so even with no cash transfer most of those children would still be 
enrolled. In fact, Schwartzman (2005) highlights that educational coverage in basic 
education is almost universal, so a small monetary transfer by itself could not make a 
significant difference on school enrolment. The aggregate data from the 2003 PNAD 
indicate that the enrolment rate for children from families who are still waiting to 
receive the monetary transfers is very similar to those already receiving the benefits, 
rather than to those who have not applied to the PBE (Schwartzman (2005)). This 
drawback is also observed in studies which evaluate the impact of CCTs on education in 
other countries, as exposed by Fiszbein and Schady (2009). 
Fiszbein and Schady (2009), however, argue that the low impact of CCTs on educational 
outcomes could be attributed not only to a high baseline enrolment, but also to 
differences in the expected rate of return to schooling. Thus, if the individuals select 
their school level based on expected returns to education, those children who expect to 
benefit the most from schooling would enrol first, so the rate of return for the marginal 
non-enrolled child may be higher when overall schooling levels are low. Also, Cardoso 
and Souza (2004), comparing their estimation results with aggregate data for the 
treatment and comparison groups, conclude that an increase of 3 percentage points on 
school attendance among boys is a big effect, given that only 8% of boys in the 
comparison group were out of school.  
Parallel to the debate regarding the magnitude of the impacts of cash transfers on 
enrolment and attendance is the discussion about the cost-effectiveness of these 
programmes. In Brazil, the amount spent on the Bolsa Familia increased steadily over 
the years, reaching 0.42% of the country’s GDP in 2011. Kassouf and Glewwe (2012) 
project that the Bolsa Escola / Bolsa Familia would lead to an increase in long-run 
                                                                                                                                                  
both private and public schools and contains data on students’ enrolments, migration between schools, and performance, 
as well as schools’ administrative aspects.  
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enrolment of 18%, which in their opinion is not an expressive improvement if we take 
into account the costs of such programmes. The authors calculated, using the 2004 
PNAD, that one extra year in school would lead to an increase of about 11% in wages, so 
the wages for the whole population would rise by 1.5%29 (or 0.8% of GDP). However, 
while the programme costs are incurred today, the benefits are spread over the 
individual’s productive lifetime; thus the estimated net present value of an increase on 
the whole population’s wage would be around 0.3 to 0.4% of GDP, depending on the 
discount rate used. Moreover, there are also direct costs of education, such as school 
facilities, teachers, and other school supplies (Kassouf and Glewwe (2012)).  
Even though the impacts on educational outcomes are not regarded as expressive by 
many authors, the PBF has other short- and long-run objectives which should not be 
overlooked. For instance, if we consider reducing child labour as an indirect but equally 
important goal,30 most of the studies which analyse the occupational choices indicate 
changes in the time allocation of children living in households receiving the CCTs. The 
researchers, however, agree that child labour is a complex phenomenon and poverty 
per se is not its only determinant. Thus, simply increasing household income would not 
put an end to early entry into the labour market or to the poverty trap. In fact, Carvalho 
Filho (2008) studied the impact of a social security reform on school enrolment and 
child labour in Brazil for children between 10 and 14 years old, concluding that an 
exogenous variation of household income does affect school enrolment (especially for 
girls) but does not have a large significant effect on child labour. Carvalho Filho (2008) 
also points out that pure cash transfers (without any conditions imposed) are not cost-
effective policies to induce changes in family behaviour regarding children’s schooling 
and work decisions. 
Ferreira and Leite (2003) used microsimulations to forecast the impact of different 
social policy scenarios on poverty and inequality, school enrolment (at different levels), 
and gender equality. The first scenario simulated the impact of policies which increase 
individuals’ educational endowments, and concludes that they are not sufficient to 
reduce poverty or inequality and do not change the children’s occupational choices. 
However, when those policies were combined with lump-sum transfers to poor 
households (in the same way as happens in CCTs), the forecast shows a reduction in 
both poverty and inequality as well as an expressive increase in net enrolment. The 
simulations indicate that even if poverty could be reduced with such policies, the impact 
on children’s occupational choices is negligible and about one third of the individuals 
receiving the benefits would still be working in the market.  
Therefore, even if there is no consensus regarding the effectiveness of the PBF, the 
results made available so far indicate that the programme does have some impact on 
the areas targeted, such as school enrolment and attendance. On the other hand, the 
                                               
29 Calculations made based on Hoffman (2006). 
30 Fiszbein and Schady (2009) highlight that a reduction in child work is often seen as a good in its own right, since working 
under poor conditions can adversely affect both the physical and mental health of children. 
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programme does not seem to change expressively the participation of children and 
adolescents in the labour force. It is clear, though, that pure supply-side policies (such 
as investments in infrastructure and subsidies) are not sufficient on their own to 
achieve the desired development in the short or long run. 
B. The impact of Bolsa Familia on children’s occupational choices 
The estimations made in this section follow the assumptions of the model presented in 
Basu and Van (1998). Here, the children’s time allocation is determined by altruistic 
parents, who take their children’s interests into account. Basu and Van (1998) argue 
that in very poor countries, parents usually withdraw their children from the labour 
force as soon as they can afford to do so. Thus, children’s leisure (or non-work) is 
considered a luxury good.  
Developing the model further, part of the children’s leisure time can be used to 
accumulate human capital and the parents take into account the potential increase on 
their children’s future wages promoted by higher schooling levels (see, e.g., Emerson 
and Souza (2002); Soares, Kruger, and Berthelon (2012)).31 As Soares, Kruger, and 
Berthelon (2012) explain, for sufficiently low family consumption, the marginal utility 
of consumption is so high that the family would allocate all of the children’s time to the 
labour market, but as the family’s consumption grows and marginal utility of 
consumption declines they start allocating some of the children’s time to human capital 
formation. This process continues until the children dedicate all their time to schooling. 
In the Brazilian context, schooling and work are not mutually exclusive and given that 
children can combine both activities, the parents maximise the household utility by 
deciding the amount of the children’s time which will be dedicated to schooling (to 
increase future earnings) and to work (to guarantee current consumption). Therefore, 
by increasing the household income and at the same time imposing school enrolment 
and attendance, the Bolsa Familia could change the dynamics of the decision process.  
In order to analyse more formally the contribution of cash income transfers to the 
changes in children’s occupational choices which are observed in aggregate data, I use 
the microdata from the 2006 household survey (PNAD). In that year the respondents 
were asked specifically if anyone in the household received the Bolsa Familia transfers, 
and therefore it is possible to compare a group of children whose families received the 
benefit with those who were technically eligible but did not receive PBF transfers. 
It is difficult to rule out completely the problem of self-selection, which could lead to 
different behaviour among individuals receiving and not receiving the transfers in the 
samples used. However, it does not seem reasonable that families in a situation of 
poverty (or extreme poverty) would not be willing to receive the cash transfers to 
                                               
31 Emerson and Souza (2002) and Soares, Kruger, and Berthelon (2012) also assume families face credit constraints due to a 
limited access to credit markets, so they cannot borrow against future earnings of the children. 
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increase their income. In 2006, families with monthly per capita income up to R$12032 
were eligible to receive the benefits. However, from the data available for that year, we 
notice that there was not a clear cut in participation and some families receiving the 
transfers had reported income greater than the official threshold. In addition, there is 
no information available regarding the families who actually applied for the benefits. 
The income per capita is the main criteria for selection, but if a family is considered to 
be in a vulnerable situation (with extreme fluctuations in their income) they could also 
receive the benefits, according to the programme’s rules. 
The first step taken to restrict the sample is to exclude all children attending private 
schools, since families receiving (or who could receive) the PBF benefits do not have 
means to afford it. Next, the work income of the household was calculated by 
subtracting the total amount of benefits from all households income. Then, the final 
sample was limited to families with total work income less than or equal to R$1,050,33 
or three times the minimum wage in 2006. 
Finally, the analysis is focused on the age group directly included in the programme’s 
conditionality, so the final sample has 27,041 children between 10 and 15 years old.34 
Table 2 presents some main statistics related to children of families receiving the Bolsa 
Familia and those with similar work income but not receiving the benefits. 
 The two subsamples seem very similar in terms of children’s characteristics; however, 
a few differences can be noticed regarding the geographical location of the families and 
the household income, which result from the programme’s design and target 
population. For instance, the fact that individuals receiving the PBF benefits are 
concentrated in the northeast region of Brazil is not surprising, since the area is known 
for its poverty and numerous families living there are in a very vulnerable situation, 
indeed. 
Using the samples above, we can estimate the effects of PBF on school attendance and 
children’s occupational choice. First, Section B.1 presents the results for estimations 
regarding school attendance using linear probability models and logistic models. Then, 
in Section B.2 the ATTs estimated with a propensity score matching approach are 
compared to the effects in Section B.1. Finally, Section B.3 contains the impacts on 
occupational choice, estimated by using a multinomial logit model.  
 
                                               
32 Using 2006 exchange rates, US$55 or NOK 354. In that year, households with monthly income per capita up to R$88 
(US$40 / NOK 258) were considered below the poverty line. 
33 US$483 or NOK 3,096 in 2006 exchange rates. 
34 The families also receive an allowance if younger children are enrolled and attending school; however, there is not 
sufficient information regarding labour market participation for individuals below 10 years old. 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
age 13397 12.37 1.674 10 15 age 13643 12.40 1.700 10 15
male 13397 0.512 0.500 0 1 male 13643 0.512 0.500 0 1
nonwhite 13397 0.726 0.446 0 1 nonwhite 13643 0.636 0.481 0 1
grade in school 12873 4.755 1.846 1 9 grade in school 12955 4.924 1.935 1 9
primary school 12899 0.961 0.194 0 1 primary 12994 0.932 0.252 0 1
high school 12899 0.035 0.183 0 1 high school 12994 0.061 0.240 0 1
adult education - primary school 12899 0.003 0.058 0 1 adult education - primary school 12994 0.005 0.069 0 1
economically active 13397 0.215 0.411 0 1 economically active 13643 0.142 0.349 0 1
north region 13397 0.150 0.357 0 1 north region 13643 0.174 0.379 0 1
northeast region 13397 0.539 0.498 0 1 northeast region 13643 0.302 0.459 0 1
southeast region 13397 0.174 0.379 0 1 southeast region 13643 0.262 0.440 0 1
south region 13397 0.077 0.267 0 1 south region 13643 0.131 0.337 0 1
center region 13397 0.060 0.238 0 1 center region 13643 0.131 0.338 0 1
rural area 13397 0.320 0.466 0 1 rural area 13643 0.175 0.380 0 1
number of household members 13397 5.540 2.030 2 17 number of household members 13643 4.537 1.648 2 16
number of children in household (5 to 17 years old) 13397 2.781 1.330 1 11 number of children in household (5 to 17 years old) 13643 2.135 1.118 1 8
household with both parents 13397 0.759 0.428 0 1 household with both parents 13643 0.684 0.465 0 1
household with a single parent 13397 0.218 0.413 0 1 household with a single parent 13643 0.294 0.456 0 1
household other income (i.e., benefits) 13397 75.02 54.64 0 1295 household other income (i.e., benefits) 13643 17.44 86.23 0 2500
household total work income 13397 471.04 268.05 0 1050 household total work income 13643 611.21 270.19 0 1050
household total work income per capita 13397 93.89 61.79 0 525 household total work income per capita 13643 150.11 82.91 0 525
BF subsample Not BF subsample
TABLE 2 - Descriptive statistics for participants and non-participants of PBF
Source: PNAD 2006; Own calculations
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B.1. Bolsa Familia and school attendance: LPM and logit estimations 
Given the conditions imposed on school enrolment and attendance for children living in 
households receiving the PBF benefits, it is natural to expect a positive impact of the 
program on those variables. Even though the PNAD 2006 has information on the 
number of days the children did not attend classes, this figure is missing for many 
individuals. Therefore, the focus is on whether the child is going regularly to school or 
not.35 The model to be estimated may be written as follows: 
              
        (1) 
where    is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if individual i is attending school 
and 0 if he/she is not;  is the constant term,  is the (1 x K) vector of coefficients for the 
control variables included in the (1 x K) vector   , and is the coefficient to be estimated 
for the PBF dummy. 
The control variables in    include both individual (age, gender, ethnicity, number of 
siblings between 5 and 17 years old, and working situation) and parent characteristics 
(schooling level, gender, working situation). The variables related to the parents’ 
characteristics are separated into two groups, households where both parents are 
present and households with only a single parent, in order to account for the impact of 
each parent (head or not) more precisely. Other controls include regional dummies 
(North, Northeast, Southeast, South, and Centre regions) and household characteristics 
(total work income per capita, persons per room, property ownership, if the household 
has electricity, phone, and TV available, and if it is located in a rural area). Table 3 
presents a list of all control variables included.  
 
                                               
35 Derived from the question ‘Is the person attending school regularly?’  
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Label
attschool 0.958 0.201 0 1 Attending school
BF 0.496 0.500 0 1 BF=1 if household received BF benefits
age10to11 0.354 0.478 0 1 Age group 10 to 11 years old
age14to15 0.304 0.460 0 1 Age group 14 to 15 years old
nonwhite 0.680 0.466 0 1 Non-white ethnicity (black, yellow, indigene, multiracial)
male 0.512 0.500 0 1 Gender (=1 if male)
sibling0 0.238 0.426 0 1 No siblings between 5 and 17 years old
sibling2to3 0.334 0.472 0 1 2 or 3 siblings between 5 and 17 years old
sibling4to5 0.062 0.241 0 1 4 or 5 siblings between 5 and 17 years old
sibling6ormore 0.008 0.088 0 1 6 or more siblings between 5 and 17 years old
ocup 0.156 0.363 0 1 occupied in the reference year
person2 0.436 0.496 0 1 Up to 2 persons per room
person3 0.064 0.244 0 1 Up to 3 persons per room
person4 0.016 0.127 0 1 Up to 4 persons per room
personmore4 0.011 0.106 0 1 More than 4 persons per room
HHcond1 0.729 0.445 0 1 Live in owned property
HHcond2 0.025 0.157 0 1 Live in owned property (not fully paid)
HHcond3 0.114 0.317 0 1 Live in rented property
HHcond4 0.036 0.187 0 1 Live in property owned by employer
HHcond5 0.085 0.278 0 1 Live in offered property
electricity 0.949 0.221 0 1 Household had electicity
phone 0.595 0.491 0 1 Household had phone
tv 0.894 0.308 0 1 Household had tv
rural 0.246 0.431 0 1 Household in rural area
NO 0.162 0.369 0 1 North region
NE 0.419 0.493 0 1 Northeast region
SE 0.218 0.413 0 1 Southeast region
CE 0.096 0.294 0 1 Centre region
HHwithC1C2 0.721 0.449 0 1 Household with both parents
C2notHH 0.257 0.437 0 1 Household with single parent
totalworkincpercapita 122.29 78.41 0 525 Household total work income (per capita)
C1schooling1to3R 0.149 0.356 0 1 Head of household's schooling: 1 to 3 years
C1schooling4to7R 0.248 0.432 0 1 Head of household's schooling: 4 to 7 years
C1schooling8to10R 0.085 0.279 0 1 Head of household's schooling: 8 to 10 years
C1schooling11moreR 0.074 0.261 0 1 Head of household's schooling: 11 years or more
C1workR 0.657 0.475 0 1 Head HH is occupied
C1male 0.681 0.466 0 1 Head HH is male
C2schooling1to3R 0.144 0.352 0 1 Spouse's schooling: 1 to 3 years
C2schooling4to7R 0.269 0.443 0 1 Spouse's schooling: 4 to 7 years
C2schooling8to10R 0.091 0.288 0 1 Spouse's schooling: 8 to 10 years
C2schooling11moreR 0.084 0.278 0 1 Spouse's schooling: 11 years or more
C2workR 0.472 0.499 0 1 Spouse occupied
C1schooling1to3M 0.041 0.198 0 1 Single parent's schooling: 1 to 3 years
C1schooling4to7M 0.084 0.277 0 1 Single parent's schooling: 4 to 7 years
C1schooling8to10M 0.037 0.189 0 1 Single parent's schooling: 8 to 10 years
C1schooling11moreM 0.043 0.202 0 1 Single parent's schooling: 11 years or more
C1workM 0.190 0.392 0 1 Single parent is occupied
TABLE 3 - Independent and control variables used
Source: PNAD 2006; Own calculations
Individual's characteristics
Household's characteristics
Parent's characteristics
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A natural starting point is to estimate the impact of Bolsa Familia benefits on the 
probability of a child attending school by means of a linear probability model: 
  (                    |                  
       (2) 
The coefficients can be estimated by OLS and have a straightforward interpretation, 
which is a big advantage of using such an approach. Moreover, the estimated coefficient 
for PBF ( ̂) is consistent, unbiased, and can be given causal interpretation if the 
conditional independence assumption (CIA) holds. The CIA implies that the potential 
outcomes are independent of the treatment status, conditional on the vector of 
observables ( ). Formally,  
(         |     (3) 
where    is the child’s potential outcome when the family is receiving PBF benefits and 
   is the potential outcome when the family is not receiving PBF benefits;    is the 
treatment, or the participation in the Bolsa Familia. The ideal scenario to assess the 
impact of a policy such as the PBF would require one to observe all individuals in the 
sample in both situations regarding the treatment, or to observe them as beneficiaries 
( 
 
    |       and non-beneficiaries of the programme (      |      . It is clear, 
though, that this scenario is not realistic and once selection of families is done, it is only 
possible to observe two outcomes:    for the beneficiaries (   |       and    for the 
non-beneficiaries of the Bolsa Familia (   |      . 
The CIA means that after controlling for  , the PBF assignment is ‘as good as random’; 
all relevant differences between the treated and control groups is captured in  . Given 
that the CIA holds, the observed outcomes for non-beneficiaries of the Bolsa Familia 
(   |     ) can be used as an approximation to the counterfactual outcomes of those 
receiving the benefits had they not been selected to participate in the programme, 
(   |     ), which are, in fact, unobservable. The CIA thus ensures that after 
controlling for the observable covariates in X, comparisons of the observed outcomes 
(   |       and (   |       provide unbiased estimates of the causal effects of 
participation in the PBF on school attendance. In addition, under the CIA the OLS 
estimators can also be proven to be consistent.36 
The results reported in Table 4 below confirm that the cash transfers made to the PBF 
families do have a positive effect on the probability that a child attends school. The 
coefficient is statistically significant but the magnitude of its impact is not very large; 
participation in the programme increases school attendance by 2.4 percentage points. 
As for the other variables, the ethnicity (non-white) and regional dummies are not 
statistically significant. Also, the parent’s working situation does not seem to be relevant 
in this model. The age of the child is significant for both age groups included and the 
                                               
36 See more in Cameron and Trivedi (2005). 
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coefficients indicate that older children are less likely to attend school. Also, the 
coefficient for the age group of 14 to 15 years old is twice the size of the PBF coefficient, 
so age itself has a great impact on the probability of the child attending school. Another 
variable relevant in the model is ‘ocup’, indicating whether the child worked during the 
year of reference. It points out that children engaging in market activities have a lower 
probability (by about 4.8 percentage points) of attending school. 
Many of the wealth-related variables (for household characteristics) included either are 
not significant at the 5% level or have a negligible coefficient. However, children whose 
families own the property where they live have a greater probability of attending 
school. Also, the concentration of people in the household is significant and an increase 
in the number of persons per room available decreases the probability of the child going 
to school. Finally, with the exception of ‘C1schooling1to3R’ (head of household’s 
schooling: 1 to 3 years), all parent’s schooling dummies are significant and point to an 
increase in the probability of the child attending school with an increase in the parent’s 
schooling. The largest effect is found for single parents and the gender of the head of 
household does not appear to be relevant.37 
                                               
37 All coefficients estimated by OLS are reported in the Appendix (II. OLS and Logit regressions). 
54 
 
 
Pi (child attends school | BF,X)
BF 0.010 ** [ 0.006 ; 0.015 ] 0.018 ** [ 0.013 ; 0.023 ] 0.023 ** [ 0.018 ; 0.028 ] 0.024 ** [ 0.019 ; 0.030 ]
age10to11   0.011 ** [ 0.007 ; 0.016 ] 0.012 ** [ 0.008 ; 0.016 ] 0.011 ** [ 0.007 ; 0.016 ]
age14to15  -0.051 ** [ -0.058 ; -0.045 ] -0.052 ** [ -0.059 ; -0.046 ] -0.052 ** [ -0.058 ; -0.045 ]
nonwhite  -0.010 ** [ -0.015 ; -0.005 ] -0.003 [ -0.009 ; 0.002 ] -0.002 [ -0.007 ; 0.003 ]
male  -0.010 ** [ -0.014 ; -0.005 ] -0.010 ** [ -0.014 ; -0.005 ] -0.010 ** [ -0.014 ; -0.005 ]
sibling0   -0.007 ** [ -0.013 ; -0.001 ] -0.013 ** [ -0.019 ; -0.006 ] -0.009 ** [ -0.015 ; -0.002 ]
sibling2to3  -0.012 ** [ -0.018 ; -0.007 ] 0.002 [ -0.004 ; 0.008 ] 0.003 [ -0.003 ; 0.009 ]
sibling4to5   -0.031 ** [ -0.044 ; -0.019 ] 0.002 [ -0.011 ; 0.016 ] 0.004 [ -0.009 ; 0.017 ]
sibling6ormore   -0.024 [ -0.058 ; 0.010 ] 0.023 [ -0.012 ; 0.057 ] 0.027 [ -0.008 ; 0.061 ]
ocup  -0.053 ** [ -0.062 ; -0.044 ] -0.048 ** [ -0.058 ; -0.039 ] -0.048 ** [ -0.058 ; -0.039 ]
_cons 0.952 ** [ 0.949 ; 0.956 ] 0.988 ** [ 0.982 ; 0.995 ] 0.882 ** [ 0.840 ; 0.925 ] 0.886 ** [ 0.843 ; 0.929 ]
Household's characteristics
Parent's characteristics
Number of observations
R-squared
Source: PNAD 2006; Own calculations
27040
0.001
*Statistically significant at 10%;  **Statistically significant at 5%
95% Confidence Interval in brackets
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
TABLE 4: Linear Probability Model
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
26992
0.058
27040
0.036
26992
0.052
YES
YES
NO
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Even if it offers a clearer understanding of the relationship between the variables and, 
therefore, an easier understanding of the estimation results, the linear probability 
model can have some limitations which are difficult to solve. For instance, the fitted 
values estimated can be outside the [0,1] interval, which does not make sense when 
dealing with probabilities. It can also lead to negative variance for the error term, 
conditional on the regressors. In addition, in the LPM an increase in one of the control 
variables always changes P(Y=1|X) by the same amount, regardless of the initial value of 
the control, so it does not produce accurate estimates of partial effects for extreme 
values of the independent variables (Wooldridge (2001)). The partial effects estimated 
can still be a reliable approximation of the response probability, though, if the extreme 
values are disregarded and we consider more central values of the controls.  
Therefore, while some authors do not encourage the use of LPM (see Greene (2003) for 
examples), others still consider it a valid method, especially when its results are similar 
to the ones obtained using non-linear models. Nevertheless, it is good practice to check 
the performance of LPM estimations by using a logistic model: 
  (                    |      
   (         
  
     (         
  
    (4) 
 
By construction, the probabilities estimated are always constrained between 0 and 1 in 
such a model, and it accounts for non-linearity of effects from explanatory variables. 
Since the purpose of this study is to evaluate the effect of participation in a social 
programme, it does not seem very relevant to consider non-linearity in the response 
function for the control variables included in   . In fact, since the estimations using 
discrete variables as a control performed slightly better, these are used as the basis for 
analysis. Table 5 presents the results for the logit model. 
Although the coefficients estimated are not directly comparable in the two models 
described above, they do have the same signs in both models and indicate a positive 
impact of the PBF on school attendance. In order to facilitate the comparison, the 
marginal effects of a change in the control variables are calculated based on the 
coefficients of the logit model. In Table 6, the marginal effect of the variable ‘BF’ 
measures the change in probability of a child attending school if his/her family is 
receiving PBF benefits. The marginal effect of the PBF from the logit model is very 
similar to the coefficient estimated by OLS and, in fact, the same is observed for the 
other control variables (the full table is given in the Appendix). 
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Pi (child attends school | BF,X) Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
BF 0.2575 ** [ 0.1382 ; 0.3768 ] 0.4571 ** [ 0.3291 ; 0.5850 ] 0.5843 ** [ 0.4475 ; 0.7211 ] 0.6090 ** [ 0.4711 ; 0.7468 ]
age10to11   0.5790 ** [ 0.3788 ; 0.7792 ] 0.6110 ** [ 0.4089 ; 0.8131 ] 0.5928 ** [ 0.3901 ; 0.7955 ]
age14to15  -1.0248 ** [ -1.1693 ; -0.8804 ] -1.0877 ** [ -1.2350 ; -0.9404 ] -1.0738 ** [ -1.2218 ; -0.9257 ]
nonwhite  -0.2771 ** [ -0.4150 ; -0.1391 ] -0.1123 [ -0.2596 ; 0.0351 ] -0.0721 [ -0.2204 ; 0.0762 ]
male  -0.2519 ** [ -0.3758 ; -0.1279 ] -0.2524 ** [ -0.3788 ; -0.1261 ] -0.2451 ** [ -0.3723 ; -0.1179 ]
sibling0   -0.2140 ** [ -0.3802 ; -0.0478 ] -0.3728 ** [ -0.5479 ; -0.1977 ] -0.2680 ** [ -0.4465 ; -0.0895 ]
sibling2to3  -0.3477 ** [ -0.5007 ; -0.1948 ] 0.0208 [ -0.1431 ; 0.1847 ] 0.0381 [ -0.1274 ; 0.2036 ]
sibling4to5   -0.7160 ** [ -0.9453 ; -0.4866 ] 0.0397 [ -0.2138 ; 0.2931 ] 0.0975 [ -0.1583 ; 0.3533 ]
sibling6ormore   -0.5640 * [ -1.1347 ; 0.0067 ] 0.3875 [ -0.2095 ; 0.9845 ] 0.4683 [ -0.1330 ; 1.0695 ]
ocup  -0.8975 ** [ -1.0303 ; -0.7646 ] -0.8097 ** [ -0.9529 ; -0.6664 ] -0.8106 ** [ -0.9577 ; -0.6635 ]
_cons 2.9968 ** [ 2.9180 ; 3.0756 ] 4.0202 ** [ 3.8214 ; 4.2190 ] 2.1963 ** [ 1.5087 ; 2.8838 ] 2.1345 ** [ 1.4388 ; 2.8303 ]
Household's characteristics
Parent's characteristics
Number of obs
Pseudo R-squared
Log likelihood 
Source: PNAD 2006; Own calculations
26992
0.1341
-4092.29
26992
0.1516
-4009.68
27040
0.0019
-4738.01
27040
0.0906
-4317.07
NO NO NO YES
*Statistically significant at 10%;  **Statistically significant at 5%
95% Confidence Interval in brackets
Table 5 - Logit Model
NO NO YES YES
57 
 
 
 
Hence, the estimations above produced consistent results in line with prior 
expectations. As discussed previously in the literature, the impact of cash transfers on 
school attendance is usually small, although statistically significant. Taking into 
consideration that most of the children in this age group are already frequenting school 
(around 96% in this sample), it appears natural that the magnitude of the Bolsa Familia 
impact would be somewhat limited. 
B.2. Bolsa Familia and school attendance: Propensity score matching estimations 
During its implementation, the PBF was not randomly assigned among the eligible 
families; therefore the effects of school attendance reported so far could suffer from 
selection bias and part of the estimated impact of the PBF could, in reality, be attributed 
to intrinsic differences among the treated (receiving the benefits) and the control group 
(not receiving the benefits).  
One way to avoid the selection bias is to use propensity score matching (PSM). With this 
approach a comparison group is constructed based on characteristics observed in the 
whole sample, so that they are as similar as possible to the treated group. In order to 
identify the impact correctly, besides the CIA (3), the PSM approach requires the 
common support condition to be followed.38 This condition states that for each value of 
 , there is a positive probability of being treated or untreated: 
0  (    |       (5) 
It ensures that there is a sufficient overlap in observed characteristics among treated 
and control groups, which makes the matching possible. 
                                               
38 Cf. Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for a more detailed explanation of assumptions and derivation of results. 
Pi (child attends school | BF,X)
BF 0.024 ** [ 0.019 ; 0.030 ] 0.023 ** [ 0.017 ; 0.028 ]
age10to11 0.011 ** [ 0.007 ; 0.016 ] 0.022 ** [ 0.014 ; 0.030 ]
age14to15 -0.052 ** [ -0.058 ; -0.045 ] -0.040 ** [ -0.046 ; -0.034 ]
nonwhite -0.002 [ -0.007 ; 0.003 ] -0.003 [ -0.008 ; 0.003 ]
male -0.010 ** [ -0.014 ; -0.005 ] -0.009 ** [ -0.014 ; -0.004 ]
sibling0 -0.009 ** [ -0.015 ; -0.002 ] -0.010 ** [ -0.017 ; -0.003 ]
sibling2to3 0.003 [ -0.003 ; 0.009 ] 0.001 [ -0.005 ; 0.008 ]
sibling4to5 0.004 [ -0.009 ; 0.017 ] 0.004 [ -0.006 ; 0.013 ]
sibling6ormore 0.027 [ -0.008 ; 0.061 ] 0.017 [ -0.005 ; 0.040 ]
ocup -0.048 ** [ -0.058 ; -0.039 ] -0.030 ** [ -0.036 ; -0.025 ]
Household's characteristics
Parent's characteristics
Source: PNAD 2006; Own calculations
YES
YES
YES
YES
Table 6 - LPM and Logit estimations
LPM LOGIT
Coefficient Margins (dy/dx)
*Statistically significant at 10%;  **Statistically significant at 5%
95% Confidence Interval in brackets
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However, matching individuals becomes complicated when the number of covariates in 
the vector   is large. Hence, instead of comparing the characteristics in   for each 
individual the matching is done based on a propensity score, or the conditional 
probability of receiving the treatment, given  . We define the propensity score as 
follows: 
 (    |       (     (6) 
If the characteristics included as control variables are well balanced between the group 
receiving the PBF benefits and those not receiving them, then after conditioning on  (   
the participation in the PBF is independent of individual-specific characteristics: 
     |  (    (7) 
With (7) it is assumed that the characteristics between two groups with the same 
propensity score value would be roughly balanced. Then if the CIA holds, it can be 
proven39 that 
(         |   (         | (     (8) 
It is crucial, though, for an accurate estimation of the model that assumptions (3) and 
(5) do hold. Even if it is not possible to test the CIA in a formal sense, the set of 
covariates ( ) used to estimate the propensity scores for the PBF are in line with the 
programme’s eligibility criteria; they are consistent with the bureaucratic rules set by 
the MDS to define the selection into the programme. The eligible families are registered 
in the government’s central record (CadUnico) and the selection of those who receive 
the benefits is made by the MDS, not by social servants at the local agencies. The federal 
government decides the allowance given to each municipality based on the estimated 
number of poor families living in the region obtained from the household survey. As 
discussed in Soares (2012), the PBF benefits are not an entitlement, so once the budget 
is exhausted, new families are included only if other families leave the programme. 
Therefore, given the number of families applying to receive the benefits, the budget set 
to each municipality, and the estimations of the number of families living below the 
poverty line, the beneficiaries are chosen from the central database taking into account 
the family’s characteristics (number and age of children, presence of pregnant women, 
and household income, for example). As the decision is made far away from each 
municipality, it seems reasonable to assume that there is no systematic pattern to the 
selection, besides the comparison of the families’ characteristics, and, provided that two 
or more families report similar household characteristics, it is expected that the 
selection of which one receives the benefits should be random. 
                                               
39 See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), for example. When the ATT is the treatment 
estimator of interest, it is only necessary to estimate the appropriate counterfactual, so (4) can be relaxed to      | . 
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Also, it is assumed that participation in the Bolsa Familia does not influence the set of 
controls available, consisting of individual and household characteristics which are 
included in .40 
The common support condition, on the other hand, can be verified by using statistical 
programs (such as STATA). This assumption implies that participation in the 
programme is not perfectly predictable and, therefore, the probabilities of receiving or 
not receiving PBF benefits, conditional on the covariates, lies between 0 and 1. Table 7 
presents the region of common support as estimated in STATA. 
 
 
 
There are only 23 observations of ‘off support’, indicating that the sample used is fairly 
balanced. Then, the PSM estimations are carried out with the 26,969 observations 
belonging to the common support area, so that 13,610 observations belong to the 
untreated group and 13,382 to the treated group. 
There are different ways to implement the PSM method. The first-stage estimations are 
made with a probit model (presented in the Appendix, Table A.11), which reports 
statistically significant coefficients for most of the variables included as controls. 
Heinrich, Maffioli, and Vazquez (2010) suggest that one should include not only the 
explicit criteria determining participation in the programmes in the estimations, but 
also any factors associated with self-selection or relevant administrative aspects. Thus, 
we keep in the model children’s as well as household’s and parent’s characteristics 
which are considered relevant for participation in the PBF as well as for the decisions 
on children´s schooling.  
The ATTs are estimated using different matching techniques; one-to-one, nearest 
neighbour, radius, kernel, and local linear regression matching. It is important to 
compare the results for all these matching methods in order to verify the consistency of 
the effects calculated (Table 8).  
                                               
40 Participation in a social programme could indeed lead individuals to change their incentives to work. If in order to receive 
the benefits families on purpose reduced their income (by reducing the amount of work performed), the variables ‘work 
income per capita’ and the dummies for parent’s employment status would violate this assumption. There is no evidence 
for such behaviour, however, in empirical work using the Brazilian data (see Ferro, Kassouf, and Levison (2010), and 
Oliveira et al. (2007) for further details).  
Treatment assignment Off support On support Total
Untreated 0 13,610 13,610
Treated 23 13,359 13,382
Total 23 26,969 26,992
Source: PNAD 2006; Own calculations
Table 7 - Common support area
Common support area
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All the methods mentioned above indicate that after matching individuals with similar 
characteristics, the difference on school attendance for children part of the PBF 
increases vis-à-vis their counterpart in the control group. So, all the methods used 
indicate that the Bolsa Familia increases the probability that a child attends school by 
nearly 3%. All the effects calculated are statistically significant at a 5% level. 
Even though the effects estimated appear to be consistent, it is still necessary to check 
the quality of the matching, assessing the balancing condition. If (7) holds, after 
conditioning on  (   there should be no other variables which, if included in the set of 
control variables, would improve the estimations. Also, after the matching there should 
be no significant difference between the means of the treatment and comparison groups 
(Heinrich, Maffioli, and Vazquez (2010)). The balancing condition can be tested with an 
after-matching test in STATA to guarantee the matching procedure was able to 
eliminate most of the bias due to non-random selection. 
Tables A.12 and A.13 in the Appendix present the results for the balancing test applied 
to all matching methods. We note that for the great majority of the variables, the PSM 
eliminates the sampling bias appropriately. Overall, the null hypothesis that the means 
for the control and treatment groups are not different after the matching cannot be 
rejected (at 5% or 10% level). Although some control variables (such as parent’s 
schooling levels and household characteristics which indicate the family’s wealth) do 
not appear to be well balanced in the sample, they seem important to the model 
specification and, therefore, they are kept in the control vector. 
The different techniques used to estimate the impacts of the Bolsa Familia on school 
attendance for children aged 10 to 15 years old in this section confirm that there is a 
positive impact on that specific outcome. The effect caused by participation in the social 
programme is statistically significant in all models, but the magnitude of the estimated 
impact never exceeds 3 percentage points. The ATTs calculated also seem consistent 
with the results from other authors, presented in Section V Part A. However, it is also 
important to consider the time allocation possibilities presented to children in this age 
group. As mentioned before, school functioning hours allow children to work at the 
same time as they are attending classes and there is no explicit condition imposed by 
Matching Method Unmatched 0.9629 0.9526 0.0103 0.0024 4.22 - -
One to one ATT 0.9629 0.9351 0.0278 0.0047 5.89 0.0056 5.00
Nearest neighbour ATT 0.9629 0.9354 0.0276 0.0041 6.70 0.0042 6.62
Radius ATT 0.9629 0.9339 0.0290 0.0033 8.76 0.0040 7.31
Kernel ATT 0.9629 0.9334 0.0295 0.0032 9.20 0.0032 9.24
Local linear regression ATT 0.9629 0.9355 0.0274 - - 0.0046 5.98
Table 8 - Propensity Score Matching
Source: PNAD 2006; Own calculations
S.E. T-stat
T-stat
(Bootstrap)
Std. Err. 
(Bootstrap)
Sample Treated Controls Difference
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the PBF regulating how those children should (or should not) engage in market 
activities. 
B.3. Bolsa Familia and occupational choices: Multinomial logit estimations 
Staying within a framework in which the family makes the decisions, children’s time can 
be divided between work and school. Then, they can ‘only study’, ‘only work’, ‘study and 
work’, or ‘not study or work’. Table 9 below shows the occupational choice for children 
in the sample used. It is possible to notice a few differences between the BF and Not-BF 
subsamples: Families not receiving the benefits have a higher proportion of children 
‘only studying’, while more children from BF families combine work and school. Also, 
there is a very low percentage of individuals in the 10 to 15 years old age group who 
‘only work’ in both subsamples. 
 
 
 
More formally, we can use a multinomial logit model to assess possible changes in 
occupational choices driven by the participation in the Bolsa Familia programme. The 
estimations are based on the following model: 
   (          |       
   (           
 )
  ∑    (          
 )
 
   
 , where                     (9) 
The index i denotes individuals, and j the four possible outcomes (‘only study’, ‘only 
work’, ‘study and work’, or ‘not study or work)’. The variables in X are the same as in the 
LPM and logit models, except for the dummy representing the working status of the 
child (‘ocup’), which is excluded in order to avoid collinearity. In addition, dummies 
indicating whether the parents started to work before they were 18 years old are also 
included in the model. Even though most of the dummies for the parents’ age of entry 
into the labour market are not significant, the models estimated perform better with 
them as part of the set of controls. Summary statistics for subsamples defined according 
to the four occupational choice outcomes are given in Table 10. 
Option Observations Percentage Observations Percentage Observations Percentage
not sudying, not working 668 2.5 263 2.0 405 3.0
only studying 21,559 79.7 10,252 76.5 11,306 82.9
only working 479 1.8 235 1.8 244 1.8
studying and working 4,335 16.0 2,647 19.8 1,688 12.4
Total 27,041 100.0 13,397 100.0 13,643 100.0
Source: PNAD 2006; Own calculations
BF Not BF
TABLE 9 - Occupational choices for participants and non-participants of PBF
All sample
62 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
attschool 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
BF 0.39 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.61 0.49
age10to11 0.20 0.40 0.40 0.49 0.05 0.21 0.20 0.40
age14to15 0.51 0.50 0.25 0.43 0.78 0.41 0.49 0.50
nonwhite 0.75 0.43 0.67 0.47 0.71 0.45 0.71 0.45
male 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.70 0.46 0.62 0.49
sibling0 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.19 0.40
sibling2to3 0.37 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.48
sibling4to5 0.09 0.29 0.05 0.22 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.29
sibling6ormore 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.12
ocup 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.33 0.88 0.33
personless1 0.50 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.45 0.50
person2 0.13 0.34 0.06 0.23 0.13 0.34 0.08 0.27
person3 0.04 0.19 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.14
person4 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.19 0.01 0.12
personmore4 0.67 0.47 0.73 0.45 0.69 0.46 0.75 0.43
HHcond1 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15
HHcond2 0.15 0.36 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.08 0.26
HHcond3 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.18 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.21
HHcond4 0.08 0.26 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29
HHcond5 0.94 0.24 0.97 0.18 0.83 0.37 0.87 0.33
HHcond6 0.50 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.43 0.50
electricity1 0.81 0.39 0.92 0.27 0.70 0.46 0.79 0.41
phone 0.25 0.43 0.20 0.40 0.42 0.49 0.48 0.50
tv 0.22 0.42 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.36
rural 0.43 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.50 0.50
NO 0.22 0.42 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.36
NE 0.43 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.50 0.50
SE 0.20 0.40 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.16 0.37
CE 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.26
HHwithC1C2 0.61 0.49 0.72 0.45 0.66 0.48 0.76 0.43
C2notHH 0.35 0.48 0.26 0.44 0.32 0.47 0.22 0.42
C1startwork5to9R 0.15 0.35 0.13 0.34 0.19 0.39 0.27 0.45
C1startwork10to17R 0.34 0.47 0.45 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.43 0.50
C1schooling1to3R 0.15 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.17 0.37 0.20 0.40
C1schooling4to7R 0.16 0.37 0.26 0.44 0.17 0.38 0.22 0.41
C1schooling8to10R 0.03 0.18 0.10 0.29 0.01 0.11 0.05 0.22
C1schooling11moreR 0.04 0.19 0.08 0.28 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.19
C1workR 0.53 0.50 0.65 0.48 0.61 0.49 0.73 0.45
C1male 0.60 0.49 0.68 0.47 0.64 0.48 0.73 0.44
C1startwork5to9M 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.25 0.05 0.21
C1startwork10to17M 0.18 0.39 0.12 0.33 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.33
C1schooling1to3M 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.21
C1schooling4to7M 0.12 0.33 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.32 0.07 0.25
C1schooling8to10M 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17
C1schooling11moreM 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.21 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.16
C1workM 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.39 0.24 0.43 0.19 0.39
C2startwork5to9R 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26 0.13 0.33 0.18 0.38
C2startwork10to17R 0.22 0.42 0.30 0.46 0.35 0.48 0.43 0.49
C2schooling1to3R 0.15 0.35 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.36 0.20 0.40
C2schooling4to7R 0.19 0.39 0.27 0.45 0.19 0.39 0.26 0.44
C2schooling8to10R 0.05 0.23 0.10 0.30 0.03 0.18 0.06 0.24
C2schooling11moreR 0.03 0.18 0.09 0.29 0.01 0.11 0.05 0.21
C2workR 0.32 0.47 0.44 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.64 0.48
totalworkincpercapita 102.49 66.70 126.24 78.42 104.53 76.45 107.42 77.82
Observations 668 21559 479 4335
Source: PNAD 2006; Own calculations
TABLE 10 - Descriptive statistics for multinomial logit model
only studying only working studying and workingnot studying, not working
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 As a start, we define the first option (‘not studying, not working’) as the baseline 
alternative, since it ensures an intuitive understanding of the different coefficients 
estimated. 
  (
 (                  
 (                         
)   
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 (                         
)   
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 (                     
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)   
 
          (10.3) 
The coefficients estimated do not have a straightforward interpretation, but they 
provide an indication of the magnitude and direction of the effect. If the coefficients 
reported are interpreted as the relative log-odds of the different occupational choices, 
given the baseline choice, then we have three different  ̂ which indicate the change in 
log-odds of the occupational choice driven by participation in the PBF. All the 
coefficients estimated for the PBF are statistically significant at the 5% level and 
participation in the programme increases the odds of ‘only studying’ by 0.7, against ‘not 
study or work’. However, it also increases the relative odds of ‘only working’ by 0.34 
and the relative odds of ‘studying and working’ by 0.82.  
The relative probability of ‘only study’ is particularly important for policies like the 
Bolsa Familia since children below 16 years old are not legally allowed to work and 
primary school is compulsory in Brazil. If the PBF leads to an increase in the relative 
probability of ‘only study’, it could mean that the programme is effective in driving 
children to attend school and, perhaps, sustain the household income without the 
necessity of child labour. However, the change in relative log-odds is even larger for the 
last defined option, ‘studying and working’, showing that this could be the preferred 
alternative even if families have an increase in their income due to the cash transfers. 
Furthermore, it is unexpected that the PBF coefficient for the option ‘only work’ 
indicates an increase in relative probabilities versus ‘not studying or working’, since 
families who do not ensure their school-age children are enrolled and attending school 
lose the benefits.41  
If we instead take the default option for a child to be ‘only work’, the same multinomial 
logit model can be used to predict the changes in occupational choice driven by the 
Bolsa Familia. The motivation for choosing ‘only work’ as a baseline option comes from 
the specialised literature on child labour, which claims that poor families depend on all 
sources of income to survive. If that is the case, then necessity would make families 
prioritise the work option for all their members, including children. 
The coefficients estimated for the PBF dummy are significant to all alternative options 
to ‘only work’. In fact, the Bolsa Familia increases the relative odds for ‘only study’ and 
                                               
41 All coefficients are reported in Tables A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix. 
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‘study and work’ by 0.36 and 0.48 respectively. Participation in the programme would 
also reduce the relative odds of ‘not studying and not working’ by 0.34.  
Since the coefficients estimated do not have a straightforward interpretation, making it 
difficult to understand the impact of PBF on occupational choices, the marginal effects of 
a change in occupational option given that the families are receiving the benefit was 
calculated. The marginal effects of the PBF, derived from equation (9), are 
   
    
   [    ̅]   (11) 
Araujo et al. (2010) highlight that the marginal effects estimated do not necessarily have 
the same sign as the coefficients estimated. In our case, the marginal effects indicate the 
change in probability for the occupational options between children of beneficiary and 
non-beneficiary families, since ‘BF’ is a binary variable. 
As Table 11 shows, the marginal effect for a change towards ‘only study’ is very low and 
also not significant at 5% or 10% levels, but the estimations show that the Bolsa Familia 
decreases the probability of a child ‘only working’ by 0.006. Finally, the results imply 
that the PBF leads to an increase of almost 2 percentage points in the probability of a 
child ‘working and studying’. The marginal effects for other control variables can be 
found in the Appendix section (Table A.10). 
 
 
 
Therefore, it is clear that the conditions imposed on school attendance by the PBF 
reduce the probability that a child does not perform any kind of activity. In the Brazilian 
social context, inactivity among children and adolescents in the poorest income classes 
is not well regarded and usually associated (whether true or not) to unwanted 
behaviour and marginality. As a matter of fact, the specialised literature links children’s 
early entry into the labour market to the culture that work builds character and is the 
best option available, occasionally.42 So if the Bolsa Familia reduces inactivity and 
                                               
42 See Rizzini (2007), Assunção and Cruz (2009), and Cacciamali and Braga (2003). 
Option 1: 'Not study, not work' -0.017 ** [ -0.021 ; -0.012 ]
Option 2: 'Only study' 0.003 [ -0.006 ; 0.013 ]
Option 3: 'Only work' -0.006 ** [ -0.010 ; -0.002 ]
Option 4: 'Study and work' 0.019 ** [ 0.010 ; 0.028 ]
Source: PNAD 2006; Own calculations
TABLE 11: Marginal effects of PBF on occupational choices
*Statistically significant at 10%;  **Statistically significant at 5%
95% Confidence Interval in brackets
Ocupational option
Margins
 dy/dx 
 [95% Conf. Interval]
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imposes school attendance, presumably, it can avoid children ending up being exposed 
to harmful environments. 
In addition, the results suggest that the programme increases school attendance but 
without removing children completely from the labour market. So, those individuals 
‘not working or studying’ and ‘only working’ appear to start engaging in both activities, 
such that combining study and work is the preferred occupational choice for the 
subpopulation here considered. Although we do not take into account the activities 
carried out or the hours worked by those children, the models give some indication of 
how persistent the decisions on occupational choices can be, and, at the same time, how 
a vast policy can have small effects on the choices made. 
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VI. Conclusion 
Over the past decades, a great emphasis has been given to social policies in Brazil. With 
the expansion of the social security net, local experiences introducing CCTs were 
regarded as very successful in reaching the targeted population and improving the 
desired outcomes. In the beginning of the 2000s the federal government had in place a 
group of cash transfers conditioned on specific goals. All those initiatives were merged 
into one larger project in 2003, the Programa Bolsa Familia, to ensure all programmes 
were aligned in terms of short- and long-run objectives. 
The PBF’s main short-run objective is to reduce poverty. As Cacciamali, Tatei, and 
Batista (2010) highlight, poverty is considered to be one of the factors leading to slow 
economic growth in Latin American countries so that, besides its moral aspects, 
removing people from poverty can also have positive effects on a country’s growth and 
long-run development. During the 90s, several macroeconomic and institutional 
changes took place in Brazil which, in combination with favourable conditions in the 
international market, led to an expressive increase of the GDP. The economic growth 
was also reflected in poverty and inequality indicators, which showed a significant 
improvement after the mid-2000s (Souza (2012)). Social assistance programmes have 
undoubtedly contributed to a great part of that improvement. According to Soares 
(2012), the PBF benefits account for 16% to 21% of the total fall in Brazilian inequality 
since 2001. Furthermore, this programme reduced poverty by 8 percentage points and 
the poverty gap by 18%. 
Although direct cash transfers are expected to have an immediate impact on families’ 
income and expenditures, there is always a concern that this effect is not permanent 
and the beneficiaries could become dependent on social programmes, as would their 
children. As Lindert and Vincensini (2010) highlight, the concerns present among 
academic and political circles are that the PBF could become no more than a cash hand-
out, not impacting the structural areas desired, but promoting welfare dependence. 
They also point out the importance of the conditions enforced on the programme’s 
beneficiaries as a way to achieve the established objectives and minimise unwanted 
behaviour from some recipients of the transfers, if they are correctly designed and 
monitored. Therefore, the conditions imposed on the families aim not only to engage the 
beneficiaries in the process of improving their standard of living, but they also attempt 
to provide better health and education for the next generations, targeting their long-run 
development. If the improvement of children’s health and educational outcomes reflects 
positively in their future wages, then those individuals might not need the cash 
transfers to keep them out of poverty. 
Due to its evident effects on poverty and inequality reduction, the PBF and other CCTs 
are well perceived by the international community. However, the impacts registered on 
educational outcomes are not as clear to interpret and are debated among researchers. 
Most of the empirical work done so far indicates a significant but small impact of the 
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PBF on school enrolment and attendance. The researcher’s own calculations presented 
in Section V Part B show the impact of the Bolsa Familia on school attendance according 
to different methods. The linear probability model and logit model indicate that 
children aged 10 to 15 years old from families receiving the PBF benefits have a 2 
percentage points higher probability of attending school, keeping other individual and 
household characteristics constant. Similarly, the ATTs calculated with the propensity 
score matching approach also confirm a limited impact of the programme on school 
attendance, varying from 2.7 to 2.9 percentage points. 
Fiszbein and Schady (2009) point out that in countries where school enrolment is 
already high, a small effect of CCTs on this outcome should be expected. In their opinion 
it has do to with the way the impact is calculated and also with people’s perception of 
the marginal returns to education. Many authors highlight that a very low percentage of 
children in the 10- to 15-years-old age bracket do not attend school and, in fact, some of 
them consider that the families who are waiting to receive the benefits already behave 
more like PBF beneficiaries than like those who do not want to receive the PBF 
transfers. Thus, it seems that the Bolsa Familia does not particularly change the families’ 
position about enrolment of children in primary school. 
Furthermore, according to Schwartzman (2008) the programme is based on the wrong 
premise: that children in that age group do not go to school because their family cannot 
afford it. Instead, he claims that the public educational system is not appropriate and 
does not prepare or challenge the students, who end up dropping out of school easily. 
Chahad and Santos (2006) agree that the way classes are structured acts as a 
disincentive for children to study and learn, leading to higher absence and lower 
promotion rates. Once the children are behind in terms of the age at which they are 
expected to finish the determined grade, there are not many options available to 
complement regular studying activities so that they would be able to progress in their 
studies. Soares, Ribas, and Osorio (2007) point out that the PBF has been effective in 
increasing school attendance and reducing dropout rates, but, as a consequence, more 
children are falling behind in school. They insist that demand-side interventions, such as 
the Bolsa Familia, are not able on their own to improve some educational outcomes, so 
they would not necessarily enable disadvantaged children to break the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty if educational policies do not improve the 
performance of such children while they are in school. 
The economic theory assumes that individuals are able to increase their stock of human 
capital through schooling. However, it is clear that enhancing natural abilities would 
only be possible if the educational service offered was of good quality. If not, attending 
school would be a mere formality imposed by a social programme such as the PBF. In 
addition, if one of the long-run objectives is to improve educational outcomes, then 
there should also be a way of including those falling behind in their studies in the 
programme. 
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Certainly, to improve the schooling system would also require great investment in 
school facilities, staff, and materials, which would add to the total cost of the Bolsa 
Familia. Schwartzman (2008) reminds us that in the 1990s a big investment was made 
in a programme called Fundescola, which was meant to improve the quality of schools 
located in rural areas and in the poorer states in Brazil, but the investment was shifted 
to CCTs from the beginning of the 2000s. He explains that the change of investment 
focus happened as Fundescola (and similar programmes) showed little measurable 
effects and also due to the difficulty of implementing changes in the schooling system. 
Finally, the author considers CCTs as being easier to understand and easier to evaluate, 
increasing the support to this kind of programme. 
Currently, about 0.42% of the Brazilian GDP is spent on PBF cash transfers and some 
argue that the vast amount today cannot improve future wages enough to compensate 
for this investment.43 Cacciamali, Tatei, and Batista (2010) agree that the conditions 
imposed are an effective way of creating positive externalities, but add that 
complementary actions to improve health and schooling services as well as policies to 
boost employment and professional capacitation are crucial to achieve the desired long-
run development.   
Another part of the literature also evaluates the impact of social programmes on 
children’s occupational choices. Early entry into the labour market is a phenomenon 
persistent in Brazil and even governmental initiatives are not enough to end child 
labour. Numerous factors can contribute to child labour and some of them can be 
established by family preferences, while others are determined by the country’s social 
context. The family’s income volatility, number of children, and even parent’s 
perception about market opportunities can influence the children to start work before 
the legal age. 
The Bolsa Familia does not have child labour as one of its explicit targets, but, given the 
features of the programme, one might expect it to reduce the incidence of children 
working by (a) increasing household income, so the children’s remunerations would not 
be essential to the family’s survival; (b) constituting a stable source of income, 
alleviating the impacts of adverse shocks to family earnings; and (c) limiting the time 
available for children to work, as they would have to comply with an 85% school 
attendance rate. However, contradicting this intuition, few studies published have found 
a positive impact of PBF transfers on child labour, so the transfers could increase the 
probability of children to work. 
In Section V Part B.3, school and work activities were not considered mutually exclusive. 
Therefore, even if children are attending school according to the PBF rules, they can still 
work while not at school. The cash transfers and their conditionality can impact the 
children’s occupational choices by changing how they allocate time between school and 
work activities. The multinomial logit estimations show that the PBF reduces idleness 
                                               
43 See Kassouf and Glewwe (2012), for example. 
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among 10- to 15-year-olds, but it increases more the probability that a child will study 
and work than only study. The marginal effects calculated indicate that participation in 
the programme decreases the probability of ‘not studying or working’ and of ‘only 
working’ by 1.7 and 0.6 percentage points, respectively. Also, it leads to an increase of 
1.9 percentage points in the probability that children ‘study and work’. The marginal 
effects are statistically significant at the 5% level, except the coefficients estimated to 
the ‘only study’ option. 
Therefore, it appears evident that working is still a preferred activity for the children 
living in the households included in this sample, so those already performing any type 
of work continue to do so even with the PBF allowance. It should be noted that the 
present analysis does not cover the impact of the Bolsa Familia on hours worked by 
economically active children, so it is not possible to assess completely the impact of the 
programme on time allocated between the different options. 
In Brazil, child labour is not only associated to insufficient household income but also to 
cultural factors. Work is viewed as an honourable activity which can also provide 
children with valuable skills. Araujo (2009) emphasises that not only do 
children/adolescents prefer to work, since its results are more concrete and immediate, 
but their parents also perceive working as an instrument which helps to build character. 
Rizzini (2007) and Assunção and Cruz (2009) point out that working is usually seen as 
the ideal alternative to inactivity, which is commonly related to illicit activities and 
marginality. So for part of the society it is acceptable, and in some cases even favoured, 
for some children to work, combining (or not) this activity with their schooling 
schedule. 
Nevertheless, child labour is usually associated with exploitation and its consequences 
to children’s health should not be undermined. Given that in the Brazilian social context, 
working can be considered a good substitute to formal education, there may be a 
tendency to undervalue schooling. And even if children can divide their time between 
working and studying, it does not seem realistic to assume they would perform as well 
as those children who dedicate their time exclusively to school and complementary 
educational activities. For Cacciamali and Braga (2003), children who attend school and 
work usually end up putting less effort into studying, which leads them to weak results 
at school and high repetition of grades. 
Therefore, the low quality of educational services provided and also the occupational 
choices chosen for or by the children could diminish the expected impact of a higher 
level of school enrolment and attendance on future human capital stock. Soares (2012) 
does not consider the Bolsa Familia a human capital accumulation programme, unlike 
Oportunidades/Progresa for example, since it does not necessarily support the 
beneficiaries for all the time needed for the generation of children to complete school. 
Furthermore, the author does not label the PBF a programme to generate opportunity, 
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either, since it lacks a strong articulation with other programmes oriented to job 
training and/or microcredit. 
After almost 10 years in place, the changes made to the Bolsa Familia were not many, 
being limited to the value of the benefits, the number of families covered, and the 
inclusion of adolescents between 16 and 17 years old as beneficiaries. Recently, the 
PETI was also incorporated to the Bolsa Familia framework, but the group of families 
selected into this programme still have to comply with specific conditions to avoid the 
re-incidence of child labour. These more restrictive conditions were not extended to all 
PBF beneficiaries, even though the extra-curricular activities offered to children and 
parents in the PETI appear to have a positive impact on children’s development.44 
Thus, given the results published by different authors, it seems important to revise the 
Bolsa Familia’s main objectives and design as a way to ensure that the promising results 
regarding the reduction of poverty and inequality can be sustained in the long run to 
future generations. 
 
 
 
                                               
44 See Cacciamali and Braga (2003); Cacciamali, Tatei, and Batista (2010); and Soares, Ribas, and Osorio (2007). 
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Appendix 
I. Summary of some Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes 
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Year Brazilian Reais (R$)/U.S. Dollar($) Brazilian Reais (R$)/Norwegian Kroner (NOK)
1995 0.916 0.145
1996 1.005 0.156
1997 1.078 0.152
1998 1.161 0.154
1999 1.821 0.233
2000 1.830 0.208
2001 2.353 0.262
2002 2.921 0.366
2003 3.075 0.434
2004 2.926 0.434
2005 2.435 0.378
2006 2.174 0.339
2007 1.946 0.332
2008 1.833 0.325
2009 1.998 0.318
2010 1.760 0.291
2011 1.672 0.299
Table A.2 - Exchange rates: Brazilian Reais (RS$), U.S. Dollars (US$) and Norwegian Kroner (NOK)
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; own elaboration
Year Currency
Minimun 
wage
US$  NOK
1993 CR$ (cruzeiro real) 9,606 - -
1995 R$ (real) 100 109 691
1996 R$ (real) 112 111 720
1997 R$ (real) 120 111 789
1998 R$ (real) 130 112 846
1999 R$ (real) 136 75 583
2000 R$ (real) 151 83 727
2001 R$ (real) 180 77 688
2002 R$ (real) 200 68 547
2003 R$ (real) 240 78 553
2004 R$ (real) 260 89 599
2005 R$ (real) 300 123 794
2006 R$ (real) 350 161 1032
2007 R$ (real) 380 195 1143
2008 R$ (real) 415 226 1276
2009 R$ (real) 465 233 1464
2010 R$ (real) 510 290 1752
2011 R$ (real) 545 326 1826
Source: Ministerio do Trabalho e Emprego (MTE), Ministry of Labour; own elaboration
Table A.3  - The minimum wage in Brazil
Year Currency Poverty line
1 US$  NOK
1993 CR$ (cruzeiro real) 2,402 - -
1995 R$ (real) 25 27 173
1996 R$ (real) 28 28 180
1997 R$ (real) 30 28 197
1998 R$ (real) 33 28 211
1999 R$ (real) 34 19 146
2000 R$ (real) 38 21 182
2001 R$ (real) 45 19 172
2002 R$ (real) 50 17 137
2003 R$ (real) 60 20 138
2004 R$ (real) 65 22 150
2005 R$ (real) 75 31 198
2006 R$ (real) 88 40 258
2007 R$ (real) 95 49 286
2008 R$ (real) 104 57 319
2009 R$ (real) 116 58 366
2010 R$ (real) 128 72 438
2011 R$ (real) 136 81 456
Table A.4  - The poverty line in Brazil
1- Natinal poverty line defined as monthly income less or equal to 1/4 of the min wage
Source: Ministerio do Trabalho e Emprego (MTE), Ministry of Labour; own elaboration
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II. OLS and Logit 
 
Pi (child attends school | BF,X) Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
BF 0.0104 ** [ 0.0056 ; 0.0152 ] 0.0176 ** [ 0.0126 ; 0.0226 ] 0.0231 ** [ 0.0177 ; 0.0285 ] 0.0242 ** [ 0.0187 ; 0.0296 ]
age10to11   0.0113 ** [ 0.0070 ; 0.0155 ] 0.0120 ** [ 0.0077 ; 0.0163 ] 0.0114 ** [ 0.0071 ; 0.0157 ]
age14to15  -0.0514 ** [ -0.0582 ; -0.0446 ] -0.0524 ** [ -0.0592 ; -0.0457 ] -0.0516 ** [ -0.0583 ; -0.0448 ]
nonwhite  -0.0099 ** [ -0.0148 ; -0.0050 ] -0.0035 [ -0.0086 ; 0.0016 ] -0.0020 [ -0.0071 ; 0.0031 ]
male  -0.0098 ** [ -0.0145 ; -0.0051 ] -0.0096 ** [ -0.0143 ; -0.0050 ] -0.0097 ** [ -0.0143 ; -0.0051 ]
sibling0   -0.0073 ** [ -0.0134 ; -0.0011 ] -0.0129 ** [ -0.0194 ; -0.0064 ] -0.0086 ** [ -0.0151 ; -0.0021 ]
sibling2to3  -0.0123 ** [ -0.0179 ; -0.0067 ] 0.0024 [ -0.0037 ; 0.0084 ] 0.0028 [ -0.0033 ; 0.0088 ]
sibling4to5   -0.0312 ** [ -0.0437 ; -0.0187 ] 0.0024 [ -0.0108 ; 0.0156 ] 0.0042 [ -0.0089 ; 0.0174 ]
sibling6ormore   -0.0244 [ -0.0583 ; 0.0095 ] 0.0226 [ -0.0118 ; 0.0571 ] 0.0266 [ -0.0081 ; 0.0614 ]
ocup  -0.0527 ** [ -0.0618 ; -0.0436 ] -0.0481 ** [ -0.0576 ; -0.0387 ] -0.0482 ** [ -0.0577 ; -0.0387 ]
person2 -0.0196 ** [ -0.0252 ; -0.0140 ] -0.0178 ** [ -0.0235 ; -0.0122 ]
person3 -0.0563 ** [ -0.0705 ; -0.0421 ] -0.0534 ** [ -0.0677 ; -0.0391 ]
person4 -0.0634 ** [ -0.0915 ; -0.0353 ] -0.0601 ** [ -0.0882 ; -0.0319 ]
personmo -0.0648 ** [ -0.0989 ; -0.0307 ] -0.0598 ** [ -0.0939 ; -0.0257 ]
HHcond1 0.0512 ** [ 0.0185 ; 0.0839 ] 0.0517 ** [ 0.0189 ; 0.0844 ]
HHcond2 0.0493 ** [ 0.0143 ; 0.0844 ] 0.0462 ** [ 0.0111 ; 0.0812 ]
HHcond3 0.0340 ** [ 0.0006 ; 0.0675 ] 0.0317 * [ -0.0018 ; 0.0651 ]
HHcond4 0.0176 [ -0.0187 ; 0.0539 ] 0.0203 [ -0.0160 ; 0.0566 ]
HHcond5 0.0538 ** [ 0.0202 ; 0.0873 ] 0.0518 ** [ 0.0183 ; 0.0853 ]
electric -0.0107 [ -0.0289 ; 0.0075 ] -0.0103 [ -0.0284 ; 0.0078 ]
phone 0.0118 ** [ 0.0059 ; 0.0176 ] 0.0064 ** [ 0.0004 ; 0.0123 ]
tv    0.0382 ** [ 0.0248 ; 0.0516 ] 0.0339 ** [ 0.0207 ; 0.0471 ]
rural 0.0065 * [ -0.0005 ; 0.0136 ] 0.0083 ** [ 0.0011 ; 0.0155 ]
NO   -0.0004 [ -0.0105 ; 0.0096 ] -0.0005 [ -0.0107 ; 0.0096 ]
NE   0.0014 [ -0.0069 ; 0.0098 ] 0.0040 [ -0.0044 ; 0.0124 ]
SE   -0.0025 [ -0.0110 ; 0.0059 ] -0.0023 [ -0.0108 ; 0.0061 ]
CE   0.0055 [ -0.0042 ; 0.0152 ] 0.0067 [ -0.0030 ; 0.0165 ]
HHwithC1 0.0190 ** [ 0.0013 ; 0.0367 ] -0.0214 * [ -0.0437 ; 0.0008 ]
C2notHH -0.0013 [ -0.0196 ; 0.0169 ] -0.0349 ** [ -0.0593 ; -0.0105 ]
totalworkincpercapita 0.0001 ** [ 0.0001 ; 0.0001 ] 0.0001 ** [ 0.0000 ; 0.0001 ]
C1schooling1to3R 0.0075 [ -0.0023 ; 0.0173 ]
C1schooling4to7R 0.0144 ** [ 0.0056 ; 0.0232 ]
C1schooling8to10R 0.0266 ** [ 0.0171 ; 0.0361 ]
C1schooling11moreR 0.0193 ** [ 0.0087 ; 0.0298 ]
C1workR 0.0051 [ -0.0050 ; 0.0152 ]
C1male 0.0022 [ -0.0069 ; 0.0113 ]
C1schooling1to3M 0.0282 ** [ 0.0077 ; 0.0487 ]
C1schooling4to7M 0.0266 ** [ 0.0084 ; 0.0447 ]
C1schooling8to10M 0.0567 ** [ 0.0384 ; 0.0750 ]
C1schooling11moreM 0.0586 ** [ 0.0411 ; 0.0760 ]
C1workM 0.0076 [ -0.0054 ; 0.0206 ]
C2schooling1to3R 0.0173 ** [ 0.0067 ; 0.0280 ]
C2schooling4to7R 0.0202 ** [ 0.0106 ; 0.0299 ]
C2schooling8to10R 0.0211 ** [ 0.0104 ; 0.0319 ]
C2schooling11moreR 0.0231 ** [ 0.0125 ; 0.0337 ]
C2workR 0.0116 ** [ 0.0058 ; 0.0173 ]
_cons 0.9524 ** [ 0.9489 ; 0.9560 ] 0.9885 ** [ 0.9822 ; 0.9947 ] 0.8824 ** [ 0.8399 ; 0.9250 ] 0.8861 ** [ 0.8432 ; 0.9290 ]
Number of obs 27040 27040 26992 26992
R-squared 0.001 0.036 0.052 0.058
Source: PNAD 2006, own calculations
Table A.5 - Linear Probability Model
*Statistically significant at 10%;  **Statistically significant at 5%
[  ] 95% Confidence Interval
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Pi (child attends school | BF,X) Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
BF 0.2575 ** [ 0.1382 ; 0.3768 ] 0.4571 ** [ 0.3291 ; 0.5850 ] 0.5843 ** [ 0.4475 ; 0.7211 ] 0.6090 ** [ 0.4711 ; 0.7468 ]
age10to11   0.5790 ** [ 0.3788 ; 0.7792 ] 0.6110 ** [ 0.4089 ; 0.8131 ] 0.5928 ** [ 0.3901 ; 0.7955 ]
age14to15  -1.0248 ** [ -1.1693 ; -0.8804 ] -1.0877 ** [ -1.2350 ; -0.9404 ] -1.0738 ** [ -1.2218 ; -0.9257 ]
nonwhite  -0.2771 ** [ -0.4150 ; -0.1391 ] -0.1123 [ -0.2596 ; 0.0351 ] -0.0721 [ -0.2204 ; 0.0762 ]
male  -0.2519 ** [ -0.3758 ; -0.1279 ] -0.2524 ** [ -0.3788 ; -0.1261 ] -0.2451 ** [ -0.3723 ; -0.1179 ]
sibling0   -0.2140 ** [ -0.3802 ; -0.0478 ] -0.3728 ** [ -0.5479 ; -0.1977 ] -0.2680 ** [ -0.4465 ; -0.0895 ]
sibling2to3  -0.3477 ** [ -0.5007 ; -0.1948 ] 0.0208 [ -0.1431 ; 0.1847 ] 0.0381 [ -0.1274 ; 0.2036 ]
sibling4to5   -0.7160 ** [ -0.9453 ; -0.4866 ] 0.0397 [ -0.2138 ; 0.2931 ] 0.0975 [ -0.1583 ; 0.3533 ]
sibling6ormore   -0.5640 ** [ -1.1347 ; 0.0067 ] 0.3875 [ -0.2095 ; 0.9845 ] 0.4683 [ -0.1330 ; 1.0695 ]
ocup  -0.8975 ** [ -1.0303 ; -0.7646 ] -0.8097 ** [ -0.9529 ; -0.6664 ] -0.8106 ** [ -0.9577 ; -0.6635 ]
person2 -0.5771 ** [ -0.7355 ; -0.4186 ] -0.5300 ** [ -0.6906 ; -0.3693 ]
person3 -1.1955 ** [ -1.4339 ; -0.9570 ] -1.1147 ** [ -1.3567 ; -0.8726 ]
person4 -1.2998 ** [ -1.6759 ; -0.9237 ] -1.2098 ** [ -1.5895 ; -0.8302 ]
personmo -1.3511 ** [ -1.7836 ; -0.9186 ] -1.2002 ** [ -1.6363 ; -0.7641 ]
HHcond1 0.8932 ** [ 0.4836 ; 1.3028 ] 0.9600 ** [ 0.5496 ; 1.3704 ]
HHcond2 0.8609 ** [ 0.2589 ; 1.4629 ] 0.8259 ** [ 0.2209 ; 1.4309 ]
HHcond3 0.4602 ** [ 0.0208 ; 0.8996 ] 0.4395 ** [ -0.0011 ; 0.8800 ]
HHcond4 0.2071 [ -0.2807 ; 0.6949 ] 0.3309 [ -0.1587 ; 0.8205 ]
HHcond5 0.9769 ** [ 0.5175 ; 1.4363 ] 0.9835 ** [ 0.5229 ; 1.4441 ]
electric -0.2208 [ -0.4921 ; 0.0505 ] -0.1943 [ -0.4676 ; 0.0790 ]
phone 0.3163 ** [ 0.1714 ; 0.4612 ] 0.1725 ** [ 0.0253 ; 0.3196 ]
tv    0.6329 ** [ 0.4370 ; 0.8288 ] 0.5479 ** [ 0.3505 ; 0.7454 ]
rural 0.0915 [ -0.0808 ; 0.2639 ] 0.1393 [ -0.0359 ; 0.3146 ]
NO   -0.0065 [ -0.2747 ; 0.2618 ] -0.0083 [ -0.2792 ; 0.2625 ]
NE   0.0395 [ -0.2042 ; 0.2833 ] 0.1106 [ -0.1368 ; 0.3581 ]
SE   -0.0964 [ -0.3499 ; 0.1572 ] -0.0914 [ -0.3464 ; 0.1636 ]
CE   0.1869 [ -0.1241 ; 0.4979 ] 0.2439 [ -0.0694 ; 0.5572 ]
HHwithC1 0.4422 ** [ 0.0757 ; 0.8088 ] -0.5154 ** [ -0.9690 ; -0.0618 ]
C2notHH -0.0627 [ -0.4372 ; 0.3117 ] -0.5195 ** [ -0.9538 ; -0.0852 ]
totalworkincpercapita 0.0028 ** [ 0.0018 ; 0.0038 ] 0.0018 ** [ 0.0007 ; 0.0029 ]
C1schooling1to3R 0.1220 [ -0.0890 ; 0.3330 ]
C1schooling4to7R 0.3993 ** [ 0.1828 ; 0.6158 ]
C1schooling8to10R 1.0925 ** [ 0.6794 ; 1.5057 ]
C1schooling11moreR 0.6617 ** [ 0.2522 ; 1.0713 ]
C1workR 0.1027 [ -0.1621 ; 0.3676 ]
C1male 0.1101 [ -0.0936 ; 0.3139 ]
C1schooling1to3M 0.3695 ** [ 0.0489 ; 0.6900 ]
C1schooling4to7M 0.3210 ** [ 0.0502 ; 0.5918 ]
C1schooling8to10M 1.1208 ** [ 0.6700 ; 1.5716 ]
C1schooling11moreM 1.2632 ** [ 0.7826 ; 1.7438 ]
C1workM 0.1835 [ -0.0600 ; 0.4271 ]
C2schooling1to3R 0.3285 ** [ 0.1117 ; 0.5453 ]
C2schooling4to7R 0.4402 ** [ 0.2261 ; 0.6542 ]
C2schooling8to10R 0.5064 ** [ 0.1698 ; 0.8430 ]
C2schooling11moreR 0.8484 ** [ 0.4209 ; 1.2758 ]
C2workR 0.3397 ** [ 0.1716 ; 0.5078 ]
_cons 2.9968 ** [ 2.9180 ; 3.0756 ] 4.0202 ** [ 3.8214 ; 4.2190 ] 2.1963 ** [ 1.5087 ; 2.8838 ] 2.1345 ** [ 1.4388 ; 2.8303 ]
Number of obs 27040 27040 26992 26992
Pseudo R-squared 0.0019 0.0906 0.1341 0.1516
Log likelihood -4738.010 -4317.069 -4092.291 -4009.679
Table A.6 - Logit Model
*Statistically significant at 10%;  **Statistically significant at 5%
[  ] 95% Confidence Interval
Source: PNAD 2006, own calculations
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Pi (child attends school | BF,X)
BF 0.024 ** [ 0.019 ; 0.030 ] 0.023 ** [ 0.017 ; 0.028 ]
age10to11 0.011 ** [ 0.007 ; 0.016 ] 0.022 ** [ 0.014 ; 0.030 ]
age14to15 -0.052 ** [ -0.058 ; -0.045 ] -0.040 ** [ -0.046 ; -0.034 ]
nonwhite -0.002 [ -0.007 ; 0.003 ] -0.003 [ -0.008 ; 0.003 ]
male -0.010 ** [ -0.014 ; -0.005 ] -0.009 ** [ -0.014 ; -0.004 ]
sibling0 -0.009 ** [ -0.015 ; -0.002 ] -0.010 ** [ -0.017 ; -0.003 ]
sibling2to3 0.003 [ -0.003 ; 0.009 ] 0.001 [ -0.005 ; 0.008 ]
sibling4to5 0.004 [ -0.009 ; 0.017 ] 0.004 [ -0.006 ; 0.013 ]
sibling6ormore 0.027 [ -0.008 ; 0.061 ] 0.017 [ -0.005 ; 0.040 ]
ocup -0.048 ** [ -0.058 ; -0.039 ] -0.030 ** [ -0.036 ; -0.025 ]
person2 -0.018 ** [ -0.023 ; -0.012 ] -0.020 ** [ -0.026 ; -0.014 ]
person3 -0.053 ** [ -0.068 ; -0.039 ] -0.042 ** [ -0.051 ; -0.032 ]
person4 -0.060 ** [ -0.088 ; -0.032 ] -0.045 ** [ -0.059 ; -0.031 ]
personmore4 -0.060 ** [ -0.094 ; -0.026 ] -0.045 ** [ -0.061 ; -0.028 ]
HHcond1 0.052 ** [ 0.019 ; 0.084 ] 0.036 ** [ 0.020 ; 0.051 ]
HHcond2 0.046 ** [ 0.011 ; 0.081 ] 0.031 ** [ 0.008 ; 0.053 ]
HHcond3 0.032 * [ -0.002 ; 0.065 ] 0.016 ** [ 0.000 ; 0.033 ]
HHcond4 0.020 [ -0.016 ; 0.057 ] 0.012 [ -0.006 ; 0.031 ]
HHcond5 0.052 ** [ 0.018 ; 0.085 ] 0.037 ** [ 0.019 ; 0.054 ]
electricity -0.010 [ -0.028 ; 0.008 ] -0.007 [ -0.017 ; 0.003 ]
phone 0.006 ** [ 0.000 ; 0.012 ] 0.006 ** [ 0.001 ; 0.012 ]
tv 0.034 ** [ 0.021 ; 0.047 ] 0.020 ** [ 0.013 ; 0.028 ]
rural 0.008 ** [ 0.001 ; 0.015 ] 0.005 [ -0.001 ; 0.012 ]
NO -0.001 [ -0.011 ; 0.010 ] 0.000 [ -0.010 ; 0.010 ]
NE 0.004 [ -0.004 ; 0.012 ] 0.004 [ -0.005 ; 0.013 ]
SE -0.002 [ -0.011 ; 0.006 ] -0.003 [ -0.013 ; 0.006 ]
CE 0.007 [ -0.003 ; 0.017 ] 0.009 [ -0.003 ; 0.021 ]
HHwithC1C2 -0.021 * [ -0.044 ; 0.001 ] -0.019 ** [ -0.036 ; -0.002 ]
C2notHH -0.035 ** [ -0.059 ; -0.010 ] -0.019 ** [ -0.036 ; -0.003 ]
totalworkincomepercapita 0.000 ** [ 0.000 ; 0.000 ] 0.000 ** [ 0.000 ; 0.000 ]
C1schooling1to3R 0.008 [ -0.002 ; 0.017 ] 0.005 [ -0.003 ; 0.012 ]
C1schooling4to7R 0.014 ** [ 0.006 ; 0.023 ] 0.015 ** [ 0.007 ; 0.023 ]
C1schooling8to10R 0.027 ** [ 0.017 ; 0.036 ] 0.041 ** [ 0.025 ; 0.056 ]
C1schooling11moreR 0.019 ** [ 0.009 ; 0.030 ] 0.025 ** [ 0.009 ; 0.040 ]
C1workR 0.005 [ -0.005 ; 0.015 ] 0.004 [ -0.006 ; 0.014 ]
C1male 0.002 [ -0.007 ; 0.011 ] 0.004 [ -0.003 ; 0.012 ]
C1schooling1to3M 0.028 ** [ 0.008 ; 0.049 ] 0.014 ** [ 0.002 ; 0.026 ]
C1schooling4to7M 0.027 ** [ 0.008 ; 0.045 ] 0.012 ** [ 0.002 ; 0.022 ]
C1schooling8to10M 0.057 ** [ 0.038 ; 0.075 ] 0.042 ** [ 0.025 ; 0.059 ]
C1schooling11moreM 0.059 ** [ 0.041 ; 0.076 ] 0.047 ** [ 0.029 ; 0.065 ]
C1workM 0.008 [ -0.005 ; 0.021 ] 0.007 [ -0.002 ; 0.016 ]
C2schooling1to3R 0.017 ** [ 0.007 ; 0.028 ] 0.012 ** [ 0.004 ; 0.020 ]
C2schooling4to7R 0.020 ** [ 0.011 ; 0.030 ] 0.016 ** [ 0.008 ; 0.024 ]
C2schooling8to10R 0.021 ** [ 0.010 ; 0.032 ] 0.019 ** [ 0.006 ; 0.031 ]
C2schooling11moreR 0.023 ** [ 0.013 ; 0.034 ] 0.032 ** [ 0.016 ; 0.048 ]
C2workR 0.012 ** [ 0.006 ; 0.017 ] 0.013 ** [ 0.006 ; 0.019 ]
Table A.7 - LPM and Logit estimations
LPM LOGIT
Coefficient Margins (dy/dx)
*Statistically significant at 10%;  **Statistically significant at 5%
[  ] 95% Confidence Interval
Source: PNAD 2006, own calculations
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III. Multinomial Logit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Option 1: (base outcome)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
1.BF 0.6999 ** [ 0.5247 ; 0.8750 ] 0.3401 ** [ 0.0738 ; 0.6063 ] 0.8228 ** [ 0.6366 ; 1.0090 ]
age10to11 0.5237 ** [ 0.2974 ; 0.7500 ] -1.0321 ** [ -1.5553 ; -0.5089 ] -0.1216 [ -0.3629 ; 0.1197 ]
age14to15 -0.9716 ** [ -1.1556 ; -0.7875 ] 1.0735 ** [ 0.7711 ; 1.3760 ] -0.0417 [ -0.2366 ; 0.1533 ]
nonwhite -0.1422 [ -0.3343 ; 0.0499 ] -0.2172 [ -0.5037 ; 0.0693 ] -0.1340 [ -0.3373 ; 0.0692 ]
male -0.1638 ** [ -0.3220 ; -0.0057 ] 0.9156 ** [ 0.6631 ; 1.1682 ] 0.5120 ** [ 0.3437 ; 0.6803 ]
sibling0 -0.2956 ** [ -0.5237 ; -0.0675 ] -0.1641 [ -0.5108 ; 0.1826 ] -0.4179 ** [ -0.6616 ; -0.1743 ]
sibling2to3 -0.0527 [ -0.2624 ; 0.1569 ] -0.1453 [ -0.4682 ; 0.1776 ] 0.0070 [ -0.2151 ; 0.2291 ]
sibling4to5 -0.0399 [ -0.3720 ; 0.2921 ] -0.0165 [ -0.5033 ; 0.4703 ] 0.2022 [ -0.1476 ; 0.5521 ]
sibling6ormore 0.2681 [ -0.5490 ; 1.0852 ] -0.3996 [ -1.5384 ; 0.7391 ] 0.2572 [ -0.5842 ; 1.0986 ]
person2 -0.6272 ** [ -0.8341 ; -0.4203 ] -0.3120 * [ -0.6264 ; 0.0024 ] -0.7365 ** [ -0.9552 ; -0.5179 ]
person3 -1.1818 ** [ -1.4894 ; -0.8742 ] -0.1207 [ -0.5827 ; 0.3412 ] -1.2058 ** [ -1.5371 ; -0.8745 ]
person4 -1.2611 ** [ -1.7427 ; -0.7796 ] -0.0784 [ -0.7897 ; 0.6328 ] -1.2279 ** [ -1.7506 ; -0.7051 ]
personmore4 -1.0286 ** [ -1.6031 ; -0.4542 ] 0.1728 [ -0.6505 ; 0.9962 ] -1.2432 ** [ -1.8782 ; -0.6081 ]
HHcond1 1.1518 ** [ 0.6651 ; 1.6385 ] 0.2005 [ -0.6002 ; 1.0013 ] 0.8537 ** [ 0.3101 ; 1.3972 ]
HHcond2 0.9784 ** [ 0.2406 ; 1.7163 ] 0.1735 [ -1.0212 ; 1.3683 ] 0.9110 ** [ 0.1119 ; 1.7101 ]
HHcond3 0.6355 ** [ 0.1133 ; 1.1576 ] 0.1883 [ -0.6723 ; 1.0489 ] 0.3091 [ -0.2754 ; 0.8935 ]
HHcond4 0.6667 ** [ 0.0558 ; 1.2775 ] 0.0660 [ -0.8777 ; 1.0097 ] 0.0133 [ -0.6543 ; 0.6810 ]
HHcond5 1.1207 ** [ 0.5638 ; 1.6776 ] 0.1395 [ -0.7560 ; 1.0350 ] 0.8882 ** [ 0.2753 ; 1.5010 ]
electricity -0.3027 [ -0.7030 ; 0.0976 ] -0.7272 ** [ -1.2442 ; -0.2103 ] -0.6661 ** [ -1.0764 ; -0.2558 ]
phone 0.1186 [ -0.0646 ; 0.3019 ] -0.3174 ** [ -0.6037 ; -0.0311 ] -0.0718 [ -0.2676 ; 0.1239 ]
tv 0.6315 ** [ 0.3765 ; 0.8865 ] -0.1618 [ -0.5303 ; 0.2067 ] 0.2836 ** [ 0.0131 ; 0.5541 ]
rural -0.0414 [ -0.2682 ; 0.1854 ] 0.4053 ** [ 0.0755 ; 0.7351 ] 0.7515 ** [ 0.5157 ; 0.9873 ]
NO -0.1826 [ -0.5333 ; 0.1680 ] -0.7298 ** [ -1.2567 ; -0.2029 ] -0.4980 ** [ -0.8691 ; -0.1268 ]
NE -0.0787 [ -0.4065 ; 0.2491 ] -0.4718 * [ -0.9488 ; 0.0051 ] -0.1600 [ -0.5040 ; 0.1840 ]
SE -0.0657 [ -0.4047 ; 0.2733 ] -0.1358 [ -0.6260 ; 0.3544 ] -0.3456 * [ -0.7030 ; 0.0119 ]
CE 0.3616 * [ -0.0574 ; 0.7806 ] 0.0573 [ -0.5439 ; 0.6584 ] 0.0618 [ -0.3792 ; 0.5027 ]
HHwithC1C2 -0.5019 * [ -1.0381 ; 0.0343 ] -0.5823 [ -1.5112 ; 0.3465 ] -1.0812 ** [ -1.6950 ; -0.4674 ]
C2notHH -0.4933 * [ -1.0111 ; 0.0245 ] -0.0512 [ -0.9201 ; 0.8178 ] -0.6497 ** [ -1.2479 ; -0.0514 ]
C1startwork5to9R -0.0523 [ -0.5002 ; 0.3955 ] 0.5058 [ -0.3317 ; 1.3433 ] 0.8198 ** [ 0.3289 ; 1.3107 ]
C1startwork10to17R 0.1818 [ -0.2252 ; 0.5888 ] 0.6073 [ -0.1862 ; 1.4008 ] 0.5933 ** [ 0.1412 ; 1.0454 ]
C1schooling1to3R 0.1602 [ -0.1177 ; 0.4382 ] 0.1011 [ -0.3054 ; 0.5077 ] 0.1859 [ -0.1051 ; 0.4770 ]
C1schooling4to7R 0.5308 ** [ 0.2500 ; 0.8117 ] 0.1749 [ -0.2442 ; 0.5941 ] 0.3784 ** [ 0.0828 ; 0.6740 ]
C1schooling8to10R 1.0332 ** [ 0.5542 ; 1.5122 ] -0.6549 [ -1.6256 ; 0.3157 ] 0.6938 ** [ 0.1907 ; 1.1970 ]
C1schooling11moreR 0.7302 ** [ 0.2372 ; 1.2232 ] -0.0849 [ -0.9614 ; 0.7915 ] 0.3678 [ -0.1569 ; 0.8925 ]
C1workR 0.0060 [ -0.4716 ; 0.4835 ] 0.1091 [ -0.8123 ; 1.0305 ] 0.1191 [ -0.4177 ; 0.6560 ]
C1male 0.0715 [ -0.1850 ; 0.3279 ] -0.1481 [ -0.5418 ; 0.2456 ] -0.0359 [ -0.3102 ; 0.2385 ]
C2startwork5to9R -0.4318 [ -0.9992 ; 0.1356 ] 0.9397 * [ -0.0094 ; 1.8887 ] 0.4996 * [ -0.0917 ; 1.0909 ]
C2startwork10to17R -0.3903 [ -0.8826 ; 0.1020 ] 0.6412 [ -0.2343 ; 1.5167 ] 0.2552 [ -0.2625 ; 0.7728 ]
C2schooling1to3R 0.2013 [ -0.0843 ; 0.4870 ] -0.3171 [ -0.7336 ; 0.0994 ] 0.1664 [ -0.1332 ; 0.4661 ]
C2schooling4to7R 0.4104 ** [ 0.1281 ; 0.6926 ] -0.2482 [ -0.6604 ; 0.1640 ] 0.2294 [ -0.0674 ; 0.5261 ]
C2schooling8to10R 0.3866 * [ -0.0281 ; 0.8014 ] -0.5258 [ -1.2174 ; 0.1657 ] 0.1014 [ -0.3379 ; 0.5408 ]
C2schooling11moreR 0.6516 ** [ 0.1521 ; 1.1512 ] -1.0009 ** [ -1.9938 ; -0.0081 ] 0.2357 [ -0.2897 ; 0.7610 ]
C2workR 0.6670 ** [ 0.1811 ; 1.1529 ] 0.2653 [ -0.6210 ; 1.1516 ] 1.0466 ** [ 0.5300 ; 1.5631 ]
C1startwork5to9M -0.3994 [ -1.1381 ; 0.3393 ] 1.4068 ** [ 0.1236 ; 2.6900 ] 0.5575 [ -0.2210 ; 1.3360 ]
C1startwork10to17M -0.7717 ** [ -1.3838 ; -0.1596 ] 0.5534 [ -0.6263 ; 1.7330 ] -0.1932 [ -0.8464 ; 0.4600 ]
C1schooling1to3M 0.3205 [ -0.0801 ; 0.7212 ] -0.0665 [ -0.6801 ; 0.5471 ] 0.4098 * [ -0.0260 ; 0.8457 ]
C1schooling4to7M 0.3658 ** [ 0.0260 ; 0.7056 ] 0.0154 [ -0.5020 ; 0.5328 ] 0.1873 [ -0.1891 ; 0.5636 ]
C1schooling8to10M 1.3512 ** [ 0.7362 ; 1.9663 ] 0.5299 [ -0.3484 ; 1.4082 ] 1.2058 ** [ 0.5568 ; 1.8548 ]
C1schooling11moreM 1.0113 ** [ 0.4605 ; 1.5622 ] -1.1011 * [ -2.2748 ; 0.0726 ] 0.6593 ** [ 0.0684 ; 1.2503 ]
C1workM 0.7060 ** [ 0.0684 ; 1.3435 ] -0.2559 [ -1.4756 ; 0.9638 ] 0.9835 ** [ 0.2914 ; 1.6756 ]
totalworkincpercapita 0.0022 ** [ 0.0008 ; 0.0036 ] 0.0014 [ -0.0007 ; 0.0035 ] 0.0023 ** [ 0.0008 ; 0.0038 ]
_cons 2.2205 ** [ 1.3458 ; 3.0952 ] -0.6478 [ -2.0143 ; 0.7187 ] 0.6014 [ -0.3538 ; 1.5566 ]
Number of obs  26992
Log likelihood -14208.42
LR chi2(153)   5940.99
Prob > chi2     0.00
Pseudo R-squared 0.1729
Source: PNAD 2006, own calculations
Table A.8 - Multinomial logit model 1
*Statistically significant at 10%;  **Statistically significant at 5%
[  ] 95% Confidence Interval
Option 2: 'Only studying' Option 3: 'Only working' Option 4: 'Studying and working'
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Option 3: (base outcome)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
1.BF -0.3401 ** [ -0.6063 ; -0.0738 ] 0.3598 ** [ 0.1484 ; 0.5712 ] 0.4827 ** [ 0.2665 ; 0.6990 ]
age10to11 1.0321 ** [ 0.5089 ; 1.5553 ] 1.5558 ** [ 1.0802 ; 2.0315 ] 0.9105 ** [ 0.4295 ; 1.3915 ]
age14to15 -1.0735 ** [ -1.3760 ; -0.7711 ] -2.0451 ** [ -2.2938 ; -1.7964 ] -1.1152 ** [ -1.3685 ; -0.8618 ]
nonwhite 0.2172 [ -0.0693 ; 0.5037 ] 0.0750 [ -0.1483 ; 0.2982 ] 0.0832 [ -0.1451 ; 0.3114 ]
male -0.9156 ** [ -1.1682 ; -0.6631 ] -1.0795 ** [ -1.2853 ; -0.8736 ] -0.4036 ** [ -0.6138 ; -0.1935 ]
sibling0 0.1641 [ -0.1826 ; 0.5108 ] -0.1315 [ -0.4056 ; 0.1426 ] -0.2538 * [ -0.5354 ; 0.0278 ]
sibling2to3 0.1453 [ -0.1776 ; 0.4682 ] 0.0926 [ -0.1645 ; 0.3498 ] 0.1523 [ -0.1099 ; 0.4145 ]
sibling4to5 0.0165 [ -0.4703 ; 0.5033 ] -0.0234 [ -0.4055 ; 0.3587 ] 0.2188 [ -0.1689 ; 0.6064 ]
sibling6ormore 0.3996 [ -0.7391 ; 1.5384 ] 0.6677 [ -0.1988 ; 1.5342 ] 0.6568 [ -0.2069 ; 1.5206 ]
person2 0.3120 * [ -0.0024 ; 0.6264 ] -0.3151 ** [ -0.5625 ; -0.0678 ] -0.4245 ** [ -0.6771 ; -0.1719 ]
person3 0.1207 [ -0.3412 ; 0.5827 ] -1.0611 ** [ -1.4312 ; -0.6909 ] -1.0851 ** [ -1.4643 ; -0.7058 ]
person4 0.0784 [ -0.6328 ; 0.7897 ] -1.1827 ** [ -1.7581 ; -0.6072 ] -1.1494 ** [ -1.7389 ; -0.5600 ]
personmore4 -0.1728 [ -0.9962 ; 0.6505 ] -1.2015 ** [ -1.8468 ; -0.5562 ] -1.4160 ** [ -2.0891 ; -0.7429 ]
HHcond1 -0.2005 [ -1.0013 ; 0.6002 ] 0.9513 ** [ 0.2625 ; 1.6401 ] 0.6531 * [ -0.0525 ; 1.3588 ]
HHcond2 -0.1735 [ -1.3683 ; 1.0212 ] 0.8049 [ -0.1877 ; 1.7976 ] 0.7374 [ -0.2774 ; 1.7523 ]
HHcond3 -0.1883 [ -1.0489 ; 0.6723 ] 0.4472 [ -0.2907 ; 1.1850 ] 0.1208 [ -0.6383 ; 0.8799 ]
HHcond4 -0.0660 [ -1.0097 ; 0.8777 ] 0.6007 [ -0.1822 ; 1.3836 ] -0.0527 [ -0.8537 ; 0.7483 ]
HHcond5 -0.1395 [ -1.0350 ; 0.7560 ] 0.9812 ** [ 0.2248 ; 1.7376 ] 0.7487 * [ -0.0247 ; 1.5221 ]
electricity 0.7272 ** [ 0.2103 ; 1.2442 ] 0.4245 ** [ 0.0549 ; 0.7942 ] 0.0611 [ -0.3075 ; 0.4298 ]
phone 0.3174 ** [ 0.0311 ; 0.6037 ] 0.4360 ** [ 0.2058 ; 0.6663 ] 0.2456 ** [ 0.0089 ; 0.4823 ]
tv 0.1618 [ -0.2067 ; 0.5303 ] 0.7933 ** [ 0.5022 ; 1.0844 ] 0.4455 ** [ 0.1489 ; 0.7420 ]
rural -0.4053 ** [ -0.7351 ; -0.0755 ] -0.4467 ** [ -0.7011 ; -0.1924 ] 0.3462 ** [ 0.0880 ; 0.6044 ]
NO 0.7298 ** [ 0.2029 ; 1.2567 ] 0.5471 ** [ 0.1340 ; 0.9603 ] 0.2318 [ -0.1906 ; 0.6542 ]
NE 0.4718 * [ -0.0051 ; 0.9488 ] 0.3931 ** [ 0.0290 ; 0.7573 ] 0.3118 * [ -0.0603 ; 0.6840 ]
SE 0.1358 [ -0.3544 ; 0.6260 ] 0.0701 [ -0.3015 ; 0.4416 ] -0.2097 [ -0.5915 ; 0.1720 ]
CE -0.0573 [ -0.6584 ; 0.5439 ] 0.3043 [ -0.1485 ; 0.7572 ] 0.0045 [ -0.4610 ; 0.4700 ]
HHwithC1C2 0.5823 [ -0.3465 ; 1.5112 ] 0.0804 [ -0.7119 ; 0.8728 ] -0.4989 [ -1.3339 ; 0.3361 ]
C2notHH 0.0512 [ -0.8178 ; 0.9201 ] -0.4421 [ -1.1769 ; 0.2927 ] -0.5985 [ -1.3812 ; 0.1842 ]
C1startwork5to9R -0.5058 [ -1.3433 ; 0.3317 ] -0.5581 [ -1.2849 ; 0.1686 ] 0.3140 [ -0.4328 ; 1.0608 ]
C1startwork10to17R -0.6073 [ -1.4008 ; 0.1862 ] -0.4255 [ -1.1229 ; 0.2718 ] -0.0140 [ -0.7323 ; 0.7043 ]
C1schooling1to3R -0.1011 [ -0.5077 ; 0.3054 ] 0.0591 [ -0.2545 ; 0.3727 ] 0.0848 [ -0.2324 ; 0.4020 ]
C1schooling4to7R -0.1749 [ -0.5941 ; 0.2442 ] 0.3559 ** [ 0.0299 ; 0.6820 ] 0.2035 [ -0.1282 ; 0.5353 ]
C1schooling8to10R 0.6549 [ -0.3157 ; 1.6256 ] 1.6881 ** [ 0.8341 ; 2.5421 ] 1.3488 ** [ 0.4859 ; 2.2116 ]
C1schooling11moreR 0.0849 [ -0.7915 ; 0.9614 ] 0.8152 ** [ 0.0766 ; 1.5537 ] 0.4528 [ -0.3005 ; 1.2061 ]
C1workR -0.1091 [ -1.0305 ; 0.8123 ] -0.1032 [ -0.9129 ; 0.7066 ] 0.0100 [ -0.8272 ; 0.8473 ]
C1male 0.1481 [ -0.2456 ; 0.5418 ] 0.2196 [ -0.0955 ; 0.5347 ] 0.1123 [ -0.2116 ; 0.4361 ]
C2startwork5to9R -0.9397 * [ -1.8887 ; 0.0094 ] -1.3714 ** [ -2.1503 ; -0.5926 ] -0.4400 [ -1.2298 ; 0.3497 ]
C2startwork10to17R -0.6412 [ -1.5167 ; 0.2343 ] -1.0315 ** [ -1.7691 ; -0.2939 ] -0.3861 [ -1.1354 ; 0.3633 ]
C2schooling1to3R 0.3171 [ -0.0994 ; 0.7336 ] 0.5184 ** [ 0.1967 ; 0.8401 ] 0.4835 ** [ 0.1581 ; 0.8089 ]
C2schooling4to7R 0.2482 [ -0.1640 ; 0.6604 ] 0.6586 ** [ 0.3417 ; 0.9754 ] 0.4776 ** [ 0.1554 ; 0.7997 ]
C2schooling8to10R 0.5258 [ -0.1657 ; 1.2174 ] 0.9125 ** [ 0.3441 ; 1.4808 ] 0.6273 ** [ 0.0484 ; 1.2061 ]
C2schooling11moreR 1.0009 ** [ 0.0081 ; 1.9938 ] 1.6526 ** [ 0.7841 ; 2.5210 ] 1.2366 ** [ 0.3587 ; 2.1144 ]
C2workR -0.2653 [ -1.1516 ; 0.6210 ] 0.4017 [ -0.3532 ; 1.1565 ] 0.7812 ** [ 0.0121 ; 1.5504 ]
C1startwo5to9M -1.4068 ** [ -2.6900 ; -0.1236 ] -1.8062 ** [ -2.8814 ; -0.7310 ] -0.8493 [ -1.9463 ; 0.2477 ]
C1startwork10to17M -0.5534 [ -1.7330 ; 0.6263 ] -1.3251 ** [ -2.3504 ; -0.2997 ] -0.7466 [ -1.7930 ; 0.2998 ]
C1schooling1to3M 0.0665 [ -0.5471 ; 0.6801 ] 0.3870 [ -0.1109 ; 0.8850 ] 0.4763 * [ -0.0389 ; 0.9916 ]
C1schooling4to7M -0.0154 [ -0.5328 ; 0.5020 ] 0.3504 * [ -0.0700 ; 0.7708 ] 0.1719 [ -0.2687 ; 0.6125 ]
C1schooling8to10M -0.5299 [ -1.4082 ; 0.3484 ] 0.8213 ** [ 0.1665 ; 1.4762 ] 0.6759 ** [ -0.0021 ; 1.3538 ]
C1schooling11moreM 1.1011 ** [ -0.0726 ; 2.2748 ] 2.1125 ** [ 1.0589 ; 3.1660 ] 1.7605 ** [ 0.6921 ; 2.8289 ]
C1workM 0.2559 [ -0.9638 ; 1.4756 ] 0.9619 * [ -0.0979 ; 2.0216 ] 1.2394 ** [ 0.1509 ; 2.3279 ]
totalworkincpercapita -0.0014 [ -0.0035 ; 0.0007 ] 0.0009 [ -0.0008 ; 0.0025 ] 0.0009 [ -0.0008 ; 0.0026 ]
_cons 0.6478 [ -0.7187 ; 2.0143 ] 2.8683 ** [ 1.7491 ; 3.9875 ] 1.2492 ** [ 0.0934 ; 2.4049 ]
Number of obs  26992
Log likelihood -14208.42
LR chi2(153)   5940.99
Prob > chi2     0.00
Pseudo R-squared 0.1729
Source: PNAD 2006, own calculations
*Statistically significant at 10%;  **Statistically significant at 5%
[  ] 95% Confidence Interval
Table A.9 - Multinomial logit model 2
Option 1: 'Not studying, not working' Option 2: 'Only studying' Option 4: 'Studying and working'
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dy/dx  [95% Conf.Interval] dy/dx  [95% Conf.Interval] dy/dx  [95% Conf.Interval] dy/dx  [95% Conf.Interval]
1.BF -0.0166 ** [ -0.0207 ; -0.0124 ] 0.0034 [ -0.0063 ; 0.0132 ] -0.0060 ** [ -0.0095 ; -0.0025 ] 0.0191 ** [ 0.0100 ; 0.0282 ]
age10to11 -0.0079 ** [ -0.0132 ; -0.0027 ] 0.0910 ** [ 0.0790 ; 0.1031 ] -0.0212 ** [ -0.0291 ; -0.0133 ] -0.0619 ** [ -0.0730 ; -0.0508 ]
age14to15 0.0166 ** [ 0.0124 ; 0.0209 ] -0.1331 ** [ -0.1428 ; -0.1235 ] 0.0271 ** [ 0.0227 ; 0.0315 ] 0.0894 ** [ 0.0803 ; 0.0985 ]
nonwhite 0.0033 [ -0.0011 ; 0.0078 ] -0.0027 [ -0.0128 ; 0.0075 ] -0.0014 [ -0.0050 ; 0.0022 ] 0.0007 [ -0.0087 ; 0.0101 ]
male -0.0001 [ -0.0037 ; 0.0035 ] -0.0831 ** [ -0.0917 ; -0.0744 ] 0.0136 ** [ 0.0102 ; 0.0170 ] 0.0696 ** [ 0.0615 ; 0.0777 ]
sibling0 0.0073 ** [ 0.0020 ; 0.0126 ] 0.0060 [ -0.0066 ; 0.0186 ] 0.0025 [ -0.0019 ; 0.0070 ] -0.0158 ** [ -0.0277 ; -0.0040 ]
sibling2to3 0.0011 [ -0.0038 ; 0.0059 ] -0.0062 [ -0.0175 ; 0.0051 ] -0.0019 [ -0.0060 ; 0.0023 ] 0.0070 [ -0.0034 ; 0.0175 ]
sibling4to5 -0.0001 [ -0.0078 ; 0.0075 ] -0.0259 ** [ -0.0447 ; -0.0071 ] -0.0010 [ -0.0071 ; 0.0051 ] 0.0270 ** [ 0.0098 ; 0.0443 ]
sibling6ormore -0.0056 [ -0.0243 ; 0.0132 ] 0.0124 [ -0.0321 ; 0.0570 ] -0.0105 [ -0.0243 ; 0.0032 ] 0.0037 [ -0.0359 ; 0.0432 ]
person2 0.0147 ** [ 0.0099 ; 0.0196 ] -0.0031 [ -0.0138 ; 0.0077 ] 0.0051 ** [ 0.0012 ; 0.0091 ] -0.0168 ** [ -0.0268 ; -0.0069 ]
person3 0.0265 ** [ 0.0193 ; 0.0338 ] -0.0291 ** [ -0.0483 ; -0.0099 ] 0.0163 ** [ 0.0103 ; 0.0223 ] -0.0137 [ -0.0318 ; 0.0043 ]
person4 0.0280 ** [ 0.0169 ; 0.0392 ] -0.0376 ** [ -0.0708 ; -0.0044 ] 0.0178 ** [ 0.0086 ; 0.0270 ] -0.0083 [ -0.0396 ; 0.0230 ]
personmore4 0.0237 ** [ 0.0104 ; 0.0370 ] -0.0081 [ -0.0484 ; 0.0323 ] 0.0197 ** [ 0.0094 ; 0.0301 ] -0.0354 * [ -0.0740 ; 0.0033 ]
HHcond1 -0.0246 ** [ -0.0358 ; -0.0133 ] 0.0606 ** [ 0.0224 ; 0.0989 ] -0.0127 ** [ -0.0237 ; -0.0017 ] -0.0234 [ -0.0598 ; 0.0130 ]
HHcond2 -0.0217 ** [ -0.0387 ; -0.0046 ] 0.0323 [ -0.0151 ; 0.0798 ] -0.0118 [ -0.0277 ; 0.0041 ] 0.0011 [ -0.0437 ; 0.0459 ]
HHcond3 -0.0129 ** [ -0.0249 ; -0.0009 ] 0.0494 ** [ 0.0089 ; 0.0898 ] -0.0049 [ -0.0166 ; 0.0069 ] -0.0316 [ -0.0703 ; 0.0071 ]
HHcond4 -0.0121 * [ -0.0261 ; 0.0019 ] 0.0851 ** [ 0.0416 ; 0.1286 ] -0.0055 [ -0.0179 ; 0.0069 ] -0.0675 ** [ -0.1087 ; -0.0264 ]
HHcond5 -0.0241 ** [ -0.0369 ; -0.0113 ] 0.0536 ** [ 0.0130 ; 0.0943 ] -0.0136 ** [ -0.0257 ; -0.0015 ] -0.0159 [ -0.0545 ; 0.0226 ]
electricity 0.0090 * [ -0.0002 ; 0.0182 ] 0.0361 ** [ 0.0152 ; 0.0571 ] -0.0051 * [ -0.0110 ; 0.0007 ] -0.0400 ** [ -0.0585 ; -0.0215 ]
phone -0.0015 [ -0.0058 ; 0.0027 ] 0.0260 ** [ 0.0157 ; 0.0362 ] -0.0059 ** [ -0.0096 ; -0.0022 ] -0.0186 ** [ -0.0282 ; -0.0089 ]
tv -0.0124 ** [ -0.0183 ; -0.0065 ] 0.0549 ** [ 0.0393 ; 0.0704 ] -0.0104 ** [ -0.0150 ; -0.0057 ] -0.0321 ** [ -0.0466 ; -0.0177 ]
rural -0.0029 [ -0.0081 ; 0.0023 ] -0.0868 ** [ -0.0979 ; -0.0756 ] 0.0028 [ -0.0012 ; 0.0068 ] 0.0869 ** [ 0.0768 ; 0.0969 ]
NO 0.0061 [ -0.0020 ; 0.0142 ] 0.0345 ** [ 0.0159 ; 0.0531 ] -0.0073 ** [ -0.0140 ; -0.0006 ] -0.0334 ** [ -0.0506 ; -0.0161 ]
NE 0.0025 [ -0.0050 ; 0.0101 ] 0.0108 [ -0.0055 ; 0.0271 ] -0.0060 ** [ -0.0119 ; -0.0001 ] -0.0073 [ -0.0223 ; 0.0076 ]
SE 0.0028 [ -0.0050 ; 0.0106 ] 0.0283 ** [ 0.0113 ; 0.0453 ] 0.0004 [ -0.0056 ; 0.0063 ] -0.0315 ** [ -0.0473 ; -0.0157 ]
CE -0.0068 [ -0.0165 ; 0.0029 ] 0.0403 ** [ 0.0197 ; 0.0610 ] -0.0029 [ -0.0102 ; 0.0044 ] -0.0306 ** [ -0.0497 ; -0.0114 ]
HHwithC1C2 0.0142 ** [ 0.0018 ; 0.0266 ] 0.0515 ** [ 0.0118 ; 0.0911 ] 0.0015 [ -0.0113 ; 0.0143 ] -0.0671 ** [ -0.1063 ; -0.0280 ]
C2notHH 0.0117 * [ -0.0002 ; 0.0237 ] 0.0029 [ -0.0368 ; 0.0427 ] 0.0076 [ -0.0043 ; 0.0195 ] -0.0223 [ -0.0617 ; 0.0172 ]
C1startwork5to9R -0.0031 [ -0.0134 ; 0.0073 ] -0.0962 ** [ -0.1235 ; -0.0689 ] 0.0042 [ -0.0076 ; 0.0159 ] 0.0951 ** [ 0.0689 ; 0.1214 ]
C1startwork10to17R -0.0064 [ -0.0158 ; 0.0030 ] -0.0433 ** [ -0.0691 ; -0.0174 ] 0.0048 [ -0.0065 ; 0.0161 ] 0.0449 ** [ 0.0198 ; 0.0700 ]
C1schooling1to3R -0.0038 [ -0.0102 ; 0.0026 ] 0.0008 [ -0.0138 ; 0.0154 ] -0.0010 [ -0.0060 ; 0.0041 ] 0.0039 [ -0.0094 ; 0.0173 ]
C1schooling4to7R -0.0113 ** [ -0.0178 ; -0.0048 ] 0.0287 ** [ 0.0141 ; 0.0433 ] -0.0044 * [ -0.0097 ; 0.0008 ] -0.0129 * [ -0.0263 ; 0.0005 ]
C1schooling8to10R -0.0209 ** [ -0.0321 ; -0.0098 ] 0.0699 ** [ 0.0467 ; 0.0932 ] -0.0246 ** [ -0.0385 ; -0.0106 ] -0.0244 ** [ -0.0454 ; -0.0035 ]
C1schooling11moreR -0.0146 ** [ -0.0261 ; -0.0032 ] 0.0584 ** [ 0.0330 ; 0.0838 ] -0.0105 * [ -0.0225 ; 0.0014 ] -0.0332 ** [ -0.0570 ; -0.0095 ]
C1workR -0.0007 [ -0.0118 ; 0.0103 ] -0.0126 [ -0.0447 ; 0.0196 ] 0.0011 [ -0.0121 ; 0.0142 ] 0.0122 [ -0.0192 ; 0.0437 ]
C1male -0.0010 [ -0.0069 ; 0.0049 ] 0.0145 ** [ -0.0002 ; 0.0292 ] -0.0029 [ -0.0080 ; 0.0022 ] -0.0106 [ -0.0244 ; 0.0033 ]
C2startwork5to9R 0.0047 [ -0.0084 ; 0.0178 ] -0.1170 ** [ -0.1432 ; -0.0909 ] 0.0167 ** [ 0.0040 ; 0.0293 ] 0.0957 ** [ 0.0721 ; 0.1193 ]
C2startwork10to17R 0.0053 [ -0.0061 ; 0.0167 ] -0.0835 ** [ -0.1070 ; -0.0600 ] 0.0128 ** [ 0.0008 ; 0.0248 ] 0.0654 ** [ 0.0439 ; 0.0870 ]
C2schooling1to3R -0.0040 [ -0.0106 ; 0.0025 ] 0.0123 [ -0.0032 ; 0.0277 ] -0.0080 ** [ -0.0132 ; -0.0029 ] -0.0002 [ -0.0143 ; 0.0139 ]
C2schooling4to7R -0.0081 ** [ -0.0147 ; -0.0016 ] 0.0324 ** [ 0.0175 ; 0.0473 ] -0.0093 ** [ -0.0144 ; -0.0042 ] -0.0150 ** [ -0.0287 ; -0.0013 ]
C2schooling8to10R -0.0069 [ -0.0165 ; 0.0027 ] 0.0452 ** [ 0.0236 ; 0.0668 ] -0.0129 ** [ -0.0221 ; -0.0036 ] -0.0254 ** [ -0.0455 ; -0.0054 ]
C2schooling11moreR -0.0118 ** [ -0.0234 ; -0.0002 ] 0.0706 ** [ 0.0461 ; 0.0952 ] -0.0239 ** [ -0.0381 ; -0.0097 ] -0.0349 ** [ -0.0572 ; -0.0127 ]
C2workR -0.0168 ** [ -0.0281 ; -0.0054 ] -0.0232 * [ -0.0480 ; 0.0016 ] -0.0080 [ -0.0203 ; 0.0042 ] 0.0480 ** [ 0.0249 ; 0.0711 ]
C1startwo5to9M 0.0034 [ -0.0136 ; 0.0205 ] -0.1233 ** [ -0.1606 ; -0.0861 ] 0.0236 ** [ 0.0061 ; 0.0411 ] 0.0963 ** [ 0.0618 ; 0.1307 ]
C1startwork10to17M 0.0142 ** [ 0.0000 ; 0.0284 ] -0.0863 ** [ -0.1186 ; -0.0541 ] 0.0176 ** [ 0.0009 ; 0.0343 ] 0.0546 ** [ 0.0243 ; 0.0849 ]
C1schooling1to3M -0.0075 [ -0.0167 ; 0.0018 ] 0.0003 [ -0.0262 ; 0.0268 ] -0.0065 [ -0.0145 ; 0.0015 ] 0.0136 [ -0.0116 ; 0.0388 ]
C1schooling4to7M -0.0074 * [ -0.0152 ; 0.0004 ] 0.0284 ** [ 0.0046 ; 0.0521 ] -0.0044 [ -0.0111 ; 0.0024 ] -0.0166 [ -0.0396 ; 0.0063 ]
C1schooling8to10M -0.0300 ** [ -0.0443 ; -0.0156 ] 0.0472 ** [ 0.0163 ; 0.0781 ] -0.0113 ** [ -0.0219 ; -0.0007 ] -0.0060 [ -0.0349 ; 0.0229 ]
C1schooling11moreM -0.0200 ** [ -0.0328 ; -0.0072 ] 0.0750 ** [ 0.0430 ; 0.1069 ] -0.0314 ** [ -0.0486 ; -0.0142 ] -0.0236 [ -0.0533 ; 0.0061 ]
C1workM -0.0167 ** [ -0.0315 ; -0.0019 ] -0.0066 [ -0.0432 ; 0.0301 ] -0.0165 * [ -0.0337 ; 0.0007 ] 0.0397 ** [ 0.0046 ; 0.0749 ]
totalworkincpercapita -0.0001 ** [ -0.0001 ; 0.0000 ] 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ; 0.0001 ] 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ; 0.0000 ] 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ; 0.0001 ]
Source: PNAD 2006, own calculations
Table A.10 - Marginal effects for occupational choices
*Statistically significant at 10%;  **Statistically significant at 5%
[  ] 95% Confidence Interval
Option 2: 'Only studying'Option 1: Not studying, not working' Option 4: 'Studying and working'Option 3:'Only working'
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IV. Propensity Score Matching 
 
 
BF Coef.
age10to11   -0.0269 [ -0.0655 ; 0.0117 ]
age14to15  -0.0512 ** [ -0.0916 ; -0.0107 ]
nonwhite  0.0425 ** [ 0.0056 ; 0.0793 ]
male  -0.0153 [ -0.0477 ; 0.0171 ]
sibling0   -0.2344 ** [ -0.2792 ; -0.1897 ]
sibling2to3  0.1184 ** [ 0.0774 ; 0.1595 ]
sibling4to5   0.2275 ** [ 0.1488 ; 0.3061 ]
sibling6ormore   0.1342 [ -0.0597 ; 0.3281 ]
ocup  0.1026 ** [ 0.0536 ; 0.1516 ]
person2 0.0608 ** [ 0.0221 ; 0.0994 ]
person3 -0.0066 [ -0.0816 ; 0.0684 ]
person4 0.0084 [ -0.1241 ; 0.1408 ]
personmo -0.0243 [ -0.1775 ; 0.1289 ]
HHcond1 -0.0183 [ -0.1683 ; 0.1318 ]
HHcond2 -0.0910 [ -0.2721 ; 0.0901 ]
HHcond3 -0.1477 * [ -0.3046 ; 0.0091 ]
HHcond4 -0.2513 ** [ -0.4241 ; -0.0785 ]
HHcond5 -0.0269 [ -0.1857 ; 0.1320 ]
electric 0.0943 ** [ -0.0007 ; 0.1894 ]
phone -0.1455 ** [ -0.1832 ; -0.1077 ]
tv    0.1280 ** [ 0.0610 ; 0.1951 ]
rural 0.1403 ** [ 0.0936 ; 0.1869 ]
NO   -0.0339 [ -0.1023 ; 0.0345 ]
NE   0.4057 ** [ 0.3455 ; 0.4659 ]
SE   0.0535 * [ -0.0087 ; 0.1157 ]
CE   -0.2184 ** [ -0.2928 ; -0.1440 ]
HHwithC1C2 0.0673 [ -0.0455 ; 0.1801 ]
C1singlemother 0.0909 * [ -0.0080 ; 0.1899 ]
C1schooling1to3R -0.0281 [ -0.0887 ; 0.0326 ]
C1schooling4to7R -0.0976 ** [ -0.1547 ; -0.0404 ]
C1schooling8to10R -0.1840 ** [ -0.2591 ; -0.1090 ]
C1schooling11moreR -0.3844 ** [ -0.4677 ; -0.3011 ]
C1workR 0.1881 ** [ 0.1182 ; 0.2580 ]
C1male -0.0602 * [ -0.1218 ; 0.0015 ]
C1schooling1to3M -0.0187 [ -0.1200 ; 0.0825 ]
C1schooling4to7M 0.0060 [ -0.0816 ; 0.0937 ]
C1schooling8to10M -0.2146 ** [ -0.3254 ; -0.1039 ]
C1schooling11moreM -0.1867 ** [ -0.2968 ; -0.0766 ]
C1workM 0.0218 [ -0.0491 ; 0.0927 ]
C2schooling1to3R 0.0515 [ -0.0128 ; 0.1157 ]
C2schooling4to7R -0.0742 ** [ -0.1339 ; -0.0145 ]
C2schooling8to10R -0.2360 ** [ -0.3126 ; -0.1594 ]
C2schooling11moreR -0.3045 ** [ -0.3858 ; -0.2232 ]
C2workR 0.1989 ** [ 0.1575 ; 0.2403 ]
totalworkincpercapita -0.0042 ** [ -0.0044 ; -0.0039 ]
_cons 0.0866 [ -0.1242 ; 0.2973 ]
Number of obs
Log likelihood
 Pseudo R2       
Source: PNAD 2006, own calculations
0.1584
Table A.11 - Probit model (PSM for Bolsa Familia)
*Statistically significant at 10%;  **Statistically significant at 5%
[  ] 95% Confidence Interval
26992
-15745.32
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age10to11 Unmatched 0.354 0.353 0.4 0.29 0.773 0.354 0.353 0.4 0.29 0.773 0.354 0.353 0.4 0.29 0.773
Matched 0.355 0.351 0.7 -92.1 0.55 0.582 0.355 0.352 0.5 -47.4 0.42 0.673 0.355 0.357 -0.5 -40.2 -0.4 0.688
age14to15 Unmatched 0.298 0.309 -2.4 -1.96 0.051 0.298 0.309 -2.4 -1.96 0.051 0.298 0.309 -2.4 -1.96 0.051
Matched 0.298 0.291 1.6 34.4 1.29 0.198 0.298 0.288 2.3 2.2 1.92 0.055 0.298 0.289 2.1 10.6 1.76 0.079
nonwhite Unmatched 0.726 0.635 19.5 16.04 0 0.726 0.635 19.5 16.04 0 0.726 0.635 19.5 16.04 0
Matched 0.726 0.733 -1.6 92 -1.34 0.182 0.726 0.733 -1.6 91.6 -1.4 0.162 0.726 0.737 -2.4 87.6 -2.07 0.038
male Unmatched 0.512 0.512 0.1 0.06 0.954 0.512 0.512 0.1 0.06 0.954 0.512 0.512 0.1 0.06 0.954
Matched 0.512 0.510 0.4 -413.7 0.29 0.769 0.512 0.515 -0.6 -756.1 -0.49 0.624 0.512 0.517 -0.9 -1247.9 -0.77 0.441
sibling0 Unmatched 0.151 0.324 -41.7 -34.21 0 0.151 0.324 -41.7 -34.21 0 0.151 0.324 -41.7 -34.21 0
Matched 0.151 0.150 0.1 99.8 0.07 0.945 0.151 0.149 0.4 99.2 0.33 0.738 0.151 0.152 -0.3 99.3 -0.29 0.772
sibling2to3 Unmatched 0.413 0.257 33.6 27.63 0 0.413 0.257 33.6 27.63 0 0.413 0.257 33.6 27.63 0
Matched 0.414 0.426 -2.5 92.4 -1.96 0.05 0.414 0.425 -2.3 93.3 -1.74 0.083 0.414 0.419 -1.1 96.6 -0.89 0.376
sibling4to5 Unmatched 0.092 0.033 24.5 20.14 0 0.092 0.033 24.5 20.14 0 0.092 0.033 24.5 20.14 0
Matched 0.090 0.083 2.8 88.5 1.96 0.05 0.090 0.083 3 87.6 2.11 0.035 0.090 0.087 1.5 94.1 1 0.316
sibling6ormore Unmatched 0.012 0.004 8.7 7.2 0 0.012 0.004 8.7 7.2 0 0.012 0.004 8.7 7.2 0
Matched 0.012 0.012 0.1 99 0.06 0.955 0.012 0.013 -1.6 81.5 -1.05 0.293 0.012 0.013 -1.8 79.2 -1.18 0.238
ocup Unmatched 0.196 0.116 22 18.11 0 0.196 0.116 22 18.11 0 0.196 0.116 22 18.11 0
Matched 0.195 0.193 0.4 98.2 0.29 0.769 0.195 0.195 -0.1 99.5 -0.08 0.932 0.195 0.196 -0.4 98.1 -0.31 0.755
person2 Unmatched 0.504 0.369 27.6 22.69 0 0.504 0.369 27.6 22.69 0 0.504 0.369 27.6 22.69 0
Matched 0.504 0.512 -1.6 94.2 -1.3 0.195 0.504 0.503 0.2 99.3 0.16 0.874 0.504 0.505 -0.1 99.5 -0.11 0.916
person3 Unmatched 0.083 0.045 15.4 12.66 0 0.083 0.045 15.4 12.66 0 0.083 0.045 15.4 12.66 0
Matched 0.082 0.085 -0.8 94.6 -0.6 0.55 0.082 0.086 -1.6 89.8 -1.12 0.262 0.082 0.092 -3.8 75.6 -2.66 0.008
person4 Unmatched 0.022 0.011 8.3 6.83 0 0.022 0.011 8.3 6.83 0 0.022 0.011 8.3 6.83 0
Matched 0.022 0.022 -0.1 99.3 -0.04 0.967 0.022 0.022 -0.4 94.7 -0.31 0.755 0.022 0.024 -1.4 82.6 -1.01 0.312
personmore4 Unmatched 0.015 0.008 5.9 4.85 0 0.015 0.008 5.9 4.85 0 0.015 0.008 5.9 4.85 0
Matched 0.015 0.019 -3.9 33.1 -2.67 0.007 0.015 0.019 -3.9 33.7 -2.65 0.008 0.015 0.017 -2.6 56.3 -1.79 0.074
HHcond1 Unmatched 0.759 0.699 13.7 11.21 0 0.759 0.699 13.7 11.21 0 0.759 0.699 13.7 11.21 0
Matched 0.759 0.747 2.6 80.7 2.21 0.027 0.759 0.747 2.7 80.5 2.24 0.025 0.759 0.750 2.1 84.8 1.75 0.08
HHcond2 Unmatched 0.018 0.033 -9.8 -8.02 0 0.018 0.033 -9.8 -8.02 0 0.018 0.033 -9.8 -8.02 0
Matched 0.018 0.019 -0.6 94.1 -0.55 0.583 0.018 0.021 -2.1 78.3 -1.97 0.048 0.018 0.019 -1.1 88.6 -1.05 0.292
HHcond3 Unmatched 0.089 0.138 -15.7 -12.89 0 0.089 0.138 -15.7 -12.89 0 0.089 0.138 -15.7 -12.89 0
Matched 0.089 0.091 -0.6 96.2 -0.54 0.592 0.089 0.093 -1.4 90.9 -1.29 0.198 0.089 0.092 -1.2 92.6 -1.04 0.298
HHcond4 Unmatched 0.036 0.037 -0.9 -0.74 0.461 0.036 0.037 -0.9 -0.74 0.461 0.036 0.037 -0.9 -0.74 0.461
Matched 0.036 0.039 -1.6 -73.6 -1.26 0.207 0.036 0.036 0 95.5 0.03 0.974 0.036 0.036 -0.2 76.1 -0.18 0.86
HHcond5 Unmatched 0.087 0.082 1.8 1.45 0.147 0.087 0.082 1.8 1.45 0.147 0.087 0.082 1.8 1.45 0.147
Matched 0.087 0.092 -1.6 7.1 -1.31 0.191 0.087 0.090 -1.1 39.1 -0.86 0.389 0.087 0.090 -1 44.8 -0.78 0.436
electricity Unmatched 0.930 0.967 -16.7 -13.71 0 0.930 0.967 -16.7 -13.71 0 0.930 0.967 -16.7 -13.71 0
Matched 0.930 0.923 3.3 80.4 2.25 0.025 0.930 0.929 0.6 96.1 0.45 0.65 0.930 0.927 1.5 90.8 1.07 0.286
phone Unmatched 0.485 0.702 -45.4 -37.32 0 0.485 0.702 -45.4 -37.32 0 0.485 0.702 -45.4 -37.32 0
Matched 0.486 0.477 1.8 96.1 1.37 0.17 0.486 0.484 0.4 99.1 0.33 0.741 0.486 0.484 0.4 99.1 0.32 0.751
tv Unmatched 0.867 0.921 -17.6 -14.46 0 0.867 0.921 -17.6 -14.46 0 0.867 0.921 -17.6 -14.46 0
Matched 0.866 0.863 1.2 93.4 0.86 0.391 0.866 0.864 0.8 95.7 0.56 0.579 0.866 0.862 1.5 91.4 1.11 0.268
rural Unmatched 0.320 0.174 34.3 28.23 0 0.320 0.174 34.3 28.23 0 0.320 0.174 34.3 28.23 0
Matched 0.319 0.316 0.6 98.2 0.46 0.646 0.319 0.316 0.7 98 0.51 0.613 0.319 0.314 1 97 0.78 0.434
NO Unmatched 0.150 0.174 -6.5 -5.34 0 0.150 0.174 -6.5 -5.34 0 0.150 0.174 -6.5 -5.34 0
Matched 0.150 0.153 -0.8 88.1 -0.65 0.517 0.150 0.154 -1 84.4 -0.85 0.395 0.150 0.160 -2.5 61 -2.11 0.035
NE Unmatched 0.539 0.302 49.5 40.67 0 0.539 0.302 49.5 40.67 0 0.539 0.302 49.5 40.67 0
Matched 0.538 0.531 1.5 97 1.15 0.249 0.538 0.535 0.6 98.7 0.49 0.624 0.538 0.536 0.4 99.3 0.28 0.78
SE Unmatched 0.174 0.262 -21.6 -17.71 0 0.174 0.262 -21.6 -17.71 0 0.174 0.262 -21.6 -17.71 0
Matched 0.174 0.173 0.3 98.7 0.24 0.808 0.174 0.171 0.8 96.5 0.68 0.496 0.174 0.165 2.1 90.3 1.87 0.062
CE Unmatched 0.060 0.131 -24.3 -19.93 0 0.060 0.131 -24.3 -19.93 0 0.060 0.131 -24.3 -19.93 0
Matched 0.060 0.069 -3.2 87 -3.06 0.002 0.060 0.067 -2.5 89.9 -2.4 0.016 0.060 0.066 -1.8 92.6 -1.77 0.076
HHwithC1C2 Unmatched 0.759 0.684 16.7 13.7 0 0.759 0.684 16.7 13.7 0 0.759 0.684 16.7 13.7 0
Matched 0.758 0.751 1.6 90.5 1.35 0.177 0.758 0.750 1.9 88.6 1.62 0.105 0.758 0.755 0.8 95.2 0.68 0.499
C1singlemother Unmatched 0.201 0.258 -13.5 -11.07 0 0.201 0.258 -13.5 -11.07 0 0.092 0.086 2.1 1.76 0.079
Matched 0.202 0.209 -1.7 87 -1.48 0.138 0.202 0.209 -1.7 87.2 -1.47 0.142 0.092 0.097 -1.8 16.9 -1.41 0.157
C1schooling1to3R Unmatched 0.181 0.117 18 14.79 0 0.181 0.117 18 14.79 0 0.181 0.117 18 14.79 0
Matched 0.181 0.180 0.2 98.8 0.16 0.874 0.181 0.174 2 88.8 1.53 0.126 0.181 0.176 1.4 92.3 1.05 0.293
C1schoolig4to7R Unmatched 0.244 0.251 -1.6 -1.3 0.192 0.244 0.251 -1.6 -1.3 0.192 0.244 0.251 -1.6 -1.3 0.192
Matched 0.245 0.245 0 98.9 0.01 0.989 0.245 0.242 0.7 56.9 0.56 0.573 0.245 0.242 0.6 64.5 0.46 0.643
C1schooling8to10R Unmatched 0.068 0.103 -12.4 -10.2 0 0.068 0.103 -12.4 -10.2 0 0.068 0.103 -12.4 -10.2 0
Matched 0.068 0.065 1.2 90.3 1.11 0.269 0.068 0.065 1.3 89.8 1.16 0.248 0.068 0.067 0.3 97.8 0.24 0.807
C1schooli11ormoreR Unmatched 0.042 0.105 -24.4 -19.97 0 0.042 0.105 -24.4 -19.97 0 0.042 0.105 -24.4 -19.97 0
Matched 0.042 0.036 2.1 91.2 2.34 0.019 0.042 0.040 0.5 97.8 0.57 0.569 0.042 0.040 0.6 97.7 0.61 0.543
C1workR Unmatched 0.698 0.617 17.1 14 0 0.698 0.617 17.1 14 0 0.698 0.617 17.1 14 0
Matched 0.698 0.681 3.4 80.1 2.83 0.005 0.698 0.688 1.9 88.6 1.63 0.103 0.698 0.691 1.4 91.5 1.21 0.226
C1male Unmatched 0.707 0.656 10.9 8.91 0 0.707 0.656 10.9 8.91 0 0.707 0.656 10.9 8.91 0
Matched 0.706 0.694 2.6 76.1 2.15 0.032 0.706 0.697 2 81.4 1.68 0.093 0.706 0.698 1.7 83.9 1.45 0.146
C1schooling1to3M Unmatched 0.040 0.043 -1.5 -1.22 0.224 0.040 0.043 -1.5 -1.22 0.224 0.040 0.043 -1.5 -1.22 0.224
Matched 0.040 0.043 -1.8 -24.9 -1.5 0.133 0.040 0.045 -2.7 -79.7 -2.14 0.032 0.040 0.044 -2.2 -51.2 -1.81 0.07
C1schooling4to7M Unmatched 0.078 0.090 -4.5 -3.73 0 0.078 0.090 -4.5 -3.73 0 0.078 0.090 -4.5 -3.73 0
Matched 0.078 0.085 -2.5 45.3 -2.06 0.039 0.078 0.082 -1.6 64.9 -1.33 0.183 0.078 0.078 -0.1 97 -0.12 0.908
C1schooling8to10M Unmatched 0.024 0.050 -13.7 -11.21 0 0.024 0.050 -13.7 -11.21 0 0.024 0.050 -13.7 -11.21 0
Matched 0.024 0.026 -1.2 91.3 -1.17 0.241 0.024 0.025 -0.4 97.4 -0.36 0.721 0.024 0.024 -0.2 98.6 -0.19 0.85
C1schooling11ormoreMUnmatched 0.025 0.060 -17.9 -14.64 0 0.025 0.060 -17.9 -14.64 0 0.025 0.060 -17.9 -14.64 0
Matched 0.025 0.022 1.5 91.7 1.63 0.104 0.025 0.023 0.9 94.9 0.99 0.325 0.025 0.024 0.5 97.5 0.49 0.627
C1workM Unmatched 0.161 0.218 -14.8 -12.12 0 0.161 0.218 -14.8 -12.12 0 0.161 0.218 -14.8 -12.12 0
Matched 0.161 0.173 -3.1 79.1 -2.64 0.008 0.161 0.173 -3 79.9 -2.54 0.011 0.161 0.166 -1.3 91.1 -1.14 0.256
C2schooling1to3R Unmatched 0.185 0.105 22.8 18.77 0 0.185 0.105 22.8 18.77 0 0.185 0.105 22.8 18.77 0
Matched 0.184 0.181 0.8 96.5 0.59 0.558 0.184 0.184 0.1 99.7 0.05 0.962 0.184 0.188 -1.1 95.2 -0.8 0.421
C2schooling4to7R Unmatched 0.276 0.262 3.1 2.53 0.011 0.276 0.262 3.1 2.53 0.011 0.276 0.262 3.1 2.53 0.011
Matched 0.276 0.267 2 34.8 1.64 0.102 0.276 0.266 2.2 28.2 1.8 0.071 0.276 0.269 1.7 44.2 1.4 0.162
C2schooling8to10R Unmatched 0.069 0.113 -15.3 -12.54 0 0.069 0.113 -15.3 -12.54 0 0.069 0.113 -15.3 -12.54 0
Matched 0.069 0.068 0.4 97.6 0.34 0.735 0.069 0.067 0.7 95.5 0.64 0.521 0.069 0.068 0.3 97.9 0.29 0.769
C2schooling11ormoreRUnmatched 0.054 0.114 -21.7 -17.8 0 0.054 0.114 -21.7 -17.8 0 0.054 0.114 -21.7 -17.8 0
Matched 0.054 0.052 0.9 95.9 0.9 0.368 0.054 0.053 0.6 97.4 0.56 0.578 0.054 0.053 0.6 97.3 0.59 0.553
C2workR Unmatched 0.523 0.421 20.5 16.86 0 0.523 0.421 20.5 16.86 0 0.523 0.421 20.5 16.86 0
Matched 0.522 0.523 -0.2 99 -0.16 0.873 0.522 0.517 1 95 0.84 0.402 0.522 0.519 0.7 96.5 0.58 0.56
totalworkincpercapita Unmatched 93.912 150.200 -77 -63.17 0 93.912 150.200 -77 -63.17 0 93.912 150.200 -77 -63.17 0
Matched 94.059 93.416 0.9 98.9 0.84 0.403 94.059 93.594 0.6 99.2 0.61 0.544 94.059 93.586 0.6 99.2 0.62 0.536
Source: PNAD 2006, own calculations
Nearest neighbour Radius (caliper = 0.01)
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Mean
%reduct 
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Table A.12 - Balancing test
86 
 
age10to11 Unmatched 0.354 0.353 0.4 0.29 0.773 0.354 0.353 0.4 0.29 0.773
Matched 0.355 0.351 0.7 -92.1 0.55 0.582 0.355 0.359 -0.9 -166.1 -0.76 0.447
age14to15 Unmatched 0.298 0.309 -2.4 -1.96 0.051 0.298 0.309 -2.4 -1.96 0.051
Matched 0.298 0.291 1.6 34.4 1.29 0.198 0.298 0.291 1.7 28.3 1.41 0.159
nonwhite Unmatched 0.726 0.635 19.5 16.04 0 0.726 0.635 19.5 16.04 0
Matched 0.726 0.733 -1.6 92 -1.34 0.182 0.726 0.734 -1.8 90.8 -1.54 0.124
male Unmatched 0.512 0.512 0.1 0.06 0.954 0.512 0.512 0.1 0.06 0.954
Matched 0.512 0.510 0.4 -413.7 0.29 0.769 0.512 0.517 -1 -1333.3 -0.82 0.412
sibling0 Unmatched 0.151 0.324 -41.7 -34.21 0 0.151 0.324 -41.7 -34.21 0
Matched 0.151 0.150 0.1 99.8 0.07 0.945 0.151 0.153 -0.6 98.6 -0.56 0.575
sibling2to3 Unmatched 0.413 0.257 33.6 27.63 0 0.413 0.257 33.6 27.63 0
Matched 0.414 0.426 -2.5 92.4 -1.96 0.05 0.414 0.416 -0.3 99 -0.27 0.789
sibling4to5 Unmatched 0.092 0.033 24.5 20.14 0 0.092 0.033 24.5 20.14 0
Matched 0.090 0.083 2.8 88.5 1.96 0.05 0.090 0.085 2 91.8 1.39 0.164
sibling6ormore Unmatched 0.012 0.004 8.7 7.2 0 0.012 0.004 8.7 7.2 0
Matched 0.012 0.012 0.1 99 0.06 0.955 0.012 0.013 -2.1 76.5 -1.33 0.185
ocup Unmatched 0.196 0.116 22 18.11 0 0.196 0.116 22 18.11 0
Matched 0.195 0.193 0.4 98.2 0.29 0.769 0.195 0.191 1.1 95 0.83 0.407
person2 Unmatched 0.504 0.369 27.6 22.69 0 0.504 0.369 27.6 22.69 0
Matched 0.504 0.512 -1.6 94.2 -1.3 0.195 0.504 0.500 0.8 97.1 0.64 0.522
person3 Unmatched 0.083 0.045 15.4 12.66 0 0.083 0.045 15.4 12.66 0
Matched 0.082 0.085 -0.8 94.6 -0.6 0.55 0.082 0.091 -3.6 76.8 -2.52 0.012
person4 Unmatched 0.022 0.011 8.3 6.83 0 0.022 0.011 8.3 6.83 0
Matched 0.022 0.022 -0.1 99.3 -0.04 0.967 0.022 0.024 -1.6 81.2 -1.09 0.275
personmore4 Unmatched 0.015 0.008 5.9 4.85 0 0.015 0.008 5.9 4.85 0
Matched 0.015 0.019 -3.9 33.1 -2.67 0.007 0.015 0.018 -3 48.3 -2.1 0.036
HHcond1 Unmatched 0.759 0.699 13.7 11.21 0 0.759 0.699 13.7 11.21 0
Matched 0.759 0.747 2.6 80.7 2.21 0.027 0.759 0.748 2.4 82.7 1.98 0.048
HHcond2 Unmatched 0.018 0.033 -9.8 -8.02 0 0.018 0.033 -9.8 -8.02 0
Matched 0.018 0.019 -0.6 94.1 -0.55 0.583 0.018 0.020 -1.3 86.5 -1.24 0.213
HHcond3 Unmatched 0.089 0.138 -15.7 -12.89 0 0.089 0.138 -15.7 -12.89 0
Matched 0.089 0.091 -0.6 96.2 -0.54 0.592 0.089 0.093 -1.5 90.5 -1.34 0.181
HHcond4 Unmatched 0.036 0.037 -0.9 -0.74 0.461 0.036 0.037 -0.9 -0.74 0.461
Matched 0.036 0.039 -1.6 -73.6 -1.26 0.207 0.036 0.036 -0.4 57.7 -0.31 0.755
HHcond5 Unmatched 0.087 0.082 1.8 1.45 0.147 0.087 0.082 1.8 1.45 0.147
Matched 0.087 0.092 -1.6 7.1 -1.31 0.191 0.087 0.089 -0.7 59.3 -0.58 0.564
electricity Unmatched 0.930 0.967 -16.7 -13.71 0 0.930 0.967 -16.7 -13.71 0
Matched 0.930 0.923 3.3 80.4 2.25 0.025 0.930 0.929 0.5 97.3 0.32 0.749
phone Unmatched 0.485 0.702 -45.4 -37.32 0 0.485 0.702 -45.4 -37.32 0
Matched 0.486 0.477 1.8 96.1 1.37 0.17 0.486 0.489 -0.6 98.7 -0.46 0.648
tv Unmatched 0.867 0.921 -17.6 -14.46 0 0.867 0.921 -17.6 -14.46 0
Matched 0.866 0.863 1.2 93.4 0.86 0.391 0.866 0.860 2 88.9 1.43 0.153
rural Unmatched 0.320 0.174 34.3 28.23 0 0.320 0.174 34.3 28.23 0
Matched 0.319 0.316 0.6 98.2 0.46 0.646 0.319 0.308 2.6 92.4 1.96 0.05
NO Unmatched 0.150 0.174 -6.5 -5.34 0 0.150 0.174 -6.5 -5.34 0
Matched 0.150 0.153 -0.8 88.1 -0.65 0.517 0.150 0.161 -2.9 56.1 -2.37 0.018
NE Unmatched 0.539 0.302 49.5 40.67 0 0.539 0.302 49.5 40.67 0
Matched 0.538 0.531 1.5 97 1.15 0.249 0.538 0.532 1.3 97.5 0.99 0.323
SE Unmatched 0.174 0.262 -21.6 -17.71 0 0.174 0.262 -21.6 -17.71 0
Matched 0.174 0.173 0.3 98.7 0.24 0.808 0.174 0.167 1.6 92.5 1.45 0.147
CE Unmatched 0.060 0.131 -24.3 -19.93 0 0.060 0.131 -24.3 -19.93 0
Matched 0.060 0.069 -3.2 87 -3.06 0.002 0.060 0.066 -2 91.6 -2.01 0.045
HHwithC1C2 Unmatched 0.759 0.684 16.7 13.7 0 0.759 0.684 16.7 13.7 0
Matched 0.758 0.751 1.6 90.5 1.35 0.177 0.758 0.752 1.4 91.7 1.17 0.242
C1singlemother Unmatched 0.201 0.258 -13.5 -11.07 0 0.092 0.086 2.1 1.76 0.079
Matched 0.202 0.209 -1.7 87 -1.48 0.138 0.092 0.098 -2 4.5 -1.62 0.105
C1schooling1to3R Unmatched 0.181 0.117 18 14.79 0 0.181 0.117 18 14.79 0
Matched 0.181 0.180 0.2 98.8 0.16 0.874 0.181 0.177 1.2 93.4 0.9 0.369
C1schoolig4to7R Unmatched 0.244 0.251 -1.6 -1.3 0.192 0.244 0.251 -1.6 -1.3 0.192
Matched 0.245 0.245 0 98.9 0.01 0.989 0.245 0.245 0 98.3 0.02 0.982
C1schooling8to10R Unmatched 0.068 0.103 -12.4 -10.2 0 0.068 0.103 -12.4 -10.2 0
Matched 0.068 0.065 1.2 90.3 1.11 0.269 0.068 0.068 0 100 0 1
C1schooli11ormoreR Unmatched 0.042 0.105 -24.4 -19.97 0 0.042 0.105 -24.4 -19.97 0
Matched 0.042 0.036 2.1 91.2 2.34 0.019 0.042 0.041 0.3 98.6 0.37 0.712
C1workR Unmatched 0.698 0.617 17.1 14 0 0.698 0.617 17.1 14 0
Matched 0.698 0.681 3.4 80.1 2.83 0.005 0.698 0.688 2.1 87.7 1.76 0.079
C1male Unmatched 0.707 0.656 10.9 8.91 0 0.707 0.656 10.9 8.91 0
Matched 0.706 0.694 2.6 76.1 2.15 0.032 0.706 0.695 2.4 77.9 1.99 0.047
C1schooling1to3M Unmatched 0.040 0.043 -1.5 -1.22 0.224 0.040 0.043 -1.5 -1.22 0.224
Matched 0.040 0.043 -1.8 -24.9 -1.5 0.133 0.040 0.045 -2.5 -70.5 -2.04 0.042
C1schooling4to7M Unmatched 0.078 0.090 -4.5 -3.73 0 0.078 0.090 -4.5 -3.73 0
Matched 0.078 0.085 -2.5 45.3 -2.06 0.039 0.078 0.079 -0.4 91.1 -0.34 0.733
C1schooling8to10M Unmatched 0.024 0.050 -13.7 -11.21 0 0.024 0.050 -13.7 -11.21 0
Matched 0.024 0.026 -1.2 91.3 -1.17 0.241 0.024 0.025 -0.3 97.9 -0.29 0.774
C1schooling11ormoreM Unmatched 0.025 0.060 -17.9 -14.64 0 0.025 0.060 -17.9 -14.64 0
Matched 0.025 0.022 1.5 91.7 1.63 0.104 0.025 0.024 0.4 98 0.39 0.697
C1workM Unmatched 0.161 0.218 -14.8 -12.12 0 0.161 0.218 -14.8 -12.12 0
Matched 0.161 0.173 -3.1 79.1 -2.64 0.008 0.161 0.168 -1.7 88.3 -1.49 0.137
C2schooling1to3R Unmatched 0.185 0.105 22.8 18.77 0 0.185 0.105 22.8 18.77 0
Matched 0.184 0.181 0.8 96.5 0.59 0.558 0.184 0.185 -0.3 98.9 -0.19 0.851
C2schooling4to7R Unmatched 0.276 0.262 3.1 2.53 0.011 0.276 0.262 3.1 2.53 0.011
Matched 0.276 0.267 2 34.8 1.64 0.102 0.276 0.271 1.1 64.2 0.9 0.37
C2schooling8to10R Unmatched 0.069 0.113 -15.3 -12.54 0 0.069 0.113 -15.3 -12.54 0
Matched 0.069 0.068 0.4 97.6 0.34 0.735 0.069 0.069 0.1 99.5 0.07 0.948
C2schooling11ormoreR Unmatched 0.054 0.114 -21.7 -17.8 0 0.054 0.114 -21.7 -17.8 0
Matched 0.054 0.052 0.9 95.9 0.9 0.368 0.054 0.053 0.4 98.3 0.37 0.714
C2workR Unmatched 0.523 0.421 20.5 16.86 0 0.523 0.421 20.5 16.86 0
Matched 0.522 0.523 -0.2 99 -0.16 0.873 0.522 0.515 1.6 92.3 1.29 0.196
totalworkincpercapita Unmatched 93.912 150.200 -77 -63.17 0 93.912 150.200 -77 -63.17 0
Matched 94.059 93.416 0.9 98.9 0.84 0.403 94.059 94.359 -0.4 99.5 -0.39 0.694
p>t
Source: PNAD 2006, own calculations
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